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SUB-TOPIC INFO – Philosophy (Section I: Metaphysics)
CONTENT TYPE – Short Notes
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Free Will and Determinism
(Metaphysics)
CUET PG – Philosophy (Notes)

Free Will
Free Will refers to the capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action among alternatives.
The question of free will relates directly to issues of moral responsibility, determinism, and causal necessity.
Ancient Greek philosophy contains early discussions of free will. Aristotle wrote about voluntary and involuntary actions, emphasizing intention and choice as central to moral evaluation.
Epicurus argued that atomic “swerves” (clinamen) introduced indeterminacy, making room for free will.
Stoics like Chrysippus proposed a compatibilist view, maintaining that human actions are predetermined by fate yet still voluntary if they arise from internal assent.
Augustine of Hippo in early Christian thought emphasized free will as necessary for sin and grace, arguing that humans have free choice but require divine assistance to do good.
Thomas Aquinas synthesized Aristotelian philosophy and Christianity, describing free will as the rational appetite—the will is moved by the intellect, yet it retains freedom to choose among perceived goods.
In modern philosophy, René Descartes saw the will as infinite, even if human understanding is finite.
Baruch Spinoza denied free will, claiming that all things, including human decisions, are determined by God’s nature and causal necessity.
Thomas Hobbes defined freedom as the absence of external impediments, laying groundwork for compatibilist positions.
David Hume defended compatibilism by arguing that freedom means actions flow from one’s character and desires, even if causally determined.
Immanuel Kant distinguished between the phenomenal world (deterministic) and noumenal world (free), positing that moral responsibility depends on transcendental freedom.
Arthur Schopenhauer argued that humans can do what they will, but they cannot will what they will, highlighting a deterministic view of the will’s origins.
In 19th-century philosophy, Friedrich Nietzsche rejected metaphysical free will, viewing it as a psychological construct useful for moral judgment.
William James argued for pragmatist indeterminism, claiming that some decisions are not predetermined and that this underpins moral responsibility.
Contemporary analytic philosophy debates free will primarily in terms of compatibilism vs. incompatibilism:
Compatibilism holds that determinism and free will are compatible.
Incompatibilism claims that if determinism is true, free will cannot exist.
Libertarianism (in metaphysics) is the view that some human actions are free in a way that requires indeterminism.
Hard determinism denies free will entirely, asserting that causal determinism governs all actions.
Peter van Inwagen developed the Consequence Argument, stating that if determinism is true, then humans have no power over the consequences of past events and laws of nature.
Harry Frankfurt introduced the idea of hierarchical compatibilism, arguing that freedom consists in acting on desires with which one identifies (second-order volitions).
Robert Kane defends a libertarian view that self-forming actions are undetermined and form the basis for moral responsibility.
The debate often examines causal determinism, the thesis that every event is necessitated by preceding events and laws of nature.
Indeterminism holds that not all events are causally determined, sometimes citing quantum mechanics as a possible source of genuine randomness.
Critics of indeterminism argue that randomness does not create meaningful freedom, because uncaused events are arbitrary.
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) holds that moral responsibility requires that a person could have done otherwise.
Frankfurt cases attempt to show that moral responsibility can exist without alternative possibilities, challenging PAP.
Reactive attitudes, as described by P.F. Strawson, suggest that interpersonal relationships and practices of praise and blame presuppose a kind of freedom, independent of metaphysical determinism.
Experimental philosophy studies public intuitions about free will and moral responsibility using surveys and cognitive science methods.
Neuroscience, including experiments by Benjamin Libet, has raised questions by suggesting that brain activity precedes conscious decisions.
Libet’s experiments showed readiness potentials in the brain hundreds of milliseconds before subjects reported deciding to act.
Some philosophers argue that these findings challenge conscious free will, while others reply that conscious veto (“free won’t”) remains intact.
Daniel Dennett defends a compatibilist account, proposing that free will is a kind of evolved self-control and rational responsiveness.
Galen Strawson argues for hard incompatibilism, holding that no agent is ultimately morally responsible because they cannot create themselves.
Susan Wolf proposed the notion of “reason-responsive” compatibilism, where free will requires the capacity to recognize and act on reasons.
Derk Pereboom defends hard incompatibilism, suggesting that determinism and indeterminism both undermine moral responsibility.
Freedom of action (doing what one wants) and freedom of will (wanting what one wants) are often distinguished in analytic philosophy.
Existentialist philosophy, especially Jean-Paul Sartre, insists that humans are radically free and responsible for creating meaning through choice.
Sartre declared that “existence precedes essence,” implying that people define themselves through acts of will.
Religious traditions have various positions on free will:
Christianity often maintains that divine omniscience and providence are compatible with free will (compatibilism).
Islamic theology debates between Qadar (predestination) and free choice.
Hindu philosophy includes ideas of karma and free will, emphasizing moral agency within cosmic law.
The problem of foreknowledge and free will argues that if God knows the future, then human freedom is compromised.
Boethius, in The Consolation of Philosophy, argued that God’s knowledge is eternal (outside of time), and thus does not necessitate human actions.
Free will remains a central topic in metaphysics, ethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of religion.
Debates continue over whether compatibilism is merely a semantic redefinition of freedom or a substantive account.
Many philosophers agree that the stakes of the debate include moral responsibility, punishment, agency, and personal identity.