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Book No. – 19 (Philosophy)
Book Name – The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy – A.C. Ewing
What’s Inside the Chapter? (After Subscription)
1. PRIMARY CERTAINTY OF EXPERIENCE REPLY TO BEHAVIOURISM
2. DIFFERENT ELEMENTS IN THE MIND
3. DISPOSITIONAL PROPERTIES
4. ‘UNCONSCIOUS’ DESIRES
5. SELF-IDENTITY AND THE CONCEPTION OF THE SELF AS A SUBSTANCE
6. KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER MINDS
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Mind
Chapter – 5

PRIMARY CERTAINTY OF EXPERIENCE REPLY TO BEHAVIOURISM
The primary certainty is not the existence of physical objects but experience, which is mental.
When I think I perceive a physical object, I might be dreaming, but I cannot dream that I (my mind) do not exist.
It might be an illusion that I have a body, but not an illusion that I think or experience, since doubting or believing requires thinking and experiencing.
This is the famous Descartes’ argument: “I think, therefore I am” (cogito ergo sum), which establishes the present existence of a thought as experience, not necessarily a permanent self.
The argument shows the primary certainty of experience against those who claim only matter is real.
Logical certainty falls into two classes: (i) Certain a priori propositions (like laws of logic) that cannot be denied without absurdity, and (ii) My own present existence as a thinking being, which is self-contradictory to deny for me personally.
The logically certain is not the same as what is practically certain; some propositions are immediately known and absolutely certain (like certain introspective judgments), even if not logically necessary.
We cannot claim absolute certainty for judgments about physical objects or other minds.
Descartes’ cogito is the start of modern philosophy and the subjective turn, focusing inward on human knowledge capacity.
The cogito does not prove the independent existence of what is thought; what is thought may be a mental image dependent on the thinker.
The argument exposes the absurdity of philosophical behaviourism, which tries to deny mental events or identify them only with physical behavior.
Behaviourism as a philosophy either denies mental events (impossible since believing is a mental event) or identifies mental events solely with physiological events like vocal movements.
To refute behaviourism, consider pain: the subjective feeling of pain is fundamentally different from observable physical reactions (withdrawal, vocalizations) or brain processes.
Mental events are empirically distinct from physiological events, not just a matter of metaphysics.
Behaviourism’s truth is that we can only know other minds through bodily behavior, interpreted via our own immediate mental experience, not our own bodies.
The mind should not be seen as a metaphysical hypothesis behind experience but as the conceptual unity of our own or another person’s diverse experiences.
Philosophers generally avoid distinctions like mind, soul, and spirit, using “mind” to refer broadly to a person’s inner nature, not just intellectual aspects.
DIFFERENT ELEMENTS IN THE MIND
In our experience, we find sensuous elements such as sensa and images which resemble qualities of physical objects rather than qualities of the mind itself.
Sensa and images are mind-dependent but not attributes of the mind; e.g., when seeing the blue sky, the mind itself is not blue.
Important to distinguish between ‘sensation’ as sensing (an attribute of mind) and ‘sensation’ as what is sensed (not an attribute of mind).
Investigation of sensa and images is a key part of psychology.
Images are closely linked to thought processes; thinking usually involves some kind of imagery. Words themselves are sensuous images (visual marks or sounds).
The mental side of ourselves is classified into three aspects:
Affective (feeling side)
Cognitive (knowing, believing, reasoning, perceiving)
Conative (acting, willing, striving, desiring)
These three aspects are not separate; most mental processes involve all three simultaneously.
Feelings (affective) are almost always present, even when half asleep; pure cognitive or conative states without feelings are rare or nonexistent.
Example: emotions like anger or fear involve feelings (affective), striving or will to act (conative), and recognizing the situation (cognitive).
Cognition is linked to conation by aiming for some end (e.g., discovering truth) and by voluntarily directing attention.
Attention connects with interest, which connects with feelings of pleasure or displeasure.
Philosophers differ by which of the three mental sides they emphasize:
Those emphasizing cognition see reality as a rational, logical system where everything has a reason.
Those emphasizing conation prioritize will and activity; cognitions are means to practical ends.
Those emphasizing affection (sensations as feelings) derive knowledge from sense-experience; Hume’s psychology is an example reducing everything to feelings.
In moral philosophy, similarly:
Some make the chief good a cognitive state (e.g., contemplation or clear ideas).
Some like Kant find the chief good in the moral will.
Others find the chief good in happiness or pleasure (feeling).
A balanced, right view should do justice to all three aspects of our nature: affective, cognitive, and conative.
Some philosophers accept images and sensa but deny the existence of mental acts or processes like knowing, believing, willing because these are not directly accessible by introspection.
We cannot introspect these acts alone because they are essentially bound to an object (e.g., cannot know without knowing something).
Although we can’t observe these activities isolated, we can distinguish between willing and not willing, believing and doubting the same object, which gives us an idea of these acts.
We cannot fully explain the self using only images and sensa, especially regarding thought.
Often, the only images discernible in thought are words, especially in abstract subjects like philosophy or economics.
We depend on verbal images for thinking about abstract topics because we cannot form pictorial images like the objects of thought.
Denying mental events beyond sensa and images would require claiming that thinking about philosophy is only a combination of verbal images, but this fails to explain the difference between meaningful statements and nonsense syllables.
The meaning of many scientific theories and abstract concepts cannot be expressed or understood purely through sensuous imagery or verbal images.
Understanding is a mental process that cannot be fully explained by images, either verbal or nonverbal.
Attempts to analyze belief purely in terms of behavior (acting as if A were B) face serious objections:
Defining belief as “acting as if” is circular since it presupposes belief itself.
People can hold beliefs they do not act upon, so hypothetical action cannot fully define belief.
Beliefs are immediately known in many cases, without needing to infer hypothetical actions.
Identifying belief with saying words expressing it fails because one might say words without truly believing.
The theory ignores human folly and immorality, where people hold beliefs but act contrary due to desires or irrationality.
Similarly, desiring, willing, liking, etc., cannot be analyzed in terms of imagery.
There are two kinds of attributes in immediate experience:
Specifically mental attributes (e.g., desires, beliefs)
Attributes of sensa and images (sensory qualities)
The latter could be conceived as existing unexperienced, but the former cannot (e.g., no one would say pleasure or pain could exist unexperienced).
Philosophy and psychology say very little about the specifically mental side because we reach characteristics knowable by experience but indefinable further.
Analysis presupposes unanalysable characteristics which we know well enough by experience but cannot explain so that someone without that experience could understand them.