From The Cold War to The War on Terror

From The Cold War to The War on Terror

John Baylis

Chapter – 4

Harshit Sharma

Alumnus (BHU)

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Introduction

Major wars create enormous challenges for those tasked with making peace.
Following the Napoleonic Wars, the Congress of Vienna aimed to establish a new European order after 20 years of revolutionary turmoil.
After World War I, statesmen sought to address the aftermath of a devastating conflict.
World War II resulted in 50 million deaths, millions displaced, and Germany and Japan left in ruins, prompting major efforts to stabilize the world.
Great wars generate immense suffering but also high expectations for a transformed world, global justice, and lasting peace.
However, those at the peace tables in 1815, 1919, and 1945 were more focused on order than lofty ideals, working to protect their interests and secure the international system.
The Cold War officially ended in 1989, leaving a world full of promise but also significant risk and potential conflict.
From the post-9/11 perspective, the years after the Cold War seem like an interregnum between two ages: one shaped by a struggle between secular ideologies and the other marked by a clash between two civilizations.
The shift from the end of the Cold War to a conflict between the modern West and radical Islamism is the focus of the essay.

The end of the cold war

Cold War lasted over forty years, dividing the world and leading to at least 25 million deaths, mostly in the Third World.
Despite the dangers, the Cold War created a degree of stability in the world that had not been seen since the early 20th century.
The bipolar order after 1947 was seen as desirable and defensible by many, including realists like Kenneth Waltz, who viewed it as a stable system with two balancing powers.
One key feature of the Cold War was its bipolar structure, with opposing views on how to organize society.
The Cold War was a managed conflict, with both sides recognizing the limits of what they could do and accepting the other’s security concerns.
The Cold War was fought within informal rules, explaining why it remained cold and did not escalate into full-scale war.
Both superpowers agreed on the need to prevent nuclear war, avoiding actions that could lead to escalation.
The Cold War’s stalemate led to its seemingly permanent character.
In 1989, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall shocked the world.
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms played a role in these changes, though few expected such a peaceful revolution.
The unexpectedness of these events raised two main questions: prediction and causation.
Experts struggled to predict the events of 1989, with some suggesting prediction was impossible or that getting it wrong proved little about their theories.
Scholars debated the causation of the end of the Cold War, with some attributing it to Gorbachev’s vision, while others questioned whether he intended to end the Cold War at all.
The role of Ronald Reagan, Gorbachev’s American counterpart, was also debated, with some crediting his tough policies and others emphasizing other factors like Soviet economic decline, Eastern European debt, and the appeal of Western capitalism.
The end of the Cold War sparked a debate in International Relations (IR), with realists emphasizing material factorsand constructivists focusing on the impact of ideas and Gorbachev’s change in approach.
These discussions shaped the debates in IR during the 1990s, defining the division between realists and constructivists.

Mapping the post-cold war era

The end of the Cold War not only changed the structure of the international system but also created divisions within the academic community.
In the West, many celebrated the collapse of communism, viewing it as the end of an economic system that had denied freedom and prosperity to millions.
Francis Fukuyama interpreted the collapse as the end of a phase in history when collectivism challenged bourgeois society, marking the beginning of a new era dominated by liberal principles.
Others, like John Mearsheimer, were less optimistic, suggesting that the passing of the old world raised troubling questions with no easy answers for policy-makers.
Western policy-makers acted with caution and energy, facing significant challenges, including devising new roles for bodies like NATO, the United Nations, and the European Union.
The transition for countries with little experience of market democracies presented a major economic challenge.
Some questioned whether the West could survive without a clear threat, given the changing global landscape.
The need for military spending was debated, as the world seemed safer and more integrated, raising questions about the purpose of spending billions on weapons to fight enemies that no longer existed in a rapidly unifying international system.

Globalization: a new international order?

The Cold War period was marked by a sharp divide between opposing socioeconomic systems with radically different standards.
The post-Cold War order is characterized by states playing by a single set of rules in an increasingly competitive world economy.
The term globalization became widely used after 1989 to describe this new system of international relations.
Globalization meant different things to different theorists:
- Some saw it as undermining borders and states, potentially abolishing the Westphalian system.
- Others viewed it as providing a new context for international relations, without destroying the state or the underlying anarchy.
- Some were skeptical, arguing that capitalism had always been a global system, with interdependence present since the sixteenth century.
The debate around globalization sparked discussions on its impact on global inequality, climate change, and the distribution of power in the international system.
In a heated exchange between David Held (a social democratic critic) and Martin Wolf (a free-market defender), it seemed they were discussing different aspects of globalization.
Despite the academic debate, governments viewed globalization as an economic fact, stressing the need to compete not retreat (as President Clinton stated).
Tony Blair used globalization as a tool to argue for economic reform in Europe, emphasizing the choice between reform and decline.
Globalization raised important questions for International Relations theory, particularly regarding the relationship between politics and economics.
Realists like Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz believed that globalization did not change the essence of international politics, which remained a primarily political activity.
Susan Strange argued that globalization made markets more important than states, and realists had to adapt to understand the modern world.
The impact of globalization on the world economy was evident, particularly in North America, Europe, and East Asia, where economic growth, interdependence, and wealth creation were significant.
This created national uncertainty as firms became more internationalized, and an unregulated economic process led to massive wealth for the few, especially in the financial sector, while generating insecurity for many.
Defenders of globalization argued that the price of economic progress was worth paying, as not being part of the system was worse than being part of it.

From superpower to hyperpower-US primacy

The end of the Cold War led to a resurgence of American self-confidence in a new international system with no serious rival.
Few had predicted the rise of the USA in the post-Cold War era, as many believed it was in decline during the 1970s and 1980s.
By the late 1990s, indicators such as military, economic, and cultural power pointed to the USA becoming a hyperpower, as described by Hubert Vedrine in 1998.
This new global order raised questions about the sustainability of US primacy.
- Some realists believed other powers would balance the USA in time.
- Others thought US hegemony would last into the twenty-first century due to its advantage in nearly every sphere.
A debate emerged about how the USA should exercise its power under unipolarity:
- Liberals recommended restraint and embedding US power in international institutions.
- They also believed the spread of democracy and an interdependent world economy would make the international system safer.
- Nationalists argued the USA should act alone when necessary, insisting that the greater danger was inaction, not unilateral action.
US policy-makers shared a view of a bleak world post-Cold War, despite America’s victory.
- While the USSR was defeated, threats such as rogue states (Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Cuba), nuclear proliferation, and Islamic terrorism still loomed large.
- Early signs of radical Islamic terrorism were evident before 9/11, such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 US embassy bombings, and the 2000 USS Cole attack.
Despite these threats, the USA in the 1990s showed reluctance to project its power with serious purpose.
- The USA had vast capabilities but seemed unwilling to expend resources in foreign interventions, particularly after the 1993 Somalia debacle.
- The USA‘s approach seemed focused on bombing rogue states (e.g., former Yugoslavia) and supporting diplomatic solutions for issues like Middle East and North Korea.
The USA after the Cold War was a hegemon without a clear mission, resulting in a reluctant warrior.

Europe in the new world system

United States faced the challenge of developing a coherent global policy post-Cold War due to the absence of a single major threat to its interests.
Europeans had to manage the newly enlarged space created by the events of 1989, with a continent that was once divided now united.
Germany was peacefully united, and the states of Eastern Europe achieved self-determination.
The threat of major war in Europe was eliminated, though the transition was not without costs, especially for those facing life under competitive capitalism.
The collapse of communism in some countries, such as Yugoslavia, was marked by tragic events.
Europe, an enlarged Europe, had much to look forward to but faced divisions on what kind of Europe it should become.
French favored specific European security arrangements, while others wanted to remain closely tied to the United States.
The Central European elites emphasized maintaining ties with the U.S.
There were federalists advocating for a deeper Union and others fearing it, playing the Eurosceptic card among ordinary Europeans.
Europeans also divided over economic approaches: dirigistes favored greater state involvement, while free marketersargued for economic reform.
The concrete issue for policymakers was how to bring the East back into the West, known as the process of enlargement.
By 2007, the EU grew to 27 members, and NATO expanded to 26 members.
The expansion led to a loss of the core meaning of both organizations, with some critics arguing that EU enlargementhad diluted integration and NATO had lost its military credibility.
Despite this, the roles of EU and NATO were key in managing the transition from Cold War Europe to a new order.
Some analysts viewed Europe as a civilian power, spreading values without becoming a military actor.
Others believed Europe’s growing economic weight and the gaps in military capabilities with the U.S. forced it to consider hard power.
The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) emerged in 1998, followed by the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003, highlighting Europe’s global security concerns.
ESS called for a functioning international society and institutions, emphasizing transatlantic relationships and Europe’s interdependence with global affairs.
The ESS did not address Europe’s future or its status as a work in progress.
There was no consensus on when or if the European Union’s work would be completed or where it would end.
Some analysts were optimistic about the EU’s future, citing successful Euro introduction and expansion.
Others were skeptical, viewing Europe as more divided than united on constitutional matters, facing economic, cultural, and political challenges.
Issues like Turkish membership in the EU, integration of Muslim citizens, and competition from China posed significant challenges.
By the 21st century, Europe had a clear understanding of its past but lacked a blueprint for its future, with some observers stating that Europe had “lost the plot.”

Russia: from Yettsin to Putin

One of the challenges for post-Cold War Europe was defining its relationship with post-communist Russia, which faced stress after 1991 as it transitioned from a superpower with a planned economy and Marxist ideology to a democratic, liberal, and market-oriented state.
This transition was difficult for a state with a system that had lasted nearly three quarters of a century.
During the 1990s, Russia shifted from a superpower to a declining power with diminishing economic and ideological assets.
Russia’s rapid adoption of Western-style privatization led to a depression akin to the 1930s, with industrial production plummeting and living standards falling.
Russia’s military regions, once devoted to Cold War production, experienced a significant decline.
President Boris Yeltsin’s foreign policy was seen as a sellout to the West, causing dissatisfaction among many Russians who felt he was conceding too much without gaining enough in return.
Nationalists and old communists were particularly critical of Yeltsin for allowing a new class of oligarchs to take control of Russia’s assets and for turning Russia into a Western dependency.
Vladimir Putin, Yeltsin’s successor, took a more authoritarian and nationalist approach, recognizing that Russia’s interests and those of the West would not always align.
Putin focused on bringing Russia’s economy and natural resources back under state control, marking a shift from the earlier approach.
Russia could no longer be seen as the ‘strategic partner’ the West had hoped for, especially as it regained strength with its vast oil and gas resources.
While Russia no longer posed the same threat as the Soviet Union, it had regained influence and was no longer in irreversible decline.
Despite economic reforms, Russia remained dependent on the West, though countries like Germany relied on Russia for energy.
Russia’s official ideology no longer directly challenged Western institutions or values.
By 2007, Russia was encircled by NATO-aligned former republics and increasingly pro-Western states like Ukraineand Georgia.
Many of Russia’s regional allies were repressive and unstable, and Russia faced an insurgency in Chechnya, which exposed weaknesses in the military and soured relations with the West.
While Russia had made positive changes since the collapse of the USSR, it still retained aspects of authoritarianism, disregard for human rights, and an inclination toward empire.
Despite a new future potentially emerging, the legacy of historical Russia continued to shape its relations with the West.

East Asia: primed for rivalry?

History plays a crucial role in shaping modern Western perceptions of post-Soviet Russia and also influences East Asia’s international relations, which have been marked by a bloody past since World War II with wars (China, Korea, Vietnam), revolutionary insurgencies (Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia), authoritarianism, and extremism (Cambodia).
East Asia’s post-war experience contrasts sharply with post-war Europe, where a new liberal security community was formed, unlike East Asia.
Germany reconciled with its neighbors, but Japan did not, partly due to internal reasons.
The end of the Cold War did not resolve East Asia’s issues, as communist parties still ruled in China, North Korea, and Vietnam, and territorial disputes (Japan-Russia, China-Taiwan) remained.
Aaron Friedberg argued in 1993 that East Asia, rather than being “primed for peace,” was ripe for new rivalries, with the potential for a violent future similar to Europe’s past.
However, Friedberg’s pessimistic view was criticized by some commentators who suggested that East Asia’s situation was not as volatile as he claimed.
Economic success in East Asia is the primary reason for optimism. The region became the third powerhouse in the global economy, accounting for 25% of world GDP by the late 20th century.
Debate continues over the causes of East Asia’s economic success: cultural factors (Asian values), economic factors (cheap labor, capital), or a non-liberal development model using strong state intervention.
The United States played a crucial role by opening its market to East Asian goods and providing security.
In the 1990s, regional trade and investment began to override past conflicts, with economic pressures and self-interest pushing countries together, even though integration was slow.
Regionalism gained momentum in the 1990s, although it did not mirror the European Union.
Japan‘s policies were largely benign, despite failure to apologize unambiguously for past atrocities, which cost it in terms of soft power.
Japan’s adoption of a peace constitution and renunciation of nuclear weapons reflected its commitment to peaceful relations and contributed to fostering regional cooperation.
China’s rise has been widely discussed, with realists predicting it will disturb the peace once it gains power, but there is optimism about China’s intentions.
China’s economic and military policies aim to reassure neighbors of its peaceful rise, supporting regional integrationand working responsibly in multilateral institutions.
Neighboring countries, including Japan, are increasingly viewing China as a benign instrument of developmentrather than a threat.
The United States remains crucial to East Asia’s future, despite China’s rise. The new Chinese leadership has pursued a cautious approach towards the U.S.
Americans may remain wary of China’s human rights record, but cooperative actions could foster better relations.
China’s growth (10% annually) and demand for raw materials, along with massive dollar reserves, have changed international political dynamics.
Despite its rapid rise, China remains dependent on foreign investment and lags behind the U.S. militarily, but it still poses challenges that did not exist during the Cold War.
China’s emergence as a capitalist power playing by market rules may eventually be more of a problem for the Westthan when it was a communist power opposing imperialism.

The haves and the have nots

International Relations during the Cold War focused on the US and the USSR, with much attention given to the Third World as a stage for proxy wars and ideological competition.
The Third World was a vague term, introduced in the 1950s, symbolizing solidarity among poor countries seeking a different economic future outside the global market.
Both USSR and USA were engaged in the Third World, forming alliances and supporting proxy wars in places like Cuba, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Angola.
The Cold War’s end brought settlements and the abandonment of front-line states by superpowers, causing political and economic instability in these countries.
The relevance of the term Third World was questioned post-Cold War, as globalization saw some previously underdeveloped countries experience economic growth.
Globalization caused a shift in how countries participated in the world market, with some countries, like China and India, embracing it for development, while others remained excluded.
Poverty remained widespread, with nearly 3 billion people living on less than two dollars a day, and the GDP of the 48 poorest nations being less than the wealth of the world’s three richest people.
China and India showcased the success of integrating into the global economy, with 30 million Chinese lifted out of poverty and a new middle class emerging in India.
Despite successes in some countries, sub-Saharan Africa‘s struggles during the 1990s highlighted the darker side of globalization.
Inequality between rich and poor countries grew, with the wealthiest 20% of the world earning 75 times more than the poorest 20% by 2000.
In 2006, over 98% of children under five who died were from less developed countries, and 790 million people were chronically undernourished.
Poverty, inequality, and growing gaps between countries contributed to insecurity, which bred instability and forced richer countries to respond to refugees or displaced people.
Inequality and poverty could lead to political violence, with those suffering from deprivation potentially turning to violent opposition, creating a ready market for discontent and violence.
Political violence may not be inevitable, but inequality made it more likely, and the perception of injustice always fueled dissatisfaction.
Governments in wealthier countries recognized the risks of inequality and insecurity, understanding that it could lead to displacement, refugees, or violence at their borders.

The war on terror: from 9/11 to Iraq

September 11 marked a major shift in the international order, highlighting that not all parts of the world accepted the post-Cold War system.
Bin Laden‘s motivation was not just globalization or American primacy, but a vision of a golden age of Islam, using modern tactics like airplanes, video, global financial systems, and mass destruction weapons.
The Bush administration viewed Bin Laden as a modern threat, requiring new methods, with traditional Cold War tactics like containment and deterrence deemed ineffective.
The post-9/11 environment presented a non-state threat, making it difficult for the West to understand the true nature of radical Islamic terrorism.
Some critics argued that the threat was exaggerated and useful for US global pre-eminence, while others turned attention to the US‘s role in the unfolding issues.
As the US expanded the war on terror to include Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, the focus shifted from radical Islamism to US imperialism.
The 9/11 attacks forced the US to adjust its foreign policy, forming alliances with countries like Russia, India, and China to wage a global war on terror.
9/11 compelled the US to adopt a more assertive foreign policy, with some believing that the US had been too passive in the 1990s.
The Bush administration abandoned the policy of tolerating autocratic regimes in exchange for oil and stability in the Middle East.
This shift in policy led to the 2003 Iraq War, despite Iraq‘s non-involvement in 9/11 and its secular government.
The motivations behind the war include ideological influence from neocons, the US‘s relationship with Israel, and the desire to control Iraq’s oil.
The Iraq War was a strategic blunder, failing to deliver stable democracy and creating a power vacuum that allowed Iran to expand its influence.
The war also provided a rallying point for radical Islamists, with attacks like those in London and Madrid connected to the events in the Middle East.
The West would still face the challenge of radical Islam, fueled by grievances, cultural values, and state practicesthat complicated effective resolution.
The conflict could not be neatly defined as a clash of civilizations, but involved opposing values: democracy, pluralism, and individualism vs. intolerance, theocracy, and jihad.
The views of radical Islam were not shared by all Muslims, but the ideology was potent enough to pose a threat, influencing international relations and shaping the future of global politics.

Conclusion

Nearly twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the world seemed to face a more uncertain future.
In Europe, peace prevailed, and great power war was not a threat to the international system.
The number of deaths in wars around the world was declining, and globalization continued to benefit more people than it disadvantaged.
Despite positive trends, the future held uncertainties, particularly for the United States, a hegemon that appeared to be losing its ability to lead or solve its challenges.
While it may be premature to declare the end of the American era or the collapse of the ‘new’ American empire, the US no longer seemed as self-confident as it did in the 1990s.
Predictions of US decline had been made before and proven wrong, but now some analysts believe they may be accurate.
The question arises: Could another world order be emerging to replace the US dominance?