INTRODUCTION

• The chapter introduces the main ideas of the theory of justice in an informal way to set the stage for detailed arguments later.
• It explores the role of justice in social cooperation and describes the basic structure of society as the primary subject of justice.
• The theory of justice as fairness is introduced, generalizing and abstracting the traditional conception of the social contract.
• The social contract is replaced by an initial situation with procedural constraints leading to an original agreement on principles of justice.
• Classical utilitarian and intuitionist conceptions of justice are contrasted with justice as fairness for clarification.
• The aim is to develop a viable alternative to dominant doctrines in the philosophical tradition.

THE ROLE OF JUSTICE

• Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, akin to truth for systems of thought.
• A theory, no matter how elegant, must be revised if untrue; similarly, laws and institutions must be reformed or abolished if unjust.
• Each person’s inviolability, rooted in justice, cannot be overridden by the welfare of society as a whole.
• Justice rejects the notion that loss of freedom for some can be justified by greater benefits for others or that sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by advantages for many.
• In a just society, liberties of equal citizenship are not subject to political bargaining or calculations of social interest.
• An injustice is tolerable only when necessary to prevent an even greater injustice, reflecting the uncompromising nature of justice and truth.
• These propositions express the primacy of justice, though they may be overstated.
• The theory of justice seeks to interpret and assess these assertions by considering the role of its principles.
• Assume a society as a self-sufficient association governed by mutually recognized rules, advancing mutual benefit.
• Social cooperation creates both identity of interests (better life for all) and conflict of interests (competing claims to benefits).
• Principles of social justice are required to allocate rights, duties, and benefits in society’s basic institutions.
• A society is well-ordered when designed to advance members’ good and is regulated by a public conception of justice where everyone accepts and knows others accept the same principles.
• In such a society, institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy principles of justice, enabling a shared perspective to adjudicate claims despite self-interest.
• A shared conception of justice fosters civic friendship and limits other pursuits, serving as the fundamental charter of well-ordered associations.
• Existing societies rarely meet this standard due to disputes over what is just, but individuals generally hold a conception of justice—a characteristic set of principles for assigning rights and duties.
• The concept of justice is distinct from its various conceptions, unified by their common role in ensuring fairness without arbitrary distinctions and balancing competing claims.
• Disagreement about principles does not negate agreement on the general criteria for just institutions, such as avoiding arbitrary distinctions and achieving a proper balance.
• Principles of justice identify relevant similarities and differences among persons and specify the fair division of advantages.
• The distinction between the concept and conceptions of justice clarifies the role of justice principles without resolving substantive disagreements.
• Agreement on conceptions of justice is essential but not sufficient for a viable human community.
• Other fundamental social problems include coordination, efficiency, and stability.
• Individuals’ plans must be coordinated to ensure compatibility and avoid severe disappointment of legitimate expectations.
• Execution of these plans should achieve social ends efficiently and in ways consistent with justice.
• The scheme of social cooperation must be stable, with widespread compliance, willingness to follow basic rules, and mechanisms to restore order when infractions occur.
• These problems are interconnected with justice, as disagreement about justice complicates coordination and undermines efficiency and stability.
• Distrust and resentment weaken social ties, while suspicion and hostility encourage undesirable behaviors.
• Conceptions of justice specify basic rights, duties, and distributive shares, but their impact extends to efficiency, coordination, and stability.
• A conception of justice cannot be assessed solely by its distributive role; its broader consequences must also be considered.
• Justice has priority as the most important virtue of institutions, but one conception is preferable to another if its wider outcomes are more desirable.

THE SUBJECT OF JUSTICE

• Many things can be deemed just or unjust, including laws, actions, attitudes, and persons, but the focus here is on social justice.
• The primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, encompassing major social institutions that distribute rights, duties, and social advantages.
• Major institutions include the political constitution, economic systems, and social arrangements like property rights and family structures.
• These institutions shape life prospects, influencing individuals’ opportunities and expectations based on their starting positions.
• Deep inequalities in starting positions, shaped by social structures, are pervasive, affect initial life chances, and cannot be justified by merit.
• Principles of social justice address these inequalities, guiding the choice of political, economic, and social systems.
• Justice in society depends on how fundamental rights, duties, and opportunities are assigned across different social sectors.
• The inquiry focuses on the basic structure of society as a closed, isolated system, distinct from justice in private associations, informal conventions, or international relations.
• This limited focus aims to develop a reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure, potentially informing other contexts with suitable modifications.
• The discussion primarily examines a well-ordered society, assuming strict compliance where everyone acts justly and upholds just institutions.
• Strict compliance theory explores the nature of a perfectly just society, contrasting with partial compliance theory, which addresses responses to injustice.
• Partial compliance theory includes topics like punishment, just war, civil disobedience, and compensatory justice, which deal with pressing real-world issues.
• Beginning with ideal theory provides a systematic foundation for addressing practical problems, offering deeper insight into principles governing justice.
• Understanding a perfectly just society is considered the fundamental part of the theory of justice, informing discussions of civil disobedience and related issues.
• The concept of the basic structure is somewhat vague, but it encompasses the most significant institutions influencing social justice.
• Principles of justice are developed first for clear cases of the basic structure, with attempts to generalize them later, though universality may not be achievable.
• A conception of social justice provides a standard to assess the distributive aspects of the basic structure, distinct from principles of other virtues like efficiency or liberty.
• A social ideal incorporates principles for all virtues of the basic structure, with justice as a crucial part but not the entirety of this vision.
• Different conceptions of justice emerge from differing notions of society and views on human life’s natural necessities and opportunities.
• Fully understanding a conception of justice requires examining the conception of social cooperation from which it derives, while keeping its special role in focus.
• Justice, as a concept, involves balancing competing claims, while a conception of justice is a set of principles interpreting this balance.
• The theory proposed extends beyond ordinary meanings, aiming to account for distributive principles in the basic structure.
• Justice principles define rights, duties, and the appropriate division of social advantages, forming a core part of ethical theory.
• Aristotle’s definition of justice as refraining from pleonexia (unjust gains) applies to actions but presupposes social institutions and legitimate expectations.
• Many entitlements and obligations derive from social institutions, aligning Aristotle’s view with modern conceptions of social justice.
• This approach aligns with traditional notions, focusing on the justice of the basic structure, which influences entitlements and social fairness.

THE MAIN IDEA OF THE THEORY OF JUSTICE

• The conception of justice generalizes the social contract theory of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, focusing on principles of justice for the basic structure of society.
• The original agreement determines principles that rational individuals in an initial position of equality would accept to define social cooperation and governance.
• This conception, called justice as fairness, imagines individuals jointly choosing principles to assign rights, duties, and social benefits.
• The original position is a hypothetical scenario where individuals choose principles behind a veil of ignorance, unaware of their social status, abilities, or personal goals.
• The veil of ignorance ensures fairness by preventing advantages or disadvantages based on natural or social contingencies.
• The fairness of the original position stems from the equality and rationality of participants as moral persons capable of pursuing their own ends.
• Justice as fairness does not equate justice with fairness but highlights that agreed principles arise from a fair initial situation.
• The sequence begins with selecting the principles of justice, followed by a constitution, laws, and institutions, all conforming to the agreed principles.
• A just society is one where institutions align with principles individuals would accept in a fair initial position, fostering public acceptance and legitimacy.
• While no society is entirely voluntary, one adhering to justice as fairness approximates voluntariness by aligning with principles free and equal individuals would autonomously endorse.
• Parties in the initial position are rational and mutually disinterested, focusing on their own interests without concern for others’ interests or spiritual aims.
• Rationality is interpreted narrowly, as in economic theory, emphasizing effective means to achieve given ends, while avoiding contentious ethical assumptions.
• A key task is to determine which principles of justice would be chosen in the original position, requiring a detailed description of this hypothetical scenario.
• The principle of utility is unlikely to be accepted, as rational individuals would not agree to sacrifices of their own rights for the sake of maximizing total advantages.
• Justice as fairness proposes two principles:
  • Equality in basic rights and duties.
  • Permissible inequalities only if they benefit everyone, especially the least advantaged.
• Inequalities are justifiable only when they improve the situation of the least fortunate, ensuring the willing cooperation of all participants.
• These principles prevent reliance on arbitrary factors like natural talents or social circumstances for political or economic advantages.
• Justice as fairness involves:
  • An interpretation of the initial situation and problem of choice.
  • A set of principles argued to result from this interpretation.
• The contractarian method offers an alternative to utilitarianism and perfectionism, but acceptance of the method does not necessitate agreement with the proposed principles.
• Justice as fairness is an example of a contract theory, focused on hypothetical agreements about moral principles rather than entering specific societies or adopting particular governments.
• The term “contract” conveys that rational persons would agree to principles of justice in a well-defined initial situation, justifying and explaining these principles.
• Principles of justice address conflicting claims to social advantages and require agreement among pluralities of individuals or groups.
• The public nature of justice is emphasized, as the agreed principles must be known and accepted by all parties involved.
• The use of the term “contract” aligns with a long tradition of contractarian thought and helps situate justice as fairness within this intellectual lineage.
• Justice as fairness is not a complete contract theory but focuses on principles of justice and related issues.
• A broader theory, such as “rightness as fairness,” could extend to an entire ethical system, covering all virtues and moral relationships.
• The scope of justice as fairness excludes moral questions about animals and nature, acknowledging its limitations.
• Future revisions of its conclusions may arise when addressing these broader moral concerns.

THE ORIGINAL POSITION AND JUSTIFICATION

• The original position is the initial status quo ensuring fair agreements, giving rise to the term “justice as fairness.”
• A conception of justice is justifiable if rational persons in the original position would choose its principles over others.
• Justification involves deliberation within the original position, linking the theory of justice to the theory of rational choice.
• To determine acceptable principles, we need to define:
  • Beliefs, interests, and relations of the parties
  • Alternatives and procedures for decision-making
• The original position is the most philosophically favored interpretation of this initial choice situation.
• Justification relies on widely accepted presumptions, argued from plausible premises to more specific conclusions.
• The aim is to restrict acceptable principles by ruling out biases from natural fortune, social circumstances, or personal inclinations.
• The veil of ignorance ensures decisions are made without knowledge of factors like wealth, social status, or specific aspirations.
• The original position represents equality among moral persons, emphasizing:
  • Equal rights in choosing principles
  • Each person’s capacity for justice and rationality
• Principles of justice emerge as those rational persons would choose as equals under the veil of ignorance.
• Justifying the original position also involves checking if its principles align with considered convictions of justice or extend them acceptably.
• Principles should match intuitive judgments on issues like religious intolerance and racial discrimination while providing guidance in areas of doubt, such as wealth and authority distribution.
• The process works from both ends:
  • Start with shared, weak conditions to describe the situation.
  • Strengthen or adjust these conditions if they fail to yield significant principles.
• Discrepancies may require revising either the initial situation or our judgments, aiming for reflective equilibrium:
  • Principles and judgments coincide, creating coherence.
  • This state is reflective because it reveals the basis for judgments and principles.
  • Equilibrium may remain unstable, requiring further revision.
• The final interpretation accommodates both reasonable philosophical conditions and considered judgments of justice, ensuring a coherent view.
• Justification is achieved through mutual support of considerations, not through self-evident premises or necessary truths.
• The original position is a purely hypothetical construct, embodying conditions we already accept or could be persuaded to accept.
• It serves as both an expository device and an intuitive notion, clarifying limits on fair terms of cooperation and helping interpret moral relationships.

CLASSICAL UTILITARIANISM

• Utilitarianism can be seen as a rational conception of justice, where society aims to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction for all individuals.
• The theory is rooted in the idea that an individual acts to maximize personal welfare, and by extension, society should do the same for the group’s welfare by balancing satisfactions and dissatisfactions.
• This leads to the principle of utility, where society’s institutions should be arranged to maximize collective satisfaction, much like an individual balances present and future gains.
• The connection between the right and the good is central to teleological theories, where the right is defined as that which maximizes the good.
• Teleological theories have an intuitive appeal, as they align with the idea of rationality—maximizing the good seems like a natural principle.
• There is an appeal to the self-evidence of the idea that systems should be arranged to maximize the good, suggesting a clear connection between rationality and morality.
• In teleological theories, the good is defined independently from the right, meaning that moral judgments about what is good are separate from those about what is right.
• A teleological theory proposes that the right is maximizing the good as already specified, but it allows for the judgment of goodness without reference to what is right.
• Utilitarianism defines the good as the satisfaction of rational desire, aiming to achieve the greatest sum of satisfaction for society by allocating resources in a way that maximizes this satisfaction.
• The distribution of satisfactions is less important in utilitarianism, as long as it contributes to the maximized fulfillment of desires. The equality of distribution is preferred only to break ties.
• Justice in utilitarianism is seen as a means to attain the greatest balance of satisfaction for society, and common sense precepts (like protecting rights) are considered derivative from this principle.
• Utilitarianism applies the principle of rational choice for one individual to society, aiming to maximize the net satisfaction of all individuals.
• The impartial spectator and sympathy are used in utilitarianism to aggregate desires and determine what is best for society, effectively collapsing individual desires into a single system.
• The ideal legislator, guided by the impartial spectator, allocates resources and assigns rights and duties in a manner that maximizes collective satisfaction, akin to an entrepreneur maximizing profit.
• In utilitarianism, the distinction between persons is not seriously considered, as the theory seeks to optimize collective welfare through a singular perspective.

SOME RELATED CONTRASTS

• Many philosophers and common sense distinguish between liberty and rights on one hand, and social welfare on the other, giving priority to the former.
• Justice holds that freedom cannot be overridden by the greater good of others. Rights secured by justice are inviolable and not subject to political bargaining or the calculus of social interests.
• Justice as fairness aims to account for the priority of justice by showing it reflects rational preferences and the initial equality of contracting parties.
• Utilitarianism acknowledges the conflict with common sense precepts of justice but views them as secondary rules that serve a socially useful purpose, permitting violations only in exceptional circumstances.
• Justice as fairness accepts the priority of justice as sound, while utilitarianism sees it as an illusion with social utility.
• Justice as fairness assumes the principles of social choice are the result of an original agreement, not simply an extension of individual choice.
• The principles of social choice should depend on the nature of society and the distinctness of individuals, and therefore justice should not be derived from utilitarian principles.
• It is possible that contract theory might eventually lead to utilitarianism, but for now, it is assumed that contract theory would reject the utility principle and adopt the two principles of justice.
• Utilitarianism, although often seen as individualistic, conflates all systems of desires into one, applying the principle of individual choice to society.
• This conflation subjects the rights secured by justice to the calculus of social interests, highlighting a contradiction in the individualistic nature of utilitarianism.
• Utilitarianism is a teleological theory, aiming to maximize the good, while justice as fairness is deontological, focusing on the right without requiring it to maximize the good.
• Deontological theories do not define the good independently from the right or interpret the right as maximizing the good.
• In justice as fairness, the principles of justice do not guarantee the maximization of the good. If equal liberty and restrictions on economic inequalities are chosen, they might not lead to the greatest net satisfaction.
• Utilitarianism values the satisfaction of any desire in itself, considering its contribution to the total sum of well-being, without evaluating the source or quality of desires.
• In utilitarianism, desires like discriminating against others for personal pleasure must be factored in, as they contribute to social welfare, even if their fulfillment may be socially destructive.
• Justice as fairness starts with the assumption of equal liberty and does not prioritize any particular desires or ends. Individuals implicitly agree to conform their conceptions of good to the principles of justice.
• Desires that violate justice principles are deemed wrong. For instance, enjoying others’ lesser liberty is not a valid claim because it contradicts the principles of justice.
• Justice as fairness restricts which desires are reasonable, specifying boundaries within which individuals’ goals must align, unlike utilitarianism, which seeks to fulfill whatever desires individuals have.
• The concept of right takes precedence over the concept of good in justice as fairness. A just social system establishes the rights, opportunities, and means necessary for individuals to pursue their ends within the framework of justice.
• Justice prevents desires that violate its principles from having any value, meaning they cannot override justice’s claims.
• Justice as fairness places the right over the good, meaning the design of social institutions must align with justice and ensure stability while respecting the principles of justice.
• Certain limits are set on what is considered good and morally worthy, defining what kind of persons individuals should be.
• Utilitarianism excludes desires that would lead to a lesser net balance of satisfaction, but its restrictions are formal and depend on circumstantial knowledge, offering less guidance on what specific desires and propensities are morally acceptable.
• Justice as fairness provides a more morally embedded framework, as its moral ideals are rooted in the first principles of the theory, unlike utilitarianism which relies on contingencies of human life.
• Utilitarianism (classical doctrine) emphasizes calculating benefits for society by balancing individual desires for social good, but justice as fairness prioritizes the rights of individuals, emphasizing equal liberty and limiting economic and social inequalities.
• Hume’s version of utilitarianism differs from classical utilitarianism and does not conflict with the priority of justice. Hume focuses on the general interests and necessities of society, suggesting that the common good should guide institutions rather than prioritizing individuals’ rights or utility maximization.
• Locke’s contract theory aligns with Hume’s view in that the common interest must respect the equal rights of individuals, avoiding situations where some people’s disadvantages outweigh the benefits of others.
• Bentham, Edgeworth, and Sidgwick’s classical utilitarianism clearly establishes the conflict between justice principles and social welfare maximization, raising the question of whether disadvantages imposed on a few can be justified by greater benefits for others.
• Justice as fairness views society as a scheme of cooperation governed by principles chosen fairly by rational individuals, while utilitarianism sees it as an efficient administration of social resources based on the satisfaction of desires.

INTUITIONISM

• Intuitionism is defined as the doctrine that there are irreducible first principles of justice, which must be weighed against each other based on our considered judgment.
• These principles may conflict and there is no higher-order standard to resolve the conflicts; instead, individuals rely on intuition to strike a balance.
• Intuitionism has two key features: a plurality of principles that can conflict in specific cases and no explicit method for determining how to prioritize them.
• Some intuitionist views argue that moral principles are self-evident or unanalyzable, but these are not necessary for the broad sense of intuitionism being discussed here.
• Common sense intuitionism deals with more specific precepts related to justice in various areas (e.g., wages, taxation, punishment). These precepts must be balanced to achieve fair outcomes.
• In fair wage determination, different criteria (e.g., skill, training, effort, need) must be balanced, as no single criterion can solely decide the outcome.
• Current social power dynamics often influence how these criteria are weighted, leading to outcomes that may not reflect any ideal conception of justice.
• To move beyond de facto resolutions of competing interests, a broader scheme or framework is needed to narrow the scope of possible balances and make justice more coherent.
• Social ends intuitionism balances various economic and social objectives, like efficiency, full employment, and equitable distribution, which influence judgments on justice (e.g., fair wages, taxation).
• This approach introduces coherence in judgments of justice by adjusting the weight given to different policy goals in relation to each other.
• Philosophical conceptions of justice involve more general principles, such as the aggregative distributive dichotomy, which balances utility (maximizing aggregate well-being) with equality (distributing satisfactions equally).
• In this conception, utility serves as an efficiency standard, while the equality principle serves as a justice constraint, aiming to balance the pursuit of the greatest good with the equitable distribution of benefits.
• Intuitionism allows for a plurality of first principles without a clear priority rule to balance them, meaning the weight given to different principles can vary.
• For example, in balancing total satisfaction and equality, the weight assigned to each principle changes depending on the combination of these factors.
• Indifference curves can represent this balancing process: points on the same curve are judged equally just, with curves further to the northeast indicating better arrangements.
• The slope of the curve at any point shows the relative urgency of the principles—larger increases in satisfaction are needed to compensate for decreasing equality.
• Different people may assign different weights to the principles, as shown in an illustration where two individuals give varying emphasis to equality and total welfare.
• Intuitionism does not impose any limitations on what constitutes the correct weightings, allowing for different balances between the principles.
• However, the intuitionist hopes that by identifying key criteria (principles), people can balance them similarly, especially when impartial. If not, they can at least agree on a compromise in assigning weights.
• The intuitionist does not deny that we can describe how we balance competing principles; these judgments can be forecasted using tools like indifference curves.
• While it may be claimed that further standards guide these weightings, the intuitionist maintains that there is no underlying ethical interpretation that justifies them.
• Intuitionism asserts that moral criteria for balancing these principles cannot be constructed explicitly, and that judgment in social justice relies on intuitive balances rather than defined rules.
• Intuitionism is not intrinsically irrational; it may be true that moral facts’ complexity resists a full, systematic account and requires a plurality of competing principles.
• The intuitionist rejects the idea that moral judgments can be derived from single principles like utility or simplistic formulations such as “giving everyone their due.”
• To refute intuitionism, one must present constructive ethical criteria that explain how to weigh competing principles, showing that such criteria exist.
• Intuitionistic theories can be either teleological or deontological, depending on whether they focus on maximizing the good or fulfilling moral duties.
• Teleological intuitionism: Values like personal affection, beauty, and knowledge may be seen as intrinsic goods, and their balance is determined by intuition.
• Deontological intuitionism: Emphasizes moral worth and distributive justice, balancing the principle of maximizing good with other prima facie principles.
• The distinctive feature of intuitionistic views is their emphasis on intuition in balancing principles, without relying on explicit, constructive ethical criteria.
• Intuitionism denies that there are explicit solutions to the priority problem—how to determine the weight of competing principles in a structured, objective way.

THE PRIORITY PROBLEM

• Intuitionism raises the question of whether it’s possible to provide a systematic account of our moral judgments about justice. It holds that we must rely on intuitive capacities to assign weights to competing principles of justice.
• Classical utilitarianism rejects intuitionism, proposing a single principle—utility—as the ultimate standard to resolve competing moral claims. Mill and Sidgwick argue that utilitarianism is necessary for systematizing judgments and overcoming conflicts between principles.
• The appeal to intuition is not inherently irrational, but reducing reliance on intuition is desirable. If people balance principles differently, it can lead to different conceptions of justice, and without clear guidance on how to assign weights, rational discussion becomes difficult.
• Intuitionist justice may be considered incomplete, and it’s argued that we should formulate explicit principles for resolving the priority problem, even if intuition can’t be eliminated entirely.
• In justice as fairness, the role of intuition is limited. The principles of justice are those that would be chosen in the original position, where rational agents, recognizing differing personal situations, would agree on the priority of principles.
• The choice of principles may provide some guidance on how to balance them, drawing from the reasons for their adoption in the first place. This can help resolve the priority problem by finding guiding principles for assigning weights.
• Serial or lexical ordering of principles might offer a solution. In such an order, principles are ranked, and later principles come into play only after earlier ones are fully satisfied. This avoids the need to balance principles and gives absolute priority to earlier ones.
• For example, the principle of equal liberty could be ranked before principles related to economic and social inequalities, meaning inequalities are allowed only insofar as they are consistent with equal liberties.
• The idea of a serial order seems unappealing at first and requires specific principles to work. For instance, principles like equal liberty can be prioritized because they are relatively clear and limited in application, whereas principles like utility could nullify subsequent criteria if placed first.
• Justice as fairness aims to show that in certain circumstances, serial ordering can offer a viable solution to the priority problem in the distribution of justice.
• The dependence on intuition can be reduced by posing more limited questions and substituting prudential for moral judgment.
• In an intuitionist system, a person might struggle to balance broad, abstract concepts like total utility and equality, as these ideas can be vague and complex. The aggregative-distributive dichotomy is attractive but unmanageable due to its generality.
• Justice as fairness narrows the focus by asking whether a representative person in a given social position would prefer a specific structure of society. Economic and social inequalities are judged based on the long-term expectations of the least advantaged social group. This approach makes the reliance on intuition less broad and focuses it on prudential judgments.
• The task of addressing the priority problem is to reduce reliance on intuition rather than eliminate it. While total avoidance is impossible, the goal is to reach a reasonably reliable agreement in judgment to form a common conception of justice.
• If people’s priority judgments are similar, the lack of explicit principles to explain them is less problematic. Contradictory judgments, however, make adjudicating claims more difficult. The objective is to formulate a conception of justice that helps converge considered judgments, whether based on intuition or prudence.
• From the original position perspective, the priority problem is not about dealing with unchangeable moral facts but about creating reasonable proposals to bring about agreement in judgments.
• In a contract doctrine, moral facts are determined by the principles chosen in the original position. The people in this position decide how simple or complex the moral facts should be, including the priority rules for justice.
• Two solutions to the priority problem have been proposed: a single principle or lexical ordering of principles. Although a lexical order is not always strictly correct, it can serve as an approximation under certain conditions, offering insight into how to better structure conceptions of justice.

SOME REMARKS ABOUT MORAL THEORY

• Moral theory aims to describe our moral capacity, specifically our sense of justice, which is developed through experience and intellectual ability.
• Moral judgments are complex and can cover an infinite number of scenarios, but are generally made based on reasons and a desire to act in accordance with them.
• A theory of justice goes beyond simply listing judgments and reasons, instead formulating principles that guide those judgments, leading us to make moral decisions in a systematic way.
• The goal of moral theory is to systematically describe the principles that align with our everyday judgments. These principles can form the basis of a reasoning process that arrives at consistent moral judgments.
• A comparison can be drawn between moral theory and grammar theory. Just as grammar theory describes the native speaker’s ability to recognize well-formed sentences, moral theory aims to characterize our sense of justice through systematic principles.
• Our moral capacities cannot be fully captured by common-sense principles, and thus moral theory must often involve more sophisticated constructions, potentially extending beyond basic norms to include advanced reasoning.
• Considered judgments are those made under optimal conditions for moral reasoning, without distortion from personal interests or emotional states.
• Judgments made in situations of hesitation, distress, or when personal gain is involved are excluded as likely to be biased or inaccurate.
• Considered judgments are made when the individual has the ability, opportunity, and desire to make a correct judgment, without external distractions or self-interest affecting the decision.
• The criteria for considered judgments are not arbitrary, but are based on conditions that promote deliberation and the proper exercise of judgment in general.
• Reflective equilibrium is central to moral philosophy as it seeks to match principles of justice with a person’s considered judgments.
• It involves revising judgments to conform with intuitively appealing accounts of justice, particularly when these theories offer explanations that undermine previous judgments.
• The best account of a person’s sense of justice is one that matches their judgments in reflective equilibrium, which is achieved after considering various conceptions of justice and revising judgments accordingly.
• Reflective equilibrium can take different forms:
  • In the first case, it involves minor revisions to match existing judgments with a proposed conception.
  • In the second case, it involves considering all possible conceptions and philosophical arguments, possibly leading to a radical shift in one’s sense of justice.
• Philosophical reflective equilibrium focuses on achieving the second type, although achieving it fully is unlikely due to practical limitations.
• Justice as fairness aims to reach reflective equilibrium by comparing its principles with other recognized views, such as those based on utility or perfection.
• Justice as fairness, though closer to the philosophical ideal, may not fully achieve it but offers a better match to our considered judgments.
• Questions about whether reflective equilibrium exists, whether it is unique, and how personal judgments affect it are complex and beyond the immediate scope of this theory.
• It is assumed that, while there may be some differences in the sense of justice between individuals, there are also shared principles that are common among those whose judgments are in reflective equilibrium.
• While differences in conceptions of justice may exist, understanding their structure is essential but remains an open question in moral theory.
• The opinions of the author and reader are the primary focus in this account, with others used only to help clarify these views.
• A theory of justice is a theory of our moral sentiments, outlining the principles that govern our moral powers or sense of justice, tested against considered judgments in reflective equilibrium.
• It follows the same rules of method as other theories, with definitions serving as a tool in constructing the theory rather than holding a special place.
• A substantive theory cannot be based solely on logical truths or definitions; it must incorporate contingent assumptions and general facts to explain considered judgments.
• Classical British writers, such as Sidgwick, adopted this view, focusing on the study of substantive moral conceptions.
• As our understanding of moral conceptions deepens, we may find clearer answers to questions of meaning and justification in moral judgments, similar to advances in logic and mathematics.
• Current theories of justice are primitive and often defective, but they can be useful approximations. Objections should focus on how often and how far a theory is wrong, rather than dismissing it entirely.
• To evaluate these theories, it is essential to understand their structure and basic intuitive ideas, which highlight key differences.
• The author contrasts justice as fairness with utilitarianism, given its philosophical dominance despite persistent doubts. A constructive alternative theory has not yet emerged that matches utilitarianism’s clarity and system.
• Justice as fairness is seen as a contract theory that aims to fill this gap, though it remains subject to the same primitive nature and defects as other theories.
• Simplifications are used within the theory, and while some aspects, like priority rules, may not be fully satisfactory, the theory serves as a guiding framework to focus moral sensibilities and clarify conflicting moral considerations.
• The original position concept helps frame deliberations, and if the theory clarifies and aligns differing convictions, it fulfills its purpose, with simplifications justified provisionally.