Pluralism

• Distributive justice is a broad concept encompassing the entire spectrum of goods in society. It involves the sharing, dividing, and exchanging of goods, as well as the labor involved in producing them.
• Everything in life, including material holdings, reputation, political standing, and status, is distributed through human relationships.
• Different political arrangements and ideologies justify different distributions of various goods, including power, honor, wealth, knowledge, work, and personal possessions.
• Societies have complex distributive systems that range from simple systems like slave galleys to more intricate structures involving familial networks, black markets, and bureaucratic alliances.
• Money has been a key medium for exchange, but it does not fully encompass all aspects of distribution, and there are many things that money cannot buy.
• No single decision point or set of agents controls all distributions. While the state can regulate some patterns of sharing and dividing, it cannot govern the full range of social goods.
• The criteria for distribution vary widely, from desert and qualification to need and political loyalty, and these criteria often coexist uneasily.
• History reveals a wide variety of distributive arrangements and ideologies. The philosophical approach, however, often seeks underlying unity, typically in the form of a single good or distributive criterion.
• While some philosophers have searched for a unified distributive system, pluralism is advocated, which allows for multiple distributive criteria and agents.
• Even in embracing pluralism, a coherent defense is necessary, and it must be grounded in principles that justify and limit the choice of distribution criteria and agents.
• The commonly discussed system of distributive justice assumes that rational individuals, under impartial conditions and without knowledge of their personal situations, would select a singular, fair system of distribution.
• However, the force of this hypothetical conclusion is debatable. Ordinary individuals, with a strong sense of their own identity and circumstances, might not align with the abstract choice made in this rational, idealized scenario.
• The primary issue lies not in the particularism of interest, which philosophers assume can be set aside for the greater good, but in the particularism of history, culture, and membership.
• Members of a political community are more likely to ask, “What would individuals like us, shaped by our unique culture and history, choose?” rather than a purely universalizing question.
• Justice is a human construction, and it is unlikely that it can be defined in a singular way across all contexts.
• The theory of distributive justice allows for multiple answers, and within this, there is space for cultural diversity and political choice.
• Distributive justice is not just about applying a universal principle in different historical contexts; it is about understanding that the principles themselves are pluralistic.
• Different social goods should be distributed for different reasons, by different agents, and using different procedures, reflecting the historical and cultural particularism that shapes them.

A Theory of Goods

• Theories of distributive justice traditionally frame the process as one where people distribute goods to one another, focusing on the actions of distributive agents and recipients. These theories typically explore questions of rights, needs, wants, and entitlements.
• This simplification overlooks the conception and creation of goods, which precedes distribution. Goods have social meanings that shape their distribution. They do not merely appear in the hands of agents, but are defined by shared understandings before being distributed.
• Distributive agents are constrained by the meanings of goods, which are shaped through social processes. Distribution reflects these meanings, and one could argue that goods, in a sense, distribute themselves based on their inherent social value.
• A theory of goods can explain and limit the pluralism in distributive possibilities, outlined in six propositions:
  1. Social goods are the primary focus of distributive justice. These goods cannot be valued idiosyncratically; their value is shaped by shared social meanings. For example, even seemingly personal goods (like domestic objects) are shaped by culture.
  2. People form identities through their relation to social goods. Their understanding of what is “me” and “mine” is tied to the goods they conceive, create, and use.
  3. There is no universal set of basic goods across all societies. Even necessities, like food, carry different meanings in different cultures and contexts, making it difficult to create a universal distributive principle.
  4. Meaning determines movement: the way goods are distributed is determined by their social meaning, not by the inherent properties of the goods themselves. Distributive justice is about understanding the social value of goods.
  5. Social meanings are historical, meaning that distributive practices change over time. Key goods have characteristic normative structures, but these structures are subject to change, requiring empirical investigation to understand how goods should be distributed.
  6. When social meanings differ, distributions must be autonomous within their respective spheres. Each social good or set of goods has a distinct distributive sphere, with specific criteria for distribution. For example, money should not influence the distribution of ecclesiastical office, as the latter falls within a different distributive sphere. However, these spheres can influence each other, requiring a principle of relative autonomy.

Dominance and Monopoly

• Social autonomy is tied to shared meanings and values, but is often violated systematically rather than enforced regularly. Societies tend to be structured around a dominant good that dictates value across all distributive spheres.
• A dominant good is one that grants its owners the power to command a wide range of other goods, while a monopoly exists when a single individual or group controls this dominant good, using it to secure power and wealth.
• Dominance in goods is a social construct, blending reality with symbolism, and often tied to factors like physical strength, reputation, political office, capital, or technical knowledge. These elements can monopolize dominance, leading to conversion: a dominant good is turned into other valuable goods.
• Although no single good ever completely dominates, and monopolies are never perfect, dominance tends to structure social arrangements. For example, capital dominates in capitalist societies, while technical knowledge dominates in technocracies.
• Ruling classes emerge when a group monopolizes a dominant good, but this rule is unstable, constantly challenged by competing groups who propose alternative ways of converting goods.
• Distribution is at the heart of social conflict, as seen in Marx’s focus on the struggle for the means of production (land, capital, etc.). These are goods that can be divided and converted into other forms of power, not limited to economic resources alone, but also including military, political, and religious power.
• History shows no single, naturally dominant good, but rather different modes of dominance that change over time, leading to competing groups vying for control of these valuable goods.
• The claim to monopolize a dominant good, when applied to public purposes, forms an ideology. These ideologies often link legitimate possession to personal qualities through a philosophical principle.
• Common forms of ideologies include:
  • Aristocracy: Claimed by those with breeding and intelligence, who monopolize landed wealth and familial reputation.
  • Divine supremacy: Claimed by those who control religious office, monopolizing grace and office.
  • Meritocracy: Claimed by those who possess talent, monopolizing education.
  • Free exchange: Claimed by those willing to risk capital, monopolizing movable wealth.
• These groups and their ideologies compete for supremacy, with shifting winners and coalitions, but no final victory. Ideologies may be corrupted but often serve as valid distributive criteria within their specific domains.
• The paradigmatic struggle occurs when a group monopolizes a dominant good, which is converted into other valuable goods, such as wealth, honor, or office. However, this process can provoke resentment and resistance, as people perceive these monopolies as unjust usurpations.
• Three main counterclaims arise in response to monopolies:
  • Redistribution of the dominant good to ensure wider sharing, arguing that monopoly is unjust.
  • Autonomous distribution of all goods, arguing that dominance itself is unjust.
  • Replacement of the current dominant good with a new one, monopolized by a different group, arguing that the existing pattern is unjust.
• Revolutionary ideologies often involve the third claim, as seen in Marxist theory, where the replacement of one dominant good (noble birth and landholding) by another (bourgeois wealth) leads to renewed class struggles.
• Marx’s view suggests that the means of production is the dominant good throughout history, with control over it granting legitimacy to rule. After a communist revolution, Marx believed control over production would be universal, and the third claim would collapse into the first—redistribution.
• Marxism is a historicist doctrine that sees the ongoing distributive struggle as central to societal change. Winning at different moments matters, but understanding why it matters requires more than just focusing on dominance and monopoly assertions.

Simple Equality

• The first two claims in social struggles focus on challenging monopolies and dominance, with the second claim, advocating for the autonomous distribution of goods, considered more complex and significant.
• The first claim challenges the monopoly of a particular social good but does not contest its dominance. If wealth is dominant and widely shared, no other good can be monopolized. In an equal society, all citizens have the same amount of money and equal access to goods. However, this system is unstable and will lead to inequality over time as conversion processes turn new forms of dominance into monopolies.
• The regime of simple equality: In this society, everything is for sale, and everyone has equal money. But, as people invest in things like education, talent or family background may begin to dominate. Education becomes the new dominant good, leading to the rise of the “group of the talented,” who monopolize educational success. This new meritocracy creates its own inequalities, as people with talent and education dominate other social goods like wealth, power, and office.
• John Rawls’s difference principle: This principle attempts to constrain the monopoly power of the talented. It justifies inequalities only if they benefit the least advantaged. It limits the conversion of talent into wealth and focuses on ensuring the greatest benefit for the disadvantaged.
• However, simple equality requires constant state intervention to break up monopolies and regulate new forms of dominance. This makes state power the central object of social struggles, as groups will attempt to monopolize it for control over other goods.
• Political power becomes a crucial resource, often more important and dangerous than economic means. To prevent the state from becoming another form of monopoly, there is a need for constitutional checks and balances, which limit political monopolies and protect against concentrated power.
• Limiting political power can be achieved by distributing it widely, though this approach faces challenges such as the danger of majority tyranny. However, the greater danger may lie in democratic weakness when facing the social strength of powerful groups like plutocrats, bureaucrats, and meritocrats.
• In theory, political power is the dominant good in a democracy, convertible by the will of the citizens. In practice, though, spreading power can neutralize its dominance as it is influenced by other dominant goods people already possess or aspire to possess.
• Democracy mirrors the distribution of social goods. Political decisions are shaped by the prevailing cultural conceptions that underwrite monopolies like wealth and merit, meaning democracy can become a tool that reflects, rather than resists, the concentration of power.
• To prevent monopolies, centralized power may be necessary, which could lead to a monopolization of the state itself. This creates a cycle where private privilege and statism reinforce each other.
• Statism and private privilege: We may need to mobilize power to check monopolies, but this creates new opportunities for elites to exploit social goods. The only escape from this cycle may be statism, which again gives rise to the concentration of power.
• The focus on monopoly as the main issue in distributive justice might be problematic, as it overlooks the central role of dominance. Historically, monopoly struggles began with the aristocracy’s hold on land and honor, which was tied to birth and blood, an arbitrary basis of privilege. As this was displaced, wealth, power, and education emerged as dominant goods.
• While simple equality cannot be sustained in these spheres, as they naturally lead to monopolies, these monopolies can only be suppressed if state power is both dominant and controlled by officials committed to repression.
• However, an alternative path to equality exists, one that does not depend on maintaining dominance through state control or monopoly.

Tyranny and Complex Equality

• Focus on reducing dominance rather than simply breaking up or constraining monopolies. The idea is to narrow the range of convertibility between goods and to recognize the autonomy of distributive spheres.
• Historically, philosophers have focused on criticizing monopolies of wealth, power, and education or justifying their conversions. Instead, the critique of dominance aims to address the actual complexity of distributions without relying on simplistic systems.
• Imagine a society where different social goods are monopolistically held, but no good is widely convertible. This creates a complex egalitarian society with various local monopolies held by different groups. While inequality may exist, it won’t multiply across goods because each sphere remains autonomous.
• Complex equality offers a more stable form of society, where ordinary people resist convertibility within their own spheres, without the need for constant state intervention.
• Simple equality only considers the distribution of goods in terms of quantity (e.g., equal hats), whereas complex equality involves a deeper, relational understanding of equality across different distributive spheres.
• Pascal argues that tyranny arises when one personal quality or social good is improperly converted into another. For example, strength cannot be converted into belief or knowledge into power. Each sphere of goods has its own legitimate boundaries and should operate within its own domain.
• Marx adds that love, trust, or influence must remain within their respective domains. Social goods should not be converted to achieve power in unrelated areas, as this would be a tyrannical use of power.
• The principle of tyranny is the violation of these boundaries: converting one good into another when no intrinsic connection exists between them. Monopoly is legitimate within its own sphere, but using political power to access other goods constitutes tyranny.
• Ultimately, dominance of goods leads to the domination of people.
• Complex equality establishes relationships that prevent domination by ensuring no citizen’s standing in one sphere (e.g., political office) can undermine their standing in another (e.g., education, healthcare).
• A person may be politically superior (chosen for office), but that should not grant them advantages in other spheres like healthcare, education, or economic opportunities.
• Dominance should not transfer across spheres; political power should not lead to advantages in unrelated areas. This ensures equality between citizens, even if some are unequal in certain spheres (e.g., politics).
• Complex equality implies a society where success in one sphere does not guarantee success in others, maintaining independence between spheres. It also suggests that people successful in different spheres are unlikely to dominate, as success is dispersed and not concentrated in one individual.
• A person who excels in politics, entrepreneurship, science, and other areas, though appealing as a story, is more of a fiction. In practice, no one dominates all spheres, and success in one does not guarantee success in others.
• Under complex equality, individuals cannot inherit the success of their parents, as their achievements are not transferable across domains.
• Dominance must be critiqued in all social goods, with the principle stating that no good should be distributed simply because someone has another good. Pascal and Marx emphasize the illegitimacy of transferring one good into another without regard for the meaning of each.
• The goal is not to dictate how goods should be divided but to study the meaning and purpose of each distributive sphere. The principle focuses on avoiding the conversion of one good into another as a means of acquiring power.

Three Distributive Principles

• The theory of complex equality is not likely to be elegant or simple, as defining the meaning of social goods and their boundaries is controversial.
• No neat procedure exists for generating or testing different accounts of these goods, and the arguments will reflect the diverse and conflict-ridden nature of society.
• The focus should be on understanding these complexities before attempting regulation, acknowledging that there is no single distributive criterion that can encompass all aspects of social life.
• Three common distributive criteria—free exchange, desert, and need—are important but insufficient on their own for a complete theory of distributive justice. They each have real force, but they only address parts of the larger distribution issue, not the whole.

Free Exchange

• Free exchange is theoretically open-ended and guarantees no specific distributive outcome, as the division of social goods will be shaped by voluntary agreements between individuals who understand the social meanings of those goods.
• In theory, the market is pluralistic and allows for goods to be convertible into one another through money, with no dominant goods or monopolies. The exchange process reflects the meanings attached to goods, and no good (x) will end up in the hands of someone simply because they possess another good (y) without considering what x means to others in society.
• In practice, however, money becomes a dominant good, monopolized by those skilled in bargaining and trading, leading to demands for redistribution and a return to simple equality.
• Even in a state of simple equality, limits on exchanges need to be set because social meanings are not always open to individual interpretation, and allowing unrestricted exchange can lead to tyranny, as illustrated by the potential for political power to be traded, undermining democratic fairness.
• The boundaries within which free exchange can operate depend on a careful analysis of particular social goods. For example, political power can be subject to private trading, but this contradicts the principles of democratic politics, where exchanges are meant to be public and subject to approval.
• Money’s influence can cross boundaries, and determining where to draw limits on its flow requires both expediency and principle, as unchecked movement of money affects the distribution of all goods.

Desert

• Desert is a concept that, like free exchange, is open-ended and pluralistic, aiming to reward individuals based on their merits. However, its application is complex, as no central authority can fairly distribute rewards without considering the social meanings of goods.
• For example, while someone might deserve love or influence, it doesn’t mean they deserve these from specific individuals. People’s personal preferences cannot be forced by an external agency, even if they would benefit from these qualities.
• This extends to political power; individuals may deserve influence but cannot force others to follow them. Democratic politics cannot be reduced to an agency assigning rewards based on desert, as this would undermine individual autonomy and democratic principles.
• Desert is not applicable within the boundaries of free exchange; for example, one may deserve to own beautiful paintings due to their skill in bargaining, but this does not mean they deserve the paintings solely based on their skill. Desert requires a deeper connection between goods and people, unlike the broader, more transactional nature of justice.
• While state intervention in markets might address urgent needs (like medical care), it is much harder to justify it for desert-based goods like art, which are not as urgent and do not involve ownership or consumption in the same way.
• Even if an omnipotent authority were to distribute goods based on desert, the problem arises in selecting the arbiters of desert. Human arbiters would likely be biased and impose their fixed conceptions of desert, leading to new forms of tyranny. Thus, desert should be applied carefully and only in limited circumstances where it is clear and specific.

Need

• Need is another distributive criterion, famously associated with Marx’s maxim, “To each according to his needs.” This suggests that the wealth of the community should be distributed based on individual needs. However, this criterion is incomplete and fails to account for several factors in practical distribution.
• The first half of Marx’s maxim, “From each according to his ability,” implies that jobs should be assigned based on qualifications, but qualifications don’t necessarily correspond to needs. If people’s material needs are met, they may not need to work at all, complicating the application of the need-based distribution.
• Need also doesn’t work for goods like political power, honor, fame, or other scarce goods. These are not strictly needed, and even if defined loosely as strong wants, scarcity and competition complicate their distribution.
• In a poor society, the criterion of need becomes more relevant, but other distributive criteria will always interact with need. While need works within its own sphere, it cannot be the sole criterion for all goods, especially those outside the sphere of basic material needs.
• Ultimately, every distributive criterion works within its own sphere and reflects the complexity of social life. The challenge lies in balancing and mapping out these criteria to address the diverse needs and goods across society.

Hierarchies and Caste Societies

• The analysis proposed here is imminent and phenomenological, reflecting the social world of the people it addresses, rather than presenting an ideal or universal plan.
• Social goods, and how they are distributed, depend on understandings of meaning, which can vary across societies. The autonomy of distributive spheres is crucial, but it is possible to imagine a society where dominance and monopoly are integral to the social meanings.
• In feudal Europe, for example, clothing was not a commodity but a badge of rank, reflecting a hierarchical social order. Dressing in finery without entitlement was a form of deceit, reinforcing the meaning of clothing within that system.
• Over time, however, alternative understandings of clothing arose, leading to the rise of egalitarian arguments against sumptuary laws, indicating the potential for evolving social meanings.
• The caste system in ancient India might represent a society where all goods were hierarchically conceived. The system integrated various aspects of social life, such as prestige, wealth, and knowledge, under a single value of ritual purity.
• Complexity arises when distributive spheres cannot be easily integrated. Hierarchical societies resist autonomous distributions, but even in systems like monarchies, there are often criteria for office (like divine grace or human insight) that are independent of birth and blood.
• Tyranny emerges when boundaries between social goods are crossed, violating social meaning. Complex equality seeks to defend these boundaries, emphasizing the differentiation of goods in a way that allows for the equality of individuals across multiple spheres.
• Simple equality is based on the distribution of one dominant good, while complex equality requires the differentiation of multiple goods. There is no clear answer to the right number of differentiated goods, but distinguishing between them is the foundation of the egalitarian enterprise.

The Setting of the Argument

• The political community serves as the most appropriate setting for the enterprise of distributive justice, as it is the closest we have to a shared world of common meanings.
• While monopoly and dominance can transcend political boundaries, the political community is where language, history, and culture intersect, creating a collective consciousness.
• National character is a myth, but shared sensibilities and intuitions among a historical community are real. If sensibilities aren’t shared, smaller units may be the focus, requiring political adjustments based on shared values like cultural diversity and local autonomy.
• Politics shapes its own bonds of commonality, and in independent states, political power is a local monopoly. Citizens have a role in distributive decisions, with the ability to replace leaders who fail them.
• Past political struggles shape present political structures, creating a context for distributive justice within political communities.
• The community itself is a valuable good to be distributed, but membership in it is decided internally, and cannot be distributed by external agencies.
• The only alternative to the political community would be humanity as a whole (the global society), but this would require the creation of shared meanings that could avoid imposing one set of values. Any agreement on global justice would likely centralize power, potentially leading to simple equality or tyranny.
• While global justice is important, it is not the focus here, as the complexities of local privilege and global statism remain significant. The focus is on cities, countries, and states that have developed their own internal life.
• Important questions about membership arise between communities, and complex equality can be extended to international relations in a limited way, respecting local decisions without imposing uniform distributions globally.
• This approach addresses the problem of mass poverty in many parts of the world but is limited in scope. A more global theory would focus on interstate relations and require a different theoretical framework.