Motivation

• Until recently, the most popular epistemological theories were foundations theories.

• Foundations theories are distinguished by granting a limited class of epistemologically basic beliefs a privileged epistemic status.

• Basic beliefs are considered self-justifying and do not require further justification.

• Nonbasic beliefs must be justified ultimately by appeal to these basic beliefs, forming a foundation for epistemic justification.

• The motivation for foundations theories comes from the psychological observation that all knowledge comes through the senses.

• Foundationalists identify sensory input as giving rise to epistemologically basic beliefs.

• Other beliefs are derived by reasoning from these basic beliefs.

• Reasoning can only justify beliefs if one is already justified in the premises; therefore, reasoning itself cannot be the ultimate source of justification.

• Only perception can serve as the ultimate source of justification.

• This leads to a pyramid model: basic beliefs from perception form the foundation, supporting all other justified beliefs through reasoning.

• The foundationalist model has intuitive force because it is based on psychological truisms.

• To develop a concrete epistemological theory, two issues must be addressed:

  • What kinds of beliefs are epistemologically basic and what qualifies them for their privileged role?

  • How are nonbasic beliefs justified by reasoning from basic beliefs?

• The problem of reasoning in foundationalism is more subtle than often assumed.

• A more nuanced version of foundationalism will be developed in the next section.

Basic Beliefs

• Foundations theories are distinguished from coherence theories by positing a class of epistemologically basic beliefs with privileged epistemic status.

• Basic beliefs must be justified independently of reasoning; if justification depends on reasoning, the belief is not basic.

• The only beliefs not held on the basis of reasoning seem to be those directly from perception, so basic beliefs must be perceptual beliefs (in a sense to be clarified).

• Perceptual beliefs about physical objects (e.g., seeing a door open, hearing sounds) can be mistaken due to illusions or misleading environments.

• Perceptual beliefs are also influenced by expectations, which can cause misperceptions.

• Since perceptual beliefs are fallible, they seem to need justification themselves, thus challenging their status as basic beliefs.

• Traditional foundationalists deny that basic beliefs are ordinary perceptual beliefs; instead, they retreat to a weaker kind of belief.

• Basic beliefs must be perceptual beliefs in some sense, but not necessarily about physical objects directly.

• One might be mistaken about external objects but not about the character of one’s sensory experiences.

• Thus, beliefs about sensory experiences (“appearance beliefs”) may serve as basic beliefs, while beliefs about physical objects are indirectly supported by reasoning from these.

• The “appeared to” terminology helps describe sensory experiences, e.g., being “appeared to redly” to express how things appear rather than what they are.

• This terminology distinguishes ordinary perceptual beliefs (claims about the world) from appearance beliefs (claims about how things appear).

• The suggestion is that basic beliefs are appearance beliefs, motivated by the idea that physical-object perceptual beliefs are fallible, but appearance beliefs are not.

• This relies on two presumptions: (1) if a belief can be mistaken, it is not basic; (2) appearance beliefs cannot be mistaken. Either could be denied.

• For a foundations theory to work, basic beliefs must satisfy:

  1. There must be enough basic beliefs to provide a foundation for all other justified beliefs.

  2. Basic beliefs must have a secure epistemic status, i.e., be self-justifying without needing further justification.

• Self-justifying belief means one can be justified in holding it simply by virtue of holding it, without independent reasons.

• Incorrigibly justified belief is a stronger concept: a belief is incorrigibly justified if it is impossible to hold it unjustifiedly.

• Few beliefs are incorrigibly justified; for example, believing “there is a book before me” can be held unjustifiedly.

• Most beliefs fail to be incorrigibly justified, but appearance beliefs might be exceptions.

• If basic beliefs are incorrigibly justified, they provide the firmest foundation for justification.

• However, incorrigible justification is stronger than needed for basic beliefs.

• Basic beliefs must allow for being justified without having reasons for them, but justification can be defeated by counter-evidence.

• One must be prima facie justified in holding basic beliefs: justified unless there is reason to think otherwise.

• Prima facie justified belief: a belief is prima facie justified if one can only hold it unjustifiedly when having reasons to doubt it; without such reasons, one is justified.