Introduction

• Classical Indian philosophy is rich in epistemology, logic, and metaphysics.
• However, discussions in ethics, politics, and aesthetics were not as extensive as expected.
• Ethics was not considered a distinct field within Indian philosophy like pramāṇavāda (epistemology and logic).
• Ethical discussions are scattered across various works and genres rather than concentrated in one field.
• Classical Indian ethics, though less developed than other branches, includes significant discussions on the theory of value.
• Indian philosophers extensively debated topics such as the ends of life and the relation of virtuous action to these ends.
• Major commonalities exist between orthodox Hindu philosophers and heterodox Buddhist and Jaina philosophers, though key differences are also present.
• The structure of classical Hindu ethics involves theories of the good and the right.
• Arguments for the primacy of the value of liberation are common to both orthodox and heterodox Indian value theorists.
• Buddhist and Jaina ethics have distinctive features that are important to consider.
• Normative presuppositions in Indian ethics underpin many technical debates in classical Indian epistemology and metaphysics.

The structure of value: the puruṣārthas

• Hindu ethical tradition is complex, and classical Hindu ethics primarily focuses on the theory of the good and the theory of the right.
• The theory of the good is articulated through the puruṣārthas, or ends of human life.
• Traditional Hindu classification identifies four puruṣārthas: dharma, artha, kāma, and mokṣa.
• The first three (dharma, artha, kāma) form the trivarga (‘group of three’), while the addition of mokṣa creates the caturvarga (‘group of four’).
• Artha refers to wealth and political power, kāma to sensual pleasure (particularly sexual and aesthetic experience), and dharma to the system of obligations and prohibitions outlined in religious and legal texts.
• The trivarga is hierarchically ordered, with artha as the lowest and dharma as the highest.
• Artha is considered an instrumental value, a means to an end, while kāma is recognized as an intrinsic value.
• The superiority of dharma over kāma is argued on the basis that only humans can pursue morality (dharma) consciously, unlike other animals, which only pursue wealth and pleasure.
• Pleasure is not always considered desirable, and dharma is viewed as the regulative principle determining which pleasures are truly valuable.
• The highest value in Hindu ethics is mokṣa, the state of complete liberation from the cycle of rebirth (saṃsāra).
• Mokṣa is the ultimate goal because all saṃsāric existence is believed to be marked by universal suffering (duḥkha).
• Mokṣa can be characterized as either absolute bliss (as in Vedānta) or the mere absence of all pain and suffering (as in Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika).
• The distinction between these characterizations may be less significant, as some schools view pleasure as the temporary absence of pain.
• Mokṣa differs from kāma in being hedonically unmixed and permanent once achieved.
• Some schools argue that mokṣa can be attained while still alive (jīvanmukti), while others believe it is only fully attained after physical death (videhamukti).
• Both schools agree that once a person attains a certain state in life, they will achieve mokṣa immediately after death without further actions.
• The relationship between mokṣa, knowledge, and action is extensively discussed in Indian philosophical texts (darśanas).
• There are separate classes of Sanskrit treatises devoted to dharma (religious and moral laws), artha (political and economic power), and kāma (sensual and aesthetic pleasure).
• Although all orthodox Hindu philosophers recognize the value of dharma, mokṣa is considered the highest value.
• The relationship between dharma and mokṣa is controversial. The oldest tradition (from Dharmaśāstra and the Epics) claims continuity between the two, where selfless performance of dharma leads to mokṣa.
• Another tradition (particularly associated with Śaṃkara and Vedāntins) emphasizes a sharp distinction between dharma and mokṣa, though dharma is still considered a prerequisite for moral development towards mokṣa.
• Ultimately, the supreme ideal of mokṣa is not easily separable from the lesser ideal of dharma.
• Hindu political philosophers acknowledged mokṣa as the ultimate end of human activity but viewed artha and dharma as legitimate worldly goals that, if properly pursued, lead to mokṣa.
• The Arthaśāstra (fourth century BCE) is a famous political treatise advocating monarchy over other forms of government.
• The king’s duty is to maintain order and stability so that people can promote their economic well-being and practice dharma.
• Order is upheld by the proper use of daṇḍa (‘the rod’), or the just use of force to punish breaches of the rules of dharma.
• The rules of dharma are outlined in the Dharmaśāstras, with the Manusmṛti being the best known.
• Dharma encompasses two sets of duties: universal duties (sādhāraṇadharma) for all, and personal duties (svadharma), specific to one’s caste and stage of life.
• Universal duties include non-injury (ahiṃsā), truthfulness, patience, and respect for others’ property.
• Personal duties (svadharma) are determined by one’s social class (varṇa) and stage in life (āśrama), with personal duties taking precedence in cases of conflict.
• The four social classes (varṇas) are: brāhmaṇa (priestly caste), kṣatriya (ruler and warrior caste), vaiśya (merchant caste), and śūdra (labourers).
• A person’s dharma is also shaped by their life stage (āśrama), which ideally progresses through four stages: student (brahmacarya), householder (gārhasthya), anchorite (vānaprastha), and renunciant (saṃnyāsa).
• Each stage allows for the realization of different puruṣārthas: the student studies dharma; the householder pursues artha and kāma in accordance with dharma; the anchorite seeks mokṣa while upholding dharma through daily sacrifices; and the renunciant is fully devoted to mokṣa.
• Sexual pleasure is explored in texts like the Kāmasūtra and other similar works.
• Aesthetic pleasure is a key focus in Indian aesthetic theory, with the central concept being rasa (‘flavour’), the special feeling or enjoyment pervading an artwork or aroused in its contemplator.
• The theory of rasa was discussed by numerous writers, including Abhinavagupta (eleventh century).
• Aesthetic enjoyment is often seen as detached from the concerns of ordinary life and is sometimes considered a foretaste of the bliss of mokṣa.

Dharma and mokṣa: moral and non-moral values

• All orthodox Hindu philosophers recognize the value of dharma, but the highest value is mokṣa.
• Dharma is closely aligned with the concept of morality, particularly in terms of obligatory and forbidden actions (nitya-karma and pratiṣiddha-karma).
• The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka school identifies dharma as the performance of obligatory actions for their own sake, without aiming for personal benefits like mokṣa.
• The Prābhākara position, emphasizing dharma as an end in itself, is a minority view in Hindu tradition.
• Most Hindu philosophers regard mokṣa as a non-moral value higher than dharma or morality.
• Debates exist about the relation between dharma and mokṣa, with some traditions seeing an essential continuity between the two, where selfless performance of dharma leads to mokṣa.
• Hindu political philosophers also affirm mokṣa as the ultimate goal but recognize artha and dharma as legitimate intermediate worldly goals that, if properly pursued, lead to mokṣa.
• The Arthaśāstra values artha as an instrumental value for enabling the performance of dharma and the enjoyment of kāma.
• Dharma is considered superior because it leads to heaven and eternal bliss and preserves the world from chaos and destruction.
• The king’s duty, as per the Arthaśāstra, is to maintain order and stability so people can pursue artha, dharma, and kāma and ensure their spiritual progression towards mokṣa.
• The proper use of daṇḍa (‘the rod’) ensures that society follows dharma and maintains order through just punishment of those who breach the rules of dharma.
• A person’s svadharma (personal duty) is determined by caste and stage of life, as outlined in the Dharmaśāstra.
• The practice of dharma is seen as leading naturally to mokṣa, particularly when viewed through the āśrama (life stage) schema.
• The exclusive pursuit of mokṣa comes at the end of life, after a lifetime of practicing dharma, which cultivates the necessary self-discipline and detachment for liberation.
• The Manusmṛti emphasizes that after fulfilling one’s duties, including study of the Vedas, producing progeny, and performing sacrifices, a person may seek mokṣa.
• If a person seeks mokṣa without fulfilling these obligations, they are considered to have failed in their quest for liberation.
• Dharma is seen as continuous with mokṣa in many Hindu traditions, but Śaṃkara, the great Advaitin philosopher of the eighth century, opposes this continuity.
• Śaṃkara’s Advaita Vedānta teaches that mokṣa is the realization of the identity of the Self (ātman) with the Absolute (Brahman), a state of non-duality.
• All action presupposes duality between self and other, so mokṣa, being a state of non-duality, precludes action, and thus opposes dharma with its concern for obligatory and forbidden actions.
• Śaṃkara argues that action is incompatible with knowledge of Brahman, as knowledge destroys the misconception of self and other that leads to action.
• For a seeker of final release, action should be renounced, as it is tied to ignorance and duality.
• Śaṃkara acknowledges the importance of dharma for those still living in the worldly life, as it cultivates moral development for the aspirant to mokṣa.
• However, for the saṃnyāsin, the renunciant who seeks mokṣa, the injunctions of dharma have no force, and the performance of ritual actions becomes unnecessary.
• Śaṃkara’s rejection of the older Vedānta view—that mokṣa is attained by a combination of both knowledge and action (jñānakarmasamuccaya)—marks a significant departure from earlier teachings.
• Rāmānuja, an eleventh-century Vedāntin philosopher, modifies Śaṃkara’s view by maintaining a place for dharma on the path to mokṣa, but still denying that liberation is directly attainable through the fulfillment of dharma obligations.
• Rāmānuja, a theist, emphasizes the importance of God’s grace in achieving liberation, asserting that it is not human action but divine grace that leads to release.
• Actions performed solely as acts of divine worship aid in devotion (bhakti) and help to remove mental impressions that obstruct calmness and concentration of mind.
• Rāmānuja’s position modifies Śaṃkara’s by denying that action directly causes release but insisting that obligatory actions (nitya-karma) should not be abandoned.
• For Rāmānuja, knowledge of Brahman is understood as synonymous with meditation and meditative worship (dhyāna, upāsanā), which are aided by acts of sacrifice and worship.
• Thus, knowledge as a means of release still requires the cooperation of actions performed as divine worship, which pleases the Supreme Person and draws divine grace.
• Dharma and mokṣa are still opposed in Rāmānuja’s philosophy, but less radically than in Advaita Vedānta.
• For Rāmānuja, acts enjoined by dharma have no intrinsic significance; only the agent’s intention matters, not the results of the action.
• Rāmānuja’s position differs from the Mīmāṃsā view, which holds that the end of life is the performance of ritual duty.
• Rāmānuja insists that devotional knowledge has no connection with ritual works in the Mīmāṃsā sense (Śrībhāṣya 3.4.12).
• Rāmānuja’s view is influenced by the Bhagavadgītā, but the Gītā presents a distinct position.
• The Bhagavadgītā emphasizes the absolute importance of dharma in sustaining cosmic and social order.
• In the Gītā, dharma and mokṣa are not opposed; instead, karma-yoga teaches that attachment to the fruits of action binds the individual, not the action itself.
• Mokṣa in the Gītā involves performing one’s svadharma with the right attitude, renouncing attachment to the fruits of action while continuing to act (Gītā 18.5–6).
• The Gītā encourages performing acts like sacrifice, donation, and askesis of penance without self-interest or desire for rewards.
• Perfection is achieved by devoting oneself to one’s own task, honoring the divine through the performance of svadharma (Gītā 18.45–48).
• The Gītā teaches that one’s own svadharma, even if imperfectly observed, is better than performing another’s dharma perfectly.
• There are at least four different Hindu views on the relationship between dharma and mokṣa: those of the Dharmaśāstra and Arthaśāstra, Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja, and the Bhagavadgītā.
• Although mokṣa is regarded as the supreme value in Hindu thought, there is significant diversity in how the relationship between moral (dharma) and non-moral (mokṣa) values is conceptualized across different traditions.

Hindu value pluralism

• Classical Hindu value theory is pluralistic about value and prioritizes the non-moral value of mokṣa over morality.
• Ethical pluralism is the view that there is an irreducible plurality of values, contrasting with value monism, which claims there is only one ultimate kind of value.
• Hindu philosophers are value pluralists, acknowledging the existence of multiple irreducible values, as seen in the traditional puruṣārtha schema.
• Hindu value pluralism is also ordered pluralism, meaning the plurality of values can be rationally ordered.
• There is disagreement among Hindu philosophers regarding whether the irreducible plurality of values can conflict with each other.
• The Dharmaśāstra and the Bhagavadgītā support ordered weak pluralism, where values are irreducibly plural and rationally ordered but do not conflict with each other.
• Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja, and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā endorse ordered strong pluralism, where values are irreducibly plural, rationally ordered, and can conflict, with the ordering resolving the conflict.

Obligation, desire and liberation

• Hindu theory of the right, as per the Mīmāṃsā tradition, recognizes three kinds of deeds: obligatory deeds (nitya-karma), optional deeds (kāmya-karma), and forbidden deeds (pratiṣiddha-karma).
• Dharma is identified with performing obligatory actions and avoiding forbidden actions.
• All actions are believed to accrue karma (good or bad), creating tension between right action and the attainment of liberation (mokṣa), which involves freedom from karma.
• This tension arises from two competing strands in Hindu thought: activism (pravṛtti), rooted in the early Vedic ritualistic tradition, and quietism (nivṛtti), rooted in the later Upaniṣadic renunciant tradition.
• Activism emphasizes living in society and fulfilling social obligations, including adherence to Vedic rituals, with the goal of attaining heaven after death by earning merit through dharma.
• Quietism emphasizes withdrawing from society, renouncing karma associated with social duties, and focusing on contemplation, with the goal of attaining mokṣa or liberation from karma.
• This historical tension manifests in divergent views on the relationship between dharma and mokṣa and technical disputes about the theory of moral motivation.

Theories of moral motivation

• Hindu ethicists developed complex theories of moral motivation, where voluntary action is seen as involving a causal chain of factors: agent, knowledge, desire to act, and effort.
• The Nyāya school posits that desire for an action arises only if the agent believes (i) the action is achievable, (ii) it is conducive to their good, and (iii) it cannot cause harm. Vedic injunctive sentences convey these beliefs.
• The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā school similarly emphasizes belief in the action’s conduciveness to the highest good, but denies that injunctive sentences directly express volitional ability. Instead, belief in the action’s connection to the highest good motivates the agent.
• The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā school simplifies the theory: all that is needed for action is the belief that the action should be done (karyātva). This belief is distinct from whether the action is conducive to the agent’s good.
• The key difference between these theories is the role of belief in the action’s conduciveness to the agent’s good: Nyāya and Bhāṭṭa emphasize it as necessary for motivation, while Prābhākara denies its necessity.
• Nyāya’s account of moral motivation is externalist, requiring a belief that an action conduces to the agent’s good for motivation. However, since self-interested action creates negative karma, this raises tension with achieving mokṣa, which is free from karma.
• Bhāṭṭa’s account is also externalist, requiring the desire for the highest good to motivate action. If the agent lacks this desire, the action won’t be performed, which still creates karma and complicates the attainment of mokṣa.
• The Prābhākara account is internalist: the belief in duty alone is sufficient to motivate action, allowing for right action without generating karma incompatible with mokṣa.

Desire and action in the Bhagavadgītā

• The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā theory of moral motivation can be seen as an elaborate systematization of ideas present in the Bhagavadgītā, a popular philosophical poem that attempts to synthesize various themes in Hindu ethics.
• The Gītā is set within the Mahābhārata epic, focusing on the battle between the Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas. Arjuna, a warrior, faces a moral dilemma about fighting against his relatives and teachers, leading him to question the ethical implications of his actions.
• Arjuna fears that fighting will lead to moral anarchy and cosmic disorder. He is torn between his duty as a warrior and the potential destruction of moral order, opting for death rather than fighting.
• Kṛṣṇa, Arjuna’s charioteer, argues that abstaining from action is not viable, as it too accrues karma. Instead, Arjuna should perform his caste duties (svadharma) while adopting a detached attitude towards the results of his actions.
• The Gītā emphasizes performing duties without attachment to their outcomes, encapsulated in the concept of niṣkāma karma (desireless action). This teaching attempts to reconcile the activist and quietist traditions by advocating for action without personal desire for its fruits.
• According to the Gītā, one should act according to their svadharma but without attachment, thereby preventing karma from leading to bondage. This ideal of detachment is meant to align with both action and renunciation.
• Kṛṣṇa also suggests that dedicating the fruits of one’s actions to God, known as bhakti-yoga (the way of devotion), is a practical method for achieving this detachment. This approach aligns with other paths to liberation, such as devotion and knowledge.
• The Gītā’s approach involves living as if disassociated from one’s actions, focusing on duty while renouncing attachment to outcomes. This means actions are performed without personal desire for specific results, potentially reducing karmic effects.
• The concept of ‘desireless’ action in the Gītā might imply eliminating attachment to desires rather than desires themselves. Thus, disinterested action could be understood as free from attached desires, which includes both a first-order desire for an object and a second-order desire for that first-order desire.
• Overall, the Bhagavadgītā promotes performing one’s duties with a detached attitude, ensuring a stable social order while pursuing the supramoral ideal of mokṣa, even if it involves performing actions that may seem morally problematic, as in Arjuna’s case.

Virtue and the supramoral

• Hindu ethics is not easily classified as virtue ethics if virtue ethics is defined as a normative theory prioritizing virtues above other factors.
• However, Hindu ethicists did engage with virtue theory, which examines the virtues in general.
• Traditional Hindu classifications divide virtues into:
  1. Virtues of the body (e.g., dāna or charity)
  2. Virtues of speech (e.g., satya or truthfulness)
  3. Virtues of the mind (e.g., dayā or benevolence)
• Non-violence (ahiṃsā) is highly praised and considered fundamental, as it is believed to underpin other virtues like truthfulness, non-stealing, continence, and greedlessness.
• Although cultivating ideal virtues is valued, it is not obligatory for ordinary people. Mokṣa, while the highest value, is not seen as a moral failure if one does not achieve it in their lifetime.
• Hindu ethics recognizes both the ordinary ideal of morality and the supramoral ideal of the saint.
• To be a candidate for mokṣa (adhikārin), one must:
  1. Discriminate between the eternal and non-eternal
  2. Renounce desires for the fruits of actions
  3. Control the mind and senses
  4. Have a strong desire for liberation
• Liberation is typically reserved for those who are dispositionally and experientially prepared, such as the ascetic saṃnyāsin.
• The material needs of ascetics are supported by the householder, indicating that while not everyone must achieve mokṣa, society should support the ideal of liberation.
• A sociopolitical structure, like the traditional varṇāśrama-dharma scheme, should harmonize the demands of morality and supramoral ideals by assigning duties according to caste and stage of life.

Defending the primacy of liberation

• A major commonality among orthodox Hindu, Buddhist, and Jaina ethics is the primacy of liberation as the supreme good.
• Various Sanskrit terms for liberation include:
  • Mokṣa
  • Mukti
  • Nirvāṇa
  • Kaivalya
  • Apavarga
• Different terms have specific connotations:
  • Apavarga (Yoga) implies liberation as escape from rebirth.
  • Kaivalya (Sāṃkhya) signifies the state of being of a liberated soul.
  • Nirvāṇa (Buddhism and Jainism) is used synonymously with mokṣa by Buddhists but refers to the final death of an enlightened being before mokṣa in Jainism.
  • Mokṣa and mukti (Vedānta) derive from the root muc, meaning ‘free, release’.
• All these philosophies agree on the primacy of liberation, though their conceptions may vary.
• Liberation is considered the highest good because ordinary worldly life is seen as characterized by suffering (duḥkha).
• The Sāṃkhyakārikā notes that the desire to end suffering arises from its torment, and the Yogasūtra (II.15) states that to the discerning, all is suffering.
• Buddhism also identifies the ubiquity of suffering as the First Noble Truth and emphasizes the difficulty of recognizing the pervasive nature of suffering.
• The view on suffering is an evaluative thesis, suggesting that ordinary human life is inherently unsatisfactory, regardless of individual perception.
• Most Indian philosophers agree that karma (actions and their consequences) and the desires they generate bind us to suffering.
• The route to freedom is generally believed to be through renunciation, though the specifics of karma’s metaphysics and the mechanism of renunciation’s liberating effect vary.
• Skepticism about the claims of suffering and the attainability of liberation existed in India.
• The Cārvāka materialists argued that sensual enjoyment is the only rational end of human action and that mokṣa is no better than death.
• They contended that even if liberation were considered superior, its attainability must be proven; otherwise, renouncing worldly pleasures for the uncertain promise of mokṣa is irrational.
• Liberation-oriented philosophers aim to show both the desirability and attainability of mokṣa in response to objections.
• They develop a nuanced account of suffering and its role in the structure of value.
• In Buddhism, suffering (duḥkha) is classified into three types:
  • Physical pain (duḥkha-duḥkha): Seen as a straightforward disvalue.
  • Suffering due to change (vipariṇāma-duḥkha): The impermanence of phenomena leads to frustration and the inability to retain objects of craving.
  • Suffering through conditioned nature (saṃskāra-duḥkha): The fragility of worldly goods due to their dependence on external conditions, causing a deep sense of unease.
• This perspective suggests that even pleasurable experiences are tainted by the impermanence and fragility of worldly pleasures.
• The Hindu tradition similarly reflects on the fragility of goodness:
  • Manusmṛti states that unhappiness arises from things under another’s control, while happiness comes from things under one’s control.
  • Yogabhāṣya classifies suffering into three types:
    • Suffering with change (pariṇāma): Fulfillment of desires increases attachment, leading to future frustration.
    • Suffering with anxiety (tāpa): The inherent anxiety and anguish of human experience.
    • Suffering with habituation (saṃskāra): Desires and habits create a potential for both pleasure and inevitable pain, highlighting the fragility of the good life.
• Both traditions agree that while pleasurable experiences exist, they are deeply marred by dissatisfaction and anxiety due to their contingent and fragile nature.
• The Buddhist simile compares the pursuit of worldly pleasures to licking honey from a razor blade, illustrating the inherent sorrow in even pleasurable experiences.

Buddhist ethics

• Indian Buddhist and Jaina ethics differ from Hindu ethics in that they do not accept the puruṣārtha schema or the varṇāśrama system.
• Both Buddhism and Jainism prioritize mokṣa (or nirvāṇa) as the supreme good.
• Buddhist ethics typically involves a two-tiered system:
  • Monks: Committed to the supramoral goal of nirvāṇa.
  • Laity: Adhere to ordinary moral ideals and support monks to improve their chances of favorable rebirth and eventual pursuit of nirvāṇa.
• The laity does not aim to exemplify the supramoral value of nirvāṇa themselves but supports those who do.
• In Mahāyāna Buddhism, the bodhisattva ideal allows more involvement for laypersons, but the monastic community is still prioritized for its conducive environment for the bodhisattva path.
• The Five Precepts (pañcaśīla) are central to Buddhist ethics:
  • Refrain from killing.
  • Refrain from stealing.
  • Refrain from sexual immorality.
  • Refrain from wrong speech.
  • Refrain from the use of intoxicants.
• Lay Buddhists formally accept these precepts in the ceremony of ‘going for refuge’.
• Monastics follow the Five Precepts plus additional, more detailed duties outlined in the Vinaya literature, with variations across different Buddhist schools.
• The number of rules for monks ranges from 218 to 263 and for nuns from 279 to 380.
• In addition to rules, Buddhism emphasizes virtues:
  • Generosity (dāna): Especially in supporting the monastic community.
  • Non-injury (ahiṃsā): Non-violence.
  • Compassion (karuṇā): Key virtues in practice.
• Mahāyāna Buddhism introduces the ideal of the bodhisattva, who seeks enlightenment for the benefit of others and practices the Six Perfections (pāramitā):
  • Generosity (dāna).
  • Morality (śīla).
  • Patience (kṣānti).
  • Perseverance (vīrya).
  • Meditation (samādhi).
  • Wisdom (prajñā).
• Mahāyāna ethics allows for the precepts to be overridden by a skilful bodhisattva to further the ideal of compassion.
• The classification of Indian Buddhist ethics is debated among scholars:
  • Virtue ethics perspective: Buddhist ethics exhibits concern with virtue theory but does not necessarily insist that virtues are logically prior to other moral notions.
  • Consequentialist perspective: Some scholars argue that Buddhist ethics is a form of consequentialism, where the rightness of actions is judged by their consequences, and virtues are valued for their contribution to promoting the best outcomes.

Intention (cetanā) in Buddhist ethics

• Buddhism places significant emphasis on intention (cetanā), making the moral value of an action often a function of the agent’s intention rather than the external act alone. The doctrine of karma highlights the importance of mental acts, where intention is the key karmic force. The Buddha’s teaching in the Aṅguttara Nikāya (3.295) states: ‘It is volition [or intention, cetanā] that I call karma. Having willed, one acts through body, speech and thought.’

• The Vinayapiṭaka reflects that moral assessment of actions involves evaluating the agent’s condition. This tradition is casuistic, focusing on specific cases rather than general principles. Implicit principles in case judgments suggest that intention is crucial for moral responsibility. An example from the Suttavibhaṅga involves a monk’s lack of consent to a sexual act, which mitigates moral responsibility if he did not intend the act.

• In Theravādin ethics, while intentionality is key to responsibility, consequences also affect the moral severity of actions. For instance, a monk struck on the neck is evaluated as follows: inadvertent killing incurs no offence; intentional killing is a grave offence (pārājika), leading to expulsion from the monastic order; an unsuccessful attempt at killing is severe but less so than successful killing.

• A successful killing is deemed a more severe violation of the precept against taking life compared to an unsuccessful attempt. The traditional conditions for a severe violation include destroying a living being, knowing it is a living being, having the intention to kill, making an effort to kill, and the being being killed through the effort. The actual outcome affects the moral gravity, indicating that Theravādin ethics integrates both intentionality and consequences in assessing moral value.

Buddhist consequentialism

• The presence of concern with virtue and intentions in Buddhist ethics does not necessarily rule out a consequentialist framework. Consequentialism holds that actions are right if they promote the good, which in Buddhism is the elimination of suffering (duḥkha). While motives are important in Buddhist ethics, their goodness is evaluated based on how well they contribute to the elimination of suffering.

• To understand Buddhist ethics in terms of consequentialism, it’s crucial to distinguish between normative factors relevant to determining the moral status of actions and the foundational principles that explain why these factors are relevant. A consequentialist can acknowledge the importance of various factors without rejecting a foundational commitment to the promotion of the good.

• Buddhist ethics can be seen as foundationally consequentialist, even if it incorporates other normative factors at the practical level. This foundational consequentialism is explicitly reflected in the Mahāyāna concept of ‘skilful means’ (upāya-kauśalya), where a bodhisattva may override other ethical considerations to reduce or prevent suffering.

• Early Theravādin texts also support a consequentialist perspective. For instance, the Majjhima Nikāya 61.88 states that actions leading to suffering are wrong, while actions that do not lead to suffering are right. This aligns with a consequentialist view where the rightness of an action is determined by its outcomes.

• Madhyamaka philosopher Śāntideva, in the eighth century, provides explicit support for Buddhist consequentialism. In his Śikṣāsamuccaya, he describes the bodhisattva’s duty to continuously strive to prevent and reduce suffering and to achieve benefits for all beings. Failing to seek the conditions for this, or neglecting to prioritize greater benefits over smaller ones, is considered a fault.

• In the Bodhicaryāvatāra, Śāntideva further explores how Buddhist metaphysics of ‘no-self’ can lead to a form of impartialist act-consequentialism, where the focus is on the overall consequences of actions rather than individual intentions or virtues alone.

‘No-self’ and selflessness

• Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra (8.90–103) argues for impartialist altruism using Buddhist reductionism about the self. The altruistic thesis defended is that since all beings experience suffering and happiness equally, one should protect others as one would oneself.

• Śāntideva makes a fundamental impartialist claim: suffering is suffering, regardless of who experiences it, and thus should be alleviated in the same way one would address their own suffering. The same applies to happiness, which is equally valuable to all beings.

• He addresses the objection that there is a metaphysical distinction between my future self and others’ future selves. He argues that the connection between oneself and future sufferings is no closer than the connection between oneself and the sufferings of others.

• Śāntideva appeals to Buddhist reductionism, asserting that consciousness and aggregates are unreal. Since suffering has no true owner, it should be alleviated universally. He argues that if one acknowledges the need to alleviate one’s own suffering, one should also acknowledge the need to alleviate the suffering of others.

• This argument from reductionism suggests that since persons are ultimately unreal, suffering should be addressed equally for all beings. However, this argument is contentious and relies on the assumption that reductionism about the self entails equal concern for all.

• Critics argue that while Buddhism may assert the unreality of personal identity, this does not necessarily translate to moral obligations. At the conventional level, where moral agency operates, there are still real persons whose suffering should be addressed, and the distinction between one’s own suffering and that of others remains significant.

• Śāntideva’s argument also includes a claim that suffering is equally bad regardless of its location, supporting the idea that one should address others’ suffering as one would their own. This argument may be independent of Buddhist metaphysics and more broadly applicable to notions of impartiality.

• A commonly conceded point is that moral judgments should be universalizable, meaning they must apply equally to all similar cases without special reference to any individual. There is a rational inconsistency in making different moral judgments about identical cases.

• Moral judgments are also prescriptive, requiring that if one asserts a particular moral action towards a person, they must assert the same for themselves in a similar situation. Thus, failing to alleviate another’s suffering, when possible, implies that one would also accept this treatment for themselves.

• Since suffering is equally abhorrent to everyone, there is no special moral weight to one’s own interests over those of others. Rational inconsistency arises if one seeks to protect oneself from suffering but not others, despite the equality of suffering.

Jaina ethics

• Jainas oppose ethical egoism but do not use a reductionist theory of the self to support their ethical position, instead being strong non-reductionists about the self. Like Buddhists, they emphasize the moral importance of a sense of fellowship and reciprocity for one’s own well-being.

• The Ācāraṅga Sūtra highlights reciprocity in Jaina ethics: understanding what is harmful to oneself is linked to understanding what is harmful to others. Those who are at peace and free from passions do not desire to live at the expense of others.

• Jainism also features a two-tiered social system similar to Buddhism, with an ascetic community focused on achieving mokṣa being materially supported by a lay community committed to a more restricted set of moral ideals expressed in the five lesser vows (aṇuvrata).

• Jaina ethics is highly demanding, with individuals undergoing a rigorous process of self-purification and self-cultivation to eliminate karma and achieve liberation. The term Jaina means “conqueror,” referring to one who has subdued passions and attained liberation from suffering.

• For Jaina monks and nuns, the ethical practice involves the five Great Vows (mahāvrata): non-violence (ahiṃsā), truthfulness (satya), non-stealing (asteya), celibacy (brahmacarya), and non-attachment (aparigraha). These vows are meant to foster internal purification necessary for liberation.

• The first vow, ahiṃsā, involves total abstinence from causing harm to all life forms in thought, word, and deed. The second vow is about avoiding falsehood and harmful speech. The third vow is a commitment not to take what has not been given. The fourth vow requires complete sexual continence. The fifth vow involves renouncing attachment to worldly possessions.

• These Great Vows are considered feasible only for ascetics, while laypersons follow a less severe code. The lay vows are twelvefold, with the core being the five Lesser Vows, similar to the Great Vows but adapted for lay life. The key difference is that laypersons replace the last two Great Vows with vows of chastity and contentment or strict limitations on wealth accumulation.

• The most fundamental vow for both ascetics and laypersons is ahiṃsā, which is central to Jaina ethics. The vow requires renouncing all killing of living beings, whether subtle or gross, movable or immovable. Ascetics take this vow with additional clauses, including careful walking to avoid harming any living being.

• A Nirgrantha, or Jaina ascetic, carefully examines his mind and speech. If either is found to be sinful or harmful, he avoids acting on such impulses or uttering such speech.

• The ascetic is meticulous about the placement of his begging utensils and inspects his food and drink to avoid harming any living beings that might be affected by unexamined consumption.

• This ideal level of non-injury is impractical for laypersons, leading to the introduction of the element of intention in Jaina ethics. Jinabhadra (seventh century) explains that intention is what truly matters. A person is not deemed a killer merely for killing but is considered so if they have the intention to kill. Conversely, a doctor who causes pain with pure intentions is considered non-injurious.

• Despite this, the demands of ahiṃsā remain rigorous for all Jainas. The Jaina metaphysics encompasses not only humans and animals but also innumerable single-sense creatures (nigoda). Therefore, Jainas avoid occupations that involve harm to living beings and adhere to strict vegetarianism.

• The ideal of non-violence extends to intellectual life and has influenced the development of Jaina pluralistic logical theory (syādvāda).

• In Jaina ethics, harm (hiṃsā) to avoid is not just harm to others but also self-injury, which creates karmic entanglements inhibiting progress towards mokṣa. Morality is viewed as a means to achieve liberation.

• An interesting practice related to this is sallekhānā, or ritual self-starvation. This practice allows a Jaina facing old age or terminal illness to die by gradual fasting. It is seen as a way to thin out the body and passions, facilitating a rapid passage to liberation.

• Sallekhānā is distinct from suicide, which is avoided because it involves attachment, aversion, or infatuation. Sallekhānā is a mindful and gradual withdrawal from food, maintaining inner peace and adherence to ahiṃsā, making it a form of voluntary death that aligns with Jaina principles.

Conclusion

• Indian philosophers presented a challenging set of substantive proposals on how to live, act, and what kind of person to be, even if ethics was not a distinct field within their philosophy.

• There was broad consensus among Hindu, Buddhist, and Jaina philosophers that liberation is the highest good.

• Observance of various moral restraints was generally agreed upon as a preliminary condition for attaining liberation.

• Indian philosophers also agreed that knowledge is a crucial condition for achieving the highest good.

• The issue of knowledge was extensively addressed by Indian philosophers, which will be explored in the next chapter