Right and Wrong

• This book discusses ethics, focusing on concepts of right and wrong, and good and bad in human life.
• A common view holds that morality is subjective, unlike science which deals with objective facts.
• According to this view, moral disagreements arise because there are no moral facts, only personal opinions.
• This perspective suggests that while science is objective, morality is subjective.
• This debate about the subjectivity or objectivity of morality dates back to ancient times, particularly to Plato’s dialogues.
• Plato’s dialogues often feature conversations between Socrates and various figures, including the Sophists.
• The Sophists argued that there is a fundamental difference between facts (physis) and values (nomos), with values being subjective.
• They believed ethical arguments are about persuasion rather than proof or demonstration.
• Plato, through Socrates, argued against the Sophists, asserting that there are objective truths about good and bad.
• Plato believed that reasoning could help discover these truths and that expertise in philosophy was essential to finding the right answers.
• The issue between Socrates (or Plato) and the Sophists can be seen as a debate about the objectivity of morality.
• The Sophists viewed morality as subjective, reflecting human opinions and desires.
• Plato and Socrates viewed morality as objective, part of the nature of the world.
• This debate marks the beginning of moral philosophy in the Western tradition.
• The historical dispute between Plato and the Sophists is complex, with distinctions such as Protagoras being more of a relativist than a subjectivist.
• The reference to this debate is to highlight a similar contemporary debate about the nature of morality.
• Modern students often view morality as subjective, contrasting with past periods where many believed in objective moral laws.
• Despite historical differences, both subjectivism and objectivism remain relevant philosophical options.
• Human rights activists and environmental campaigners often adopt an objectivist stance, believing in universal obligations.
• Engaging in philosophical thinking about ethics involves considering reasons for and against subjectivism and objectivism.
• The critical question remains: Which view is correct?

Relativism and Subjectivism

• Many people believe the subjectivity of morality is obvious.
• If true, it should be easy to produce good reasons supporting subjectivism.
• Common reasons for subjectivism include:
  • People hold conflicting moral opinions.
  • The impossibility of proving one moral view’s superiority over another.
  • The lack of observable moral “facts.”
• Assessing subjectivism involves examining the truth of these claims and their implications.
• The first proposition—serious moral disagreements exist—cannot be denied.
• These disagreements occur not just individually but also between entire cultures.
• Herodotus provides an example with Greek and Callatian funeral practices.
  • Greeks practiced cremation, which the Callatians found abhorrent.
  • This example illustrates “ethical relativism,” the belief that ethical views are culturally relative.
• Ethical relativism implies there is nothing universally right or wrong.
• Subjectivism extends relativism from social groups to individuals.
• Subjectivism suggests no universal ethical truth; what is right for one person may be wrong for another.
• Modern examples, like abortion, show agreement on medical procedures but not on moral rightness.
• Similar disagreements exist on capital punishment and euthanasia.
• While moral disagreements are prominent, there is significant moral agreement in contemporary society.
• Few people think rape, murder, or theft are good, or honesty, loyalty, and generosity are evil.
• Everyone condemns slavery, child molestation, and cheating at sport.
• No one is openly proud of deviant behaviors like child molestation.
• Moral disagreement is often exaggerated because it garners more attention.
• There is much moral agreement on issues like slavery, child prostitution, and famine relief.
• Scientific disagreement is also exaggerated, as consensus is needed for widespread acceptance.
• Natural science is marked by radical disagreements between experts.
• History shows dramatic scientific disagreements, such as Newtonian mechanics replacing Aristotelian physics, then being replaced by Einstein’s theory of relativity.
• Science progresses through generations disputing previous hypotheses.

Proof and Probability

• Subjectivists argue there is a significant difference between science and ethics.
• Einstein didn’t just disagree with Newton; he disproved him, showing scientific progress.
• In ethics, opinions change over time but don’t progress, lacking proof or disproof, just consensus or disagreement.
• Subjectivists claim there is no such thing as moral proof.
• Logical or mathematical deduction proofs must start from agreed premises.
• Subjectivists haven’t shown that people can’t agree on moral premises.
• Outside of mathematics and logic, strict proof is rare in human life.
• Legal proof, required in courts, operates with different standards:
  • Criminal cases: Beyond reasonable doubt.
  • Civil cases: More probable than the opponent’s story.
• Applying a legal concept of proof to morality suggests moral “proofs” are possible.
• Reaching an impasse in moral arguments doesn’t imply lack of proof possibilities.
• Legal standards of reasonable doubt and probability can be applied in morality.
• Absence of proof doesn’t imply no truth exists, only that we can’t currently know it.
• Historical example: Day of the week of Henry VIII’s marriage to Anne Boleyn.
  • Lack of proof doesn’t mean no truth exists.
• Legal proof is more plausible than logical proof for moral arguments.
• Many factual matters also lack definitive proof but have a truth of the matter.
• Examples in history, geomorphology, climatology, and physiology show some questions are irresolvable.
• Lack of proof doesn’t mean all opinions are equally valid.
• Subjectivists argue moral disagreements are irresolvable in principle.
• Moral disagreements lack empirical evidence equivalent to scientific evidence.
• Subjectivists claim there are no moral facts to provide proof.

Moral Realism

• Subjectivism is sometimes called “noncognitivism,” meaning “not a matter of knowledge.”
• According to noncognitivists, moral disagreements are not about facts but rather expressions of sentiments.
• David Hume, an 18th-century Scottish philosopher, famously endorsed this view.
• Hume’s argument: Examining an action like willful murder reveals only passions, motives, volitions, and thoughts, not an objective vice.
• Moral realism, opposed by Hume, claims moral values are real properties of people and actions, like physical properties of objects.
• J. L. Mackie criticized moral realism, citing three aspects of its “queerness”:
  • Moral properties can’t be discovered through senses like physical properties can (e.g., light, dark, hot, cold).
  • Gilbert Harman pointed out that moral properties differ from physical properties in explanatory power.
    • Physical properties explain observations (e.g., feeling heat requires the presence of heat).
    • Moral properties don’t explain moral observations; psychology of the observer does (e.g., feeling moral revulsion requires only moral beliefs).
  • Hume and Mackie argue that perception of properties is “inert,” meaning it doesn’t lead to action by itself.
    • Observing a yellow sweater doesn’t imply any action; desire does.
    • Morality requires action-guiding force, but moral properties lack this.
    • Mackie: Moral reasoning must yield “authoritatively prescriptive conclusions,” but sensory perception can’t explain authoritative prescriptivity.
• Hume’s problem widely known as “the naturalistic fallacy”:
  • Moral systems often transition imperceptibly from descriptive propositions (is) to prescriptive ones (ought), which is a significant and problematic shift.

• Hume argues that deriving an “ought” from an “is” is logically invalid; statements of fact cannot have prescriptive implications.
• Propositions referring to “real” moral properties provide no rational basis for action because they describe how the world is, not how it ought to be.
• According to another version of the naturalistic fallacy, we cannot infer good and bad from is and is not.
• The “open question argument” illustrates this: for any natural property, it always makes sense to ask “Is it good?” showing that “good” and “bad” cannot be natural properties like “hard” and “soft.”
  • For example, if happiness is claimed to be naturally good, we can still ask “Is happiness good?” indicating the question is sensible and disputable.
• The open question argument was formulated by G. E. Moore in his book “Principia Ethica.”
• Moore’s argument influenced philosophical discussion, though not everyone agreed with it.
• Despite the argument, Moore was a kind of moral realist, believing in the existence of moral properties.
• Moore declared that goodness is a “non-natural” property and indefinable, similar to how yellow is indefinable yet recognizable.
  • Moore believed we just “see” the property of goodness in things, like we see yellowness in yellow objects.
  • In “Principia Ethica,” Moore argued that consciousness of personal affection and beauty has this indefinable goodness, stating this as the “ultimate and fundamental truth of Moral Philosophy.”
• Moore’s view was initially persuasive, but many philosophers criticized his reliance on non-natural properties.
• Moore’s appeal to non-natural properties implied a need for a non-natural sense to apprehend them, raising questions about what this special sense could be.
• Appeals to “conscience” do not resolve the issue, as the naturalistic fallacy shows that value judgments cannot be inferred from natural facts using ordinary perception.
• Introducing an internal detector of “non-natural” facts complicates the matter, making it more mysterious.

Moral Rationalism

• In the “Treatise,” Hume allows reason to operate in two spheres: “matters of fact” and “relations of ideas.”
• “Matters of fact” pertain to empirical observations, while “relations of ideas” refer to mathematics and logic.
• The moral realist struggles with “matters of fact” in moral perception but might explore “relations of ideas.”
• An example argument:
  1. You promised to pay back the money you borrowed.
  2. Promises ought to be kept.
  3. Therefore, you ought to pay back the money you borrowed.
• This argument is logically valid; if the premises are accepted, the conclusion must be accepted.
• Critics argue the second premise, “Promises ought to be kept,” is a moral principle, not a factual claim.
• Despite not being a factual claim, this premise can be seen as true in virtue of relations between ideas.
• Understanding the concept of a promise and obligation implies that promises ought to be kept.
• This idea is more complex than Hume’s analytic truths but aligns with John Searle’s distinction between regulative and constitutive rules.
• Regulative rules regulate existing behavior (e.g., polite table behavior), while constitutive rules create new forms of behavior (e.g., rules of chess, marriage, money, promising).
• Promises and obligations are related by a constitutive rule, not by linguistic definition.
• Hume is right that moral reasoning is not based on perception but wrong to dismiss reasoning about moral matters.
• “Moral rationalism” focuses on the ability to think and judge rather than on perception.
• Thomas Reid, Hume’s contemporary critic, argued that rational belief is based on first principles or reasoned deductions from them.
• Disputes about reasoning deductions appeal to rules of reasoning, while disputes about first principles appeal to common sense.
• Reid’s “common sense” refers to deep-seated principles essential to human transactions, not just widely held opinions.
• Common sense moral principles include:
  • Some actions deserve praise, and others blame.
  • Voluntary actions can be praised or blamed.
  • Inaction can be as blameworthy as action.
• These principles are fundamental and necessary for meaningful conduct, unlike widely held but historically contingent beliefs like the wrongness of slavery.
• Principles distinguishing voluntary from involuntary actions and the accountability for inaction are essential for any system of conduct.

• Reid lists additional principles governing rational conduct:
  • A greater good is to be preferred to a lesser one, and a lesser evil to a greater one.
  • Human beings are essentially social.
  • A lack of honesty, not intellectual ability, commonly clouds moral judgment.
• Using these principles, Reid believes we can determine our duties to ourselves and others.
• This “working out” what we ought to do aligns moral reasoning with general reasoning.
• Unlike moral realism, which requires a special kind of property and perception, moral rationalism requires:
  • Reasoning in accordance with indispensable principles.
  • Paying attention to facts.
  • Understanding the concepts employed.
  • Acting with fairness and impartiality.
• Moral reasoning is akin to legal reasoning, where arguments are constructed based on rules of reasoning, factual evidence, and legal concepts.
• Differences include the fact that laws are established by legislative bodies, while there is no obvious moral equivalent.
• Reid believes God is the ultimate source of moral law, but moral agents do not need to believe this to act morally.
• Conscience, for Reid, is the capacity to reason about moral matters, not an occult faculty of perception.
• The ability to invoke general principles and reason about their application counters subjectivist views.
• Morality engages both rational faculties and feelings.
• Like in a court of law, moral reasoning involves constructing arguments with clear conclusions about what ought to be done.
• Such arguments provide proof beyond reasonable doubt, not absolute proof.
• Legal reasoning is a good way to resolve disagreements and decide what is right and proper.
• The same approach applies to morality.
• Moral rationalists make three claims:
  • There are no grounds to declare reason powerless with respect to morality from the outset.
  • Clear and cogent reasoning is the most plausible and intelligent approach to moral questions and disagreements.
  • Belief in the rationality of morality does not require metaphysical realism or a special moral sense.
• Practical reasoning in other contexts does not need these supports, nor does morality.

• Reid’s conception of common sense parallels Wittgenstein’s concept of a “form of life” from his Philosophical Investigations.
• Wittgenstein’s method is distinctive, with a focus on mind and language rather than traditional moral philosophy.
• Wittgenstein highlights that humans use words for more than naming properties or formulating propositions:
  • They ask questions, issue commands, pay compliments, give greetings, express wishes, warn, praise, encourage, say prayers, etc.
• Wittgenstein calls these activities “language games” to emphasize the functional aspect of language.
• Language learning in children involves engaging with others in various activities, not just naming objects.
• Language inducts children into a form of life, a way of being in the world, facilitated by shared human desires, reactions, and responses.
• This shared background makes language possible and underlies mutual understanding and cooperation.
• Applying this insight to morality:
  • Human beings differ in attitudes and opinions, but share the language to express these differences.
  • Morality is not primarily cognitive but practical—focused on performing, praising, recommending, condemning, and deciding actions.
• This perspective aligns with Reid’s view that morality is about practical judgment, not just emotional feeling, countering Hume’s stance.

Objectivism

• Feelings vary in intensity but lack inherent rightness or wrongness according to Hume.
• Hume’s view suggests morality as feeling lacks objective moral truth; shared moral feelings arise from social norms and upbringing.
• Reid argues moral judgment should guide feelings, not vice versa, rooted in practical rationality for objectivity.
• The debate between Reid (objectivism) and Hume (subjectivism) is part of a broader philosophical dispute.
• Practical judgment over moral truth is a promising approach, evident in fields like artistic judgment.
• Reid’s Practical Ethics lectures emphasize humans’ ability to pursue a great End in Life, unlike instinct-driven animals.
• Philosophy distinguishes between personal pursuit of principles and societal pursuit of rules and principles for communal living.
• Recent philosophical focus has leaned towards societal principles; Chapter 2 will delve into this.