Levels of Development

• Three stages in the development of morality can be distinguished: (a) level of instinct – conduct appears right when determined by fundamental needs and instincts (as described by McDougall), (b) level of custom – conduct appears right when in accordance with the customs of the group, and (c) level of conscience – conduct appears right when approved by individual judgement of right and wrong.

• There is no sufficient evidence that moving from one level to another is a historical development.

• The most primitive societies today approve much conduct according to custom, but in some matters, individual judgement sets the standard.

• Even in the most advanced societies, the level of instinct still appears in certain behaviours.

• Example: when a man “sees red”, he may commit an act of violence approved neither by group standards nor by his own reflective judgement when calm.

• The most conscientious individual in modern society often follows group customs without reflection in most matters.

• Such an individual may adopt a new personal standard in only one or two specific matters, differing from those around him.

• The description of these stages reflects a logical order of moral judgement development, not necessarily the actual complexity of real moral judgements at different levels.

The Level of Instinct

• Two contrasting views of primitive man: Rousseau saw him as naturally free and good, living in peace, harmony, goodwill, and happiness without artificial restrictions; Hobbes saw him as self-seeking, acquisitive, and ferocious, leading to a state of war where life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

• Rousseau ignored instinctive tendencies like pugnacity, self-assertion, and acquisitiveness; Hobbes ignored instincts like gregariousness, parental instinct (which extends beyond direct offspring), sympathy, imitation, and suggestibility.

• The life of lower animals is closest to the purely instinctive level and, though poor compared to cultured society, is not constant conflict; gregarious instinct and harmony among instincts are common.

• Painful conflicts linked to moral judgements arise when man’s innate tendencies become conscious desires.

• Rousseau believed in an unconscious harmony of instincts in primitive man, possibly with a mystical unity with nature (Levy-Bruhl’s law of participation), though little evidence exists for this in known primitive societies.

• Primitive societies often control instincts through customary morality supported by supernatural punishments or tabus.

• Animal conduct at the instinctive level is amoral, lacking moral motivation or sense of duty, though the animal may dimly regard following instinct as the “right” thing.

• Instinctive impulses in humans feel axiomatically obvious, e.g., an angry man feeling vengeance is obviously right.

• At the instinctive level, outside circumstances dominate over inner nature, and with full knowledge, conduct could be completely predicted.

• Later moral labelling of instinctive acts (e.g., hen’s defence as “good,” tiger’s slaughter as “bad”) is metaphorical, borrowed from a later stage of morality.

• Even instinctive behaviour can be liked or disliked by members of the same species, influencing self-assertive, repulsion, or pugnacity instincts.

• Westermarck traced the origin of moral disapproval to the violation of self-feeling, prompting resentment.

• Primitive man likely regarded as bad what he disliked.

• The origin of moral judgements in likes and dislikes does not prove they now lack objective validity, just as science’s origin in alchemy does not make it magical.

• Westermarck held impartiality or disinterestedness as essential to moral emotion, which plays a greater role in modern moral judgements than the primitive emotions from which they may have evolved.

• The development of conduct in primitive society progressed in two main directions:

  • (i) It became more social and co-operative, as a single man could do little to meet his needs or protect himself.

  • Innate tendencies like the gregarious instinct, sex instinct, imitativeness, suggestibility, and sympathy implied relations with others.

  • Social nature and the need for better satisfaction of needs led to both temporary and permanent associations.

  • These associations quickly resulted in division of labour, with people performing tasks suited to them.

  • Simple forms included the man defending the home and the woman providing food, or the man hunting while the woman gathered vegetables.

  • Later, the man did outdoor work and the woman indoor work due to childcare needs.

  • Advanced stages required specialized craftsmen like potters and weavers, marking a developing society.

  • (ii) Conduct became more rational, with increased use of intelligence to satisfy needs.

  • Seen in the making of tools and use of stratagem in primitive wars, enabling the weaker to defend against the stronger.

  • At this stage, reason was mainly used in choosing means, but means can become proximate ends, temporarily treated as goals.

  • The distinction between proximate and ultimate ends is often vague, even for civilized man (e.g., passing exams, making money as proximate ends).

• A society entirely at the level of instinct may never have existed in humans or animals.

• The raw material of instinctive tendencies included socializing tendencies from the start.

• Early stages must have involved pleasure in certain conduct and displeasure in others, spreading through suggestibility and sympathy.

• Development towards more rational and more social conduct likely occurred unevenly and spasmodically.

• Despite emphasis on continuity of evolution, at one stage nature made a leap.

• While there are resemblances between animal conduct and savage conduct, the difference is immense, with no intermediate links.

• The most cultured chimpanzee falls far short of the most primitive savage in reasoning, social activity, and communication, and likely in conscious direction of conduct.

• Even at the lowest level, man can judge his own behaviour, a capacity seemingly absent in the animal world.