IMPORTANCE OF CONCEPT

• The concept of cause has played a very important role in both science and philosophy.

• Some claim modern science can dispense with cause, but they reject a particular metaphysical conception of cause, not the practical use of it.

• Science and practical action both require the ability to infer from observed cases to unobserved cases, essential for making generalizations and predictions.

• The concept of cause involves passing from what has happened to what is likely to happen, which is necessary for any science or practical steps.

• This inference problem has always been a challenge for empiricists, because predicting the future is not based on empirical observation of the future.

• The topic also poses difficulties for rationalists.

• Until Hume, it was generally accepted that the principle “every change has a cause” was known a priori and was a necessary presupposition for science.

• Hume did not reject the principle of causation outright but raised philosophical difficulties making it impossible to fully justify or defend.

• The minimum principle of causation necessary for science is that the repeated occurrence of certain events under certain conditions makes it likely that similar events will occur under similar conditions.

• Without this principle, we cannot make any scientific predictions or move from the observed to the unobserved.

REGULARITY THEORY

• Philosophical theories about the nature of causation explore what is meant by the term “cause.”

• An empiricist tends to identify causation with regular sequence because it can be observed empirically.

• Empiricists must still assume the principle that past regularity predicts future regularity, though it cannot be justified empirically.

• According to the regularity view, “A causes B” means B usually or always follows A when A and B are classes of events.

• This differs from the common-sense view, where causation involves a special connection or active power causing the effect.

• The regularity view denies any intrinsic necessary connection or explanation of why the effect happens; it only states what precedes the effect.

• The theory contrasts sharply with common-sense but remains popular due to its alignment with empiricism and rejection of a priori concepts.

• In the physical world, even if causation is just regular sequence, no intelligible connection explains why effects must follow causes.

• Chemists may derive propositions (e.g., “wood burns”) from general principles, but the truth of those principles is only known empirically.

• The regularity view faces problems when applied to single events: complex causes (e.g., wars, economic depressions) cannot be satisfactorily explained by mere regular sequence.

• Saying “Hitler’s invasion caused WWII” implies more than just that the war followed the invasion; it implies a specific causal relation not captured by regularity alone.

• Some regular sequences are not causation: e.g., a factory hooter sounding at 8 a.m. is regularly followed by workers arriving at that factory and at another factory in Manchester, but only the first is caused by the hooter.

• These difficulties might be addressed by minor modifications of the theory, but some problems are more serious.

• The theory is particularly inapplicable in psychology:

  • When I believe something for a reason, my belief must be determined by the reason itself, not merely by a pattern of mental states.

  • Saying an action is caused by will means it is genuinely determined by the will, not just that it follows a usual pattern of similar mental states.

  • Memory requires that my present consciousness be genuinely determined by the past event remembered, not just correlated.

• Without genuine determination by causes (reasons, will, past events), reasonableness, intentionality, and memory would be undermined.