The Use of Language

• Expressions may be grammatically similar but logically different; e.g., “A puppy is a young dog” (definition) vs. “A puppy is a nuisance in the house” (observed fact + emotional reaction).

• Bertrand Russell, following Frege, showed that the apparent logical form of a proposition may not be its real form.

• Wittgenstein demonstrated that many philosophical questions are senseless and do not admit answers, e.g., “Is the Absolute red or yellow?”

• Gilbert Ryle (1932): Philosophy’s main task is to detect misconceptions and absurd theories in linguistic idiom.

• Application to ethics: Early attempts by Russell, Carnap, and Ayer; first systematic treatment by C. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (1945).

• Future ethics writers must examine ethical language use more thoroughly than 19th-century idealists or early 20th-century intuitionists.

• Words are tools for communication and constructive thinking; different sentences serve different functions.

• Prescriptive language: Commands/imperatives; tells someone what to do, e.g., “Shut the door,” “Thou shalt not steal,” “I want you to write this letter.”

• Emotive language: Expresses or evokes emotional attitudes, e.g., “Alas!,” “It’s smashing!,” “What a shame!” vs. “How splendid!”

• Descriptive language: Provides information, tells what to believe and that the speaker believes it, e.g., “Clouds are often followed by rain,” “A puppy is a young dog,” “Go to Glasgow to see the largest city in Scotland.”

• Interrogative language: Questions intended to evoke a statement or command, e.g., “What is the colour of a blackbird’s legs?”, “What shall I do to be saved?”

• Each language type has a characteristic grammatical form: imperative verb (prescriptive), interjection (emotive), indicative verb (descriptive), interrogative pronoun/adjective (interrogative).

• Other grammatical forms can express the same function depending on context and intonation, e.g., “You didn’t speak to him at the meeting” can be a question, statement, or emotive expression.

• Two-function sentences are common in emotive language, combining information and emotion.

• Statements have been historically seen as the sole vehicle of Truth in philosophy; applicable as true or false.

• Misapplying truth/falsity to non-descriptive sentences is a common error in ethics language analysis.

• Verificationist theory of meaning: Sentence has literal meaning only if analytic or empirically verifiable, per Ayer; e.g., “Triangles are three-sided” (analytic), “It will rain tomorrow” (empirically verifiable).

• Philosophers rejecting verificationism still find it possible to engage in a logical study of moral language without adopting the verificationist principle.

The Language used in Ethics

• Most people assume sentences in ethics textbooks, e.g., “To speak the truth is right,” “Stealing is bad,” “One ought to pay one’s debts,” are true statements without being analytic or empirically verifiable.

• If an apparently ethical sentence is verifiable by observation, it may not be an ethical sentence.

• Example: Mr. Hare’s Indian Army Major says “Plunkett is a good fellow,” meaning descriptive facts about Plunkett’s behavior, not a moral judgement.

• Words in moral judgements also have non-ethical uses, e.g., “Pick out the good apples,” “Five sums were right, two wrong,” “The weather ought to be better after Easter.”

• Moral judgements can perform multiple language functions:

  • Prescriptive: Answering “Shall I tell the truth?” with “It is right to tell the truth” ≈ command “Tell the truth.”

  • Emotive: Spectator exclaims “That was nobly done” ≈ expressing admiration or applause.

  • Descriptive: Clergyman’s testimonial “A. is a good girl” implies factual qualities; even if moral, partly descriptive.

• Philosophers of language recognize multiple uses of ethical terms.

• Stevenson: “This is good” ≈ “I approve of this; do so as well,” combining emotive (approval) and prescriptive (command) uses.

• Ayer: Ethical terms express feeling, arouse feeling, and stimulate action, thus having both emotive and prescriptive functions.

• Ethical words are troublesome: same words used in ethical and non-ethical contexts, and even within ethics, may serve multiple functions simultaneously.

• Logical analysis of “good” can follow three methods:

  • (a) Different meanings: “good” in ethics vs. essay marking; ignores common elements shared across uses (addressed by Hare and Urmson).

  • (b) Common element approach: Define total meaning as general commendation (e.g., Oxford English Dictionary), though “commendation” can be vague; e.g., “good load” = large load.

  • (c) Extended meaning: Base on criteria or standards for commendation in different spheres; moral use may include prescriptive element, unlike grading apples.

• Philosophers of language aware of varying uses of ethical terms, but some deny that ethical words have descriptive use, partly reacting to intuitionist view of moral knowledge and partly due to verificationist constraints.

• Examples:

  • Braithwaite: Moral “ought” is non-descriptive.

  • Ayer: Ethical predicates are not factual, do not describe features of situations.

• Using ethical words solely as emotive or prescriptive is inefficient; simpler words like “approve of this; do so as well” could achieve the same purpose without raising philosophical questions.

• There is something more in “good”, which philosophers may seek to capture by dual analysis or multi-use definitions.

• Some philosophers of language, in trying to preserve flexibility and reflect ordinary use of words, sometimes forget that science and philosophy aim to modify language to make words more efficient tools.

• No physicist uses words like “atom” or “force” in the vague, ambiguous way they appear in common speech.

• Similarly, students of ethics, while wanting to connect with common speech for exhortation, need to establish a technical, standard use of terms.

• Mr. Hare’s analytical model constructs a model language, defining artificial moral words in terms of a modified imperative mood.

• Hare cautions that the model is not to be taken too seriously, but it illustrates the kind of serious work philosophers of language should undertake.

• Using words incorrectly is like using a chisel as a screwdriver, which can damage the chisel; similarly, Hare’s Army Major misuses “good” when saying Plunkett is “a good fellow.”

• Vagaries of popular usage constantly spoil words we use as tools in ethical judgements.

• It is the duty of philosophers of language to determine the proper use of words and ensure they are properly applied.