The Structure of Reality – CUET PG Philosophy – Notes

Substance and Qualities

In metaphysics, the inquiry into the fundamental nature of reality often begins with a distinction between a thing and its properties. This is the classic philosophical distinction between substance and qualities. The concept of substance refers to the ultimate, independently existing reality that underlies the changing world of our perceptions. Qualities, also known as attributes, properties, or accidents, are the characteristics or features that a substance possesses and that we perceive, such as color, shape, size, or weight. The central question is: what is the relationship between a thing and its characteristics? Is a thing merely the sum of its qualities, or is there something more, an underlying ‘substratum’, that holds these qualities together?

Aristotle’s Conception of Substance

Aristotle provided one of the most influential accounts of substance (ousia). For him, substance is the fundamental category of being, upon which everything else depends. He distinguished between two types of substance:

• Primary Substance: This refers to the individual, particular thing, such as ‘this man’ (e.g., Socrates) or ‘this horse’. Primary substances are the ultimate subjects of predication; you can say things about Socrates, but Socrates is not said of anything else. They are the fundamental realities that exist independently.
• Secondary Substance: This refers to the species and genera to which a primary substance belongs. For example, ‘man’ is the species to which Socrates belongs, and ‘animal’ is the genus to which the species ‘man’ belongs. Secondary substances are less real than primary substances because their existence is dependent on the existence of individual things. There would be no ‘man’ if there were no individual men.

Qualities, for Aristotle, are called accidents. An accident is a property that a substance has, but which is not essential to its nature. For example, Socrates can be ‘sitting’ or ‘standing’, ‘pale’ or ‘tanned’. These are accidental properties because Socrates remains Socrates whether he is sitting or standing. These accidents cannot exist on their own; they must inhere in a substance. The ‘whiteness’ of a wall exists only because the wall exists. Thus, for Aristotle, substance is the stable, independent reality that persists through changes in its accidental qualities.

The Rationalist Debate: Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz

The rationalist philosophers of the 17th century placed the concept of substance at the core of their metaphysical systems, though they came to radically different conclusions.

René Descartes defined substance as “a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence.” Strictly speaking, only God fits this definition perfectly as the ultimate, uncreated substance. However, Descartes also identified two created substances that depend only on God for their existence:

1. Res Cogitans (Thinking Substance): This is the mind, which is non-extended, immaterial, and whose principal attribute is thought.
2. Res Extensa (Extended Substance): This is matter, which is nonthinking, extended in three dimensions (length, breadth, depth), and whose principal attribute is extension.

This view is known as substance dualism, positing two fundamentally different kinds of reality. All qualities are modes of either thought or extension.

Baruch Spinoza reacted against Cartesian dualism by arguing for a radical monism. He claimed there could only be one substance, which he identified with God or Nature (Deus sive Natura). This single substance is infinite, eternal, and self-caused. What Descartes called ‘substances’ (mind and matter), Spinoza re-categorized as attributes of the one substance. An attribute is “that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence.” While the one substance has infinite attributes, humans are only aware of two: Thought and Extension. Individual things, like a particular person or a rock, are not substances but modes-modifications or states of the one substance. Thus, everything in the universe is a part of and an expression of this single, all-encompassing reality.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz proposed adifferent view: pluralism. He argued that the universe is composed of an infinite number of simple, indivisible, non-extended, and mind-like substances called monads. Each monad is a unique center of perception and activity. Unlike Spinoza’s single substance, reality for Leibniz is a multiplicity of active, self-contained substances. Monads are “windowless,” meaning they do not causally interact with each other. The apparent interaction and harmony of the universe are explained by a “pre-established harmony” ordained by God, who created the monads in such a way that their internal development would correspond with one another perfectly.