The Concept of Value

• Ethics deals with good and bad conduct, whereas axiology deals with good and bad things in general, including beautiful pictures, mystic experiences, and good conduct.

• Axiology is sometimes defined as the science of value.

• Teleological ethical theories hold that an action is right or good if it brings about consequences of value.

• In common English, “good” is used for things of value, though it may cause some ambiguity.

• Some good things, such as the starry heavens, are unaffected by human action, and ethics does not concern itself with these.

• Even for human-made things, the moral quality of conduct is often judged independently of the value of the resulting objects (e.g., a wine producer’s wine).

• Morally good or morally bad consequences of actions include events and actions, not just things.

• Deontological theories assert that only actions can be morally good.

• Central problem: Which consequences of value can be regarded as morally good?

• The term value originates from economics, referring to:

  • Value in use: capacity of an object to satisfy a human need or desire.

  • Value in exchange: amount obtainable in trade or money.

• Prohibitionists may acknowledge value in use, but moral evaluation is independent of this value.

• Morally good things cannot be estimated in monetary terms or purely quantitative terms.

• Utilitarians attempted a hedonistic calculus using this analogy, but it is unrealistic for ordinary moral life.

• David Ross distinguishes between:

  • Objects of satisfaction: have value in use; pleasing things satisfy human desires.

  • Objects of admiration: may bring no ordinary satisfaction, but can produce psychological satisfaction through admiration (e.g., tragedy of King Lear).

• Morally good objects are not merely objects of satisfaction; claiming they are commits the naturalistic fallacy.

• Morally good objects are not solely objects of admiration, to avoid the naturalistic fallacy again.

• Ross introduces “worthy” objects of admiration and “worthy” or “fit” objects of satisfaction, which may be part of good things to aim for.

• Values can also be divided into:

  • Instrumental values: valuable as a means to produce something else of value (e.g., a potato-peeling machine).

  • Absolute values: valuable in themselves, independent of consequences.

• It is commonly thought that only absolute values can be morally good, as they are worthy of admiration.

• However, actions that are means to an end can still be worthy of admiration (e.g., a soldier’s brave deed for a wrong cause is morally admirable for its courageous quality).

• Focus on the teleological view: an action is right or morally good if it leads to consequences of value.

• Consequences of value may be things or events.

• These consequences can have absolute value or instrumental value.

• Such consequences are more likely to be found among objects of admiration rather than objects of satisfaction.

• It has not yet been determined which good consequences are worthy objects of admiration.

• To determine this, the deontological view is considered, which holds that actions have value apart from their consequences.

• Introduces the concept of intrinsic value, which is closely related to absolute value but more carefully defined.