Absolute and Relative Ethics

• Every science consists of true universal statements, and if ethics is to be a science, it must contain moral judgements true for all humans or at least for all in a certain group.

• Relative ethics holds that no moral rules apply universally to all humans; milder forms allow common standards for a limited group, while extreme forms see morality as purely individual with no standard at all.

• Argument against absolute ethics: There have been many different moral standards across history and cultures; judging one as superior may be due to bias.

• Examples: Duel in the 17th century once seen as honourable is now wrong; Sati once valued by Hindus was condemned by British.

• Counterpoint: Modern anthropologists note less variation in moral codes than once believed; differences often lie in applications of the same principles, not in the principles themselves.

• Example: Chastity applies differently for celibate monks and married life; honour and wifely affection valued across times but expressed differently.

• Factors obscuring similarities in moral codes:

  • Same-named actions may differ in moral quality (e.g., slavery in 1st-century Rome vs. 19th-century Africa).

  • Differences may stem from factual disagreements about consequences, not from principles (e.g., prohibition in America).

• Existing moral codes are seen by absolutists as imperfect approximations to the absolute moral code, allowing differences without denying its existence.

• The emotional basis argument: Moral judgements may originate from emotions (Westermarck); emotions vary among individuals and over time, encouraging belief in relativity.

• Emotions may be a necessary psychological condition for making moral judgements but are not their content (Ewing compares to breathing being necessary for judgement but not its subject).

• Logical positivists argue moral judgements are not real judgements because terms like “ought” cannot be analysed into sense-experienced elements; thus, they are commands, wishes, or exclamations.

• Others accept ethical judgements differ from scientific judgements but hold they can be universal and unconditional without being sensory-based.

• Ethical relativists note lack of agreement on the basis of absolute ethics; in earlier Europe, Christian revelation and faith in reason reduced relativity, but today, with no single accepted basis, belief in relativity is more common.

• Disagreement among moral philosophers now does not prove disagreement will always exist.

• Believing there are no absolute moral standards has consequences that are difficult for any sane person to accept.

• (a) We not only judge actions by our own moral code, but also judge some codes as better than others (e.g., ancient Israelites vs. cannibal tribes).

  • Without absolute standards, such judgements lack a basis; ethical relativists claim preferences are prejudices.

  • Some people prefer codes of other societies, suggesting prejudice may not fully explain moral preference.

  • It seems reasonable to consider higher civilizations (e.g., Roman Stoics, Christians) morally superior to codes permitting cannibalism or blood feuds.

• (b) Without moral superiority, there can be no moral progress or moral decline, which contradicts common modern belief.

• (c) If no code is superior and no progress is possible, moral effort becomes meaningless.

  • Ethical relativists argue one should adhere to the code of oneself or society, but if the code has no superiority over personal appetites, the effort to follow it seems unjustified.

• (d) Logical conclusion of ethical relativity: no man is better than another, as each acts according to their moral outlook.

  • A person who preys on society is not morally worse than one who serves society if all codes are equally valid.

• Ethical relativists counter that they recognize local moral standards for limited groups, not universal ones.

  • However, they do not clearly define the limits of these groups or justify why standards cannot be individualized, which would imply no standards at all.

• Ethical relativists are correct that ordinary moral rules are not the ultimate, unchanging, absolute principles of right and wrong.

  • Ordinary rules are applications of ultimate principles to specific circumstances.

  • Ultimate principles are neither perfectly known nor perfectly embodied in any existing moral code.