PRIMARY CERTAINTY OF EXPERIENCE REPLY TO BEHAVIOURISM

• The primary certainty is not the existence of physical objects but experience, which is mental.

• When I think I perceive a physical object, I might be dreaming, but I cannot dream that I (my mind) do not exist.

• It might be an illusion that I have a body, but not an illusion that I think or experience, since doubting or believing requires thinking and experiencing.

• This is the famous Descartes’ argument: “I think, therefore I am” (cogito ergo sum), which establishes the present existence of a thought as experience, not necessarily a permanent self.

• The argument shows the primary certainty of experience against those who claim only matter is real.

• Logical certainty falls into two classes: (i) Certain a priori propositions (like laws of logic) that cannot be denied without absurdity, and (ii) My own present existence as a thinking being, which is self-contradictory to deny for me personally.

• The logically certain is not the same as what is practically certain; some propositions are immediately known and absolutely certain (like certain introspective judgments), even if not logically necessary.

• We cannot claim absolute certainty for judgments about physical objects or other minds.

• Descartes’ cogito is the start of modern philosophy and the subjective turn, focusing inward on human knowledge capacity.

• The cogito does not prove the independent existence of what is thought; what is thought may be a mental image dependent on the thinker.

• The argument exposes the absurdity of philosophical behaviourism, which tries to deny mental events or identify them only with physical behavior.

• Behaviourism as a philosophy either denies mental events (impossible since believing is a mental event) or identifies mental events solely with physiological events like vocal movements.

• To refute behaviourism, consider pain: the subjective feeling of pain is fundamentally different from observable physical reactions (withdrawal, vocalizations) or brain processes.

• Mental events are empirically distinct from physiological events, not just a matter of metaphysics.

• Behaviourism’s truth is that we can only know other minds through bodily behavior, interpreted via our own immediate mental experience, not our own bodies.

• The mind should not be seen as a metaphysical hypothesis behind experience but as the conceptual unity of our own or another person’s diverse experiences.

• Philosophers generally avoid distinctions like mind, soul, and spirit, using “mind” to refer broadly to a person’s inner nature, not just intellectual aspects.

DIFFERENT ELEMENTS IN THE MIND

• In our experience, we find sensuous elements such as sensa and images which resemble qualities of physical objects rather than qualities of the mind itself.

• Sensa and images are mind-dependent but not attributes of the mind; e.g., when seeing the blue sky, the mind itself is not blue.

• Important to distinguish between ‘sensation’ as sensing (an attribute of mind) and ‘sensation’ as what is sensed (not an attribute of mind).

• Investigation of sensa and images is a key part of psychology.

• Images are closely linked to thought processes; thinking usually involves some kind of imagery. Words themselves are sensuous images (visual marks or sounds).

• The mental side of ourselves is classified into three aspects:

  • Affective (feeling side)

  • Cognitive (knowing, believing, reasoning, perceiving)

  • Conative (acting, willing, striving, desiring)

• These three aspects are not separate; most mental processes involve all three simultaneously.

• Feelings (affective) are almost always present, even when half asleep; pure cognitive or conative states without feelings are rare or nonexistent.

• Example: emotions like anger or fear involve feelings (affective), striving or will to act (conative), and recognizing the situation (cognitive).

• Cognition is linked to conation by aiming for some end (e.g., discovering truth) and by voluntarily directing attention.

• Attention connects with interest, which connects with feelings of pleasure or displeasure.

• Philosophers differ by which of the three mental sides they emphasize:

  • Those emphasizing cognition see reality as a rational, logical system where everything has a reason.

  • Those emphasizing conation prioritize will and activity; cognitions are means to practical ends.

  • Those emphasizing affection (sensations as feelings) derive knowledge from sense-experience; Hume’s psychology is an example reducing everything to feelings.

• In moral philosophy, similarly:

  • Some make the chief good a cognitive state (e.g., contemplation or clear ideas).

  • Some like Kant find the chief good in the moral will.

  • Others find the chief good in happiness or pleasure (feeling).

• A balanced, right view should do justice to all three aspects of our nature: affective, cognitive, and conative.

• Some philosophers accept images and sensa but deny the existence of mental acts or processes like knowing, believing, willing because these are not directly accessible by introspection.

• We cannot introspect these acts alone because they are essentially bound to an object (e.g., cannot know without knowing something).

• Although we can’t observe these activities isolated, we can distinguish between willing and not willing, believing and doubting the same object, which gives us an idea of these acts.

• We cannot fully explain the self using only images and sensa, especially regarding thought.

• Often, the only images discernible in thought are words, especially in abstract subjects like philosophy or economics.

• We depend on verbal images for thinking about abstract topics because we cannot form pictorial images like the objects of thought.

• Denying mental events beyond sensa and images would require claiming that thinking about philosophy is only a combination of verbal images, but this fails to explain the difference between meaningful statements and nonsense syllables.

• The meaning of many scientific theories and abstract concepts cannot be expressed or understood purely through sensuous imagery or verbal images.

• Understanding is a mental process that cannot be fully explained by images, either verbal or nonverbal.

• Attempts to analyze belief purely in terms of behavior (acting as if A were B) face serious objections:

  • Defining belief as “acting as if” is circular since it presupposes belief itself.

  • People can hold beliefs they do not act upon, so hypothetical action cannot fully define belief.

  • Beliefs are immediately known in many cases, without needing to infer hypothetical actions.

  • Identifying belief with saying words expressing it fails because one might say words without truly believing.

  • The theory ignores human folly and immorality, where people hold beliefs but act contrary due to desires or irrationality.

• Similarly, desiring, willing, liking, etc., cannot be analyzed in terms of imagery.

• There are two kinds of attributes in immediate experience:

  • Specifically mental attributes (e.g., desires, beliefs)

  • Attributes of sensa and images (sensory qualities)

• The latter could be conceived as existing unexperienced, but the former cannot (e.g., no one would say pleasure or pain could exist unexperienced).

• Philosophy and psychology say very little about the specifically mental side because we reach characteristics knowable by experience but indefinable further.

• Analysis presupposes unanalysable characteristics which we know well enough by experience but cannot explain so that someone without that experience could understand them.