The General Structure

The Constitution of India provides for a federal Government, with separate systems of administration for the Union and the States. It contains provisions for the governance of both, and lays down a uniform structure for the State Government in Part VI of the Constitution, which is applicable to all the States, including the erstwhile State of Jammu & Kashmir [Refer to Chapter 15 for details].

Broadly, the pattern of Government in the States is the same as that for the Union—namely, a parliamentary system. Here, the executive head is a constitutional ruler who acts according to the advice of Ministers responsible to the State Legislature (or to its popular House, where there are two Houses). The exception arises in matters where the Governor of a State is empowered by the Constitution to act “in his discretion” [Article 163(1)].

The Governor

At the head of the executive power of a State is the Governor, just as the President stands at the head of the executive power of the Union. The executive power of the State is vested in the Governor, and all executive action of the State is to be taken in the name of the Governor.

Normally, each State shall have a Governor, but the 1956 amendment makes it possible to appoint the same person as the Governor for two or more States [Article 153].

Appointment and Eligibility:

• The Governor is not elected, but is appointed by the President and holds office at the pleasure of the President.

• Any citizen of India who has completed 35 years of age is eligible for the office.

• The Governor must not hold any other office of profit, nor be a member of the Legislature of the Union or any State [Article 158].

• If a Member of a Legislature is appointed as Governor, he ceases to be a Member immediately upon such appointment.

Tenure and Removal:

• The normal term of office of the Governor is five years.

• However, the tenure may end earlier by:

  1. Dismissal by the President, at whose pleasure he holds the office [Article 156(1)].

  2. Resignation [Article 156(2)].

• The grounds of removal are not specified in the Constitution. However, removal may occur in cases of gross delinquency such as bribery, corruption, treason, or violation of the Constitution.

• A person may be appointed as Governor more than once.

The Debate on Election vs. Appointment:

The Draft Constitution originally provided for elected Governors. However, the Constituent Assembly replaced this with appointment by the President, based on the following arguments:

Arguments in Favor of Appointment:

1. Avoidance of unnecessary elections – Another large-scale election would be costly and would run on personal issues rather than substantive governance.

2. Prevention of superiority complex – An elected Governor might consider himself superior to the Chief Minister, leading to friction.

3. Consistency with the parliamentary system – The Governor is meant to be a constitutional head, with real power lying in the Council of Ministers. An elected Governor might interfere with governance, undermining democracy.

4. Cost efficiency – The expenses and machinery of elections would be disproportionate to the limited powers of the Governor.

5. Prevention of power struggle – An elected Governor might aspire to become Chief Minister, making the position politically unstable and reducing its significance.

6. Central control over States – Appointment by the President allows the Union Government to maintain control over States, ensuring unity and stability.

7. Prevention of separatism – Election of Governors might encourage separatist tendencies. Appointment helps prevent such disruption.

8. Impartiality and detachment – A Governor from outside the State may be more detached, acceptable, and above party politics, while still cooperating with the State Government.

Arguments Against Appointment (in Favor of Election):

1. Alienation from the State – A nominated Governor may be seen as a foreigner and may not understand the local needs of the State.

2. Possibility of friction remains – Even under appointment, friction with the Chief Minister may arise if they belong to different political parties.

3. Comparison with the President – At the Centre, even under a parliamentary system, there exists an elected President (albeit indirectly elected). Hence, the claim that election is incompatible with parliamentary government is weak.

4. Central interference – An appointed Governor, acting under instructions of the Union Government, might run the State contrary to the Cabinet’s wishes, leading to conflicts. In such cases, the Governor would have to be recalled. Election, therefore, could ensure better self-government.

5. Federal principle – Appointment of the head of State executive by the federal executive is contrary to a strict federal system, as seen in the USA and Australia.

Role in Practice:

• In States where one party commands a clear majority, the Governor usually functions as a constitutional and impartial head.

• In States with multiple parties and uncertain legislative support, the Governor often acts as an agent of the Centre. This is evident in cases such as:

  • Sri Rajagopalachari in Madras (1952) – Invited to form a Ministry despite lacking clear legislative support, due to belonging to the ruling party at the Centre.

  • Kerala (1959) – The Communist Ministry of Sri Namboodiripad was dismissed following a report by the Governor under Article 356.

Nevertheless, one positive outcome of the system of appointment by the Centre has been the prevention of disruptive and separatist forces from undermining national unity and strength—a risk that might have arisen under locally elected Governors.