Introduction
Chapter – 1
This Book
This book aims to introduce readers to ecological ethics, providing a clear and critical overview without delving deeply into specific schools of thought or philosophers.
The goal is to present a coherent set of ethical ideas and practices based on ecocentric values, emphasizing their urgent need in light of current ecological crises.
Ethical treatment of the natural world involves loving and respecting it for its own sake, not just for human benefit. Failure to adopt this perspective leads to increased suffering and destruction of innocent entities.
Ethics is fundamentally about determining the best way to live and act. Although the question of ethics is ancient, ecological ethics—extending ethical considerations to the entire natural world—is a relatively new concept that has gained prominence in the last thirty years due to the escalating global ecological crisis.
The book seeks to contribute positively to discussions within academic settings and beyond, focusing on practical relevance rather than abstract scholarship.
While there are existing textbooks and anthologies on ecological ethics, this book distinguishes itself by emphasizing the deep, ecocentric aspects of the field.
Ecological ethics are categorized into three strands: light-green (environmentalism), mid-green (concerned with animals), and dark-green or deep-green (ecocentric). The latter, which encompasses and goes beyond the other two, represents a fully ecological perspective.
The book prioritizes a detailed exploration of deep-green ethics, including Deep Ecology, Gaia Theory, and related ethics such as ecofeminism, which are often underrepresented in other works.
It focuses on the distinctive perspective of ecological and ecocentric ethics, aiming to avoid getting sidetracked by other subjects while addressing the critical issues within the field.
This book does not advocate for ethics derived from human interests extending to other animals and, potentially, to nature.
Instead, it begins with the belief that nature, which includes humanity, is the ultimate source of all value.
Nature, as described by Abram (1997), is not merely a set of resources for human use; it has intrinsic value and attributes such as agency, intention, and emotion that are properties of the entire web of life.
Relationships between subjects involve ethical considerations, unlike relationships with mere objects, which do not entail ethical implications.
As Richard Sylvan and David Bennett (1994) suggest, “the ecological community forms the ethical community,” placing humans and non-humans within a shared ethical framework.
This perspective integrates humans into ecological terms and non-humans into ethical terms, offering a more just, stable, and fulfilling life for all, with novel and sometimes startling implications.
One key implication is that a truly ecocentric ethic must sometimes prioritize the needs or rights of the Earth and its inhabitants over purely human interests.
An ecological ethic is needed because traditional ethics based on enlightened human self-interest have proven inadequate, as evidenced by the ongoing ecological crisis.
The current state of ecological crisis suggests that established ethics are insufficient, highlighting the need for ethical change to influence behavioral change.
Self-interest-based ethics are criticized for being unenlightened and difficult to reform, often fostering limited sympathies, short-term thinking, and greed.
Ethics focused solely on human concerns denies responsibility for the impacts on other species and individuals, which is not ethically commendable.
An Initial Example
In the debate over logging an old-growth forest for paper products, both sides represent different ethical perspectives rather than one side being outright ethical and the other not.
Supporters of logging adopt anthropocentric values (focused mainly on human beings) and instrumentalist values (valuing the forest based on its utility).
Opponents of logging adopt ecocentric values (concerned with both humans and nonhuman nature) and intrinsic values (valuing the forest for its own sake, regardless of its utility).
Proponents of logging might argue that:
- Local jobs depend on the logging.
- There is a public need for paper products.
- Old-growth trees can be replaced by purpose-grown ones that are equally good for timber.
Opponents argue from enlightened self-interest:
- The old-growth forest contributes to climate stabilization, air and soil quality, which humans depend on.
- The forest’s biodiversity and intrinsic value cannot be replaced by planted monocultures.
- Converting such a unique and irreplaceable environment into paper products is seen as deeply undesirable or irrational.
Both sides are making value judgments, which are unavoidable. Even if a computer were to calculate an outcome, it would still reflect the values placed on quantification and objectivity.
Deep ecology emphasizes the need to discuss environmental decisions in terms of values and priorities, not just facts (Naess 1989: 72).
Stephen Jay Gould (1993) notes that forging an emotional bond with nature is crucial for environmental preservation, suggesting that an emotional and even religious appreciation of nature’s intrinsic value is important in ecological ethics.
The classical economists’ view of humans as purely rational actors seeking to maximize self-interest is critiqued.
Concern for nonhuman nature, while paradoxical, can actually enhance human survival by addressing broader ecological concerns.
Many people do not value what is genuinely valuable, and what is valued ultimately determines practical ethics. People tend to treat properly what they care about and neglect what they don’t.
There is a political, social, and cultural dimension to ecological ethics, focusing on how to encourage eco-ethical behavior and discourage harmful actions.
People’s busy lives and urgent personal concerns often overshadow ecological virtue. However, imagining and striving for what lies beyond current practices, as Sylvan and Bennett suggest, is part of implementing environmental ethics.
Everything humanity does is a development of the Earth from which we evolved and are still composed. Without Earth and its systems, life would cease to exist. An ecological ethic, in this light, seems like profound common sense.
Many so-called realists—corporate leaders, political figures, and media moguls—are, in fact, dreamers with disastrous fantasies. Historical disasters have often been pursued by these so-called realists.
The belief that growth can continue forever in a finite world, or reliance on practices like Credit Default Swaps and increasing debt, demonstrates the absurdity of some modern economic thinking.
‘Enlightened self-interest’ alone is insufficient. Non-human nature deserves moral consideration equal to humans, and without it, many of Earth’s richest places and fellow beings might not survive this century.
Despite being entangled in personal and immediate concerns, many modern humans retain an awareness of their profound involvement in and dependence on the natural world. Many still feel that nature is a source of all value and entitled to respect, which is a hopeful sign.
Looking Ahead
The following chapter will briefly review the concept of ecocide, which refers to the large-scale destruction of life and the Earth’s ability to provide a livable home.
The chapter will outline ethics broadly, focusing on two modern kinds and one ancient but recently revived form known as ‘virtue ethics,’ which is suggested to offer hope for developing a widespread and flexible ecological ethic.
The book will then explore three types of ecological ethics: light-green (environmental), mid-green (animal liberation/rights/welfare), and dark- or deep-green (ecocentric). The deep-green category includes Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic, James Lovelock’s Gaia Theory, Arne Naess’s Deep Ecology, Richard Sylvan’s Deep Green Theory, Left Biocentrism, and the Earth Manifesto and Earth Charter.
In the second part of the book, various dimensions of ecocentric virtues and behaviors will be considered, both individually and collectively. This includes contributions from ecofeminism, pluralism and pragmatism, religion/spirituality (with focus on Christianity, Buddhism, and animism), developing green citizenship, eco-education, traditional ecological knowledge, and sustainable economies/societies (covering food systems, energy, and climate change).
There will be a chapter on the eco-ethical issue of human overpopulation, followed by final thoughts in the concluding chapter.
The new edition includes significant revisions and additions, particularly in sections on religious ethics, virtue ethics, animal issues (including meat-eating), post-secular green ethics, green citizenship, eco-education, and a completely new chapter on grounding an ecological ethic (covering sustainability, ecosocialism, business, the commons, climate change, wind power, and green movements).
Value and Nature
There is a spectrum of values in ethics, ranging from anthropocentric (human-centered) to thoroughly ecocentric (Earth-centered).
The focus will increasingly shift towards ecocentric ethics, examining the strengths and limitations of each major position on this spectrum, while acknowledging that traditional human-centered ethics remains important for intra-human relationships.
The goal is to incorporate a new perspective that anthropocentric ethics cannot provide, rather than replacing traditional ethics. Once a fully deep or dark green ethic is reached, there will be no attempt to judge which type is the “most ecocentric,” recognizing that each has its own strengths and weaknesses.
The term ‘environmental ethics’ is avoided because it implies a passive setting surrounding humans, often reflecting the assumption that only humans matter and that the value of other entities is secondary to human needs.
The term ‘ecological’ was introduced in 1866 by Ernst Haeckel to describe the study of relationships among organisms and their environments. Over time, it has come to describe a broad range of subjects emphasizing interrelationships, leading to potential confusion.
Despite its complications, ‘ecological’ is also understood to refer to a metaphysical and political philosophy centered on nature. This view sees nature as an extraordinarily complex and relational web, where entities are defined by their relationships and cannot be observed or manipulated without affecting or being affected by the whole system.
Human beings are considered part of nature within this ecological understanding, but they are just one part among many, and not necessarily the most significant.
Ethics and Grub
The fundamental questions of ethics are: What is good? What is the ultimate good? What is the best way to live? What is the right way to be or act?
These questions are often avoided, leading to the mistaken belief that ethics is a special or optional subject, separate from everyday life. Bertold Brecht’s phrase, “Grub first, then ethics,” reflects this view, suggesting that immediate needs take precedence over ethical considerations.
All human societies have values and ethics, which are crucial in determining actual behavior. Brecht’s statement represents a specific ethical perspective rather than a lack of ethics.
Prioritizing efficiency or technical considerations over ethics can be problematic. In modern professions, especially those with significant rewards, there is substantial pressure to neglect ethical considerations.
The extreme example of Auschwitz, where efficiency was prioritized over ethics, illustrates the danger of disregarding ethics. This attitude, as noted by Paul Feyerabend, can persist in various forms in contemporary society.
Viewing ethics as optional is not only incorrect but dangerous. Everyone operates with some notion of what is good and right, even if these notions are perverted from different ethical perspectives.
The consequences of ethical decisions impact everyone, not just humans. There are always choices in how one acquires goods, and some choices are more ethically defensible than others.
Ignoring ethical values allows unexamined values to guide choices, often under the guise of a “sensible consensus.”
Recently, some committees have started hiring an ‘ethicist,’ but ethics is a dimension of every human experience and enterprise, not something that can be delegated.
Joseph R. Des Jardins highlights that environmental decisions made by “experts” in science and technology are not value-neutral but are influenced by the values and philosophical assumptions of these experts.
This applies to ecology as well; the destruction of the natural world is not a result of a lack of ethics but is driven by a particular kind of unethical, ecologically pathological, and largely unconscious ethics.
As stated, “we do not have the idea; it has us,” emphasizing that ethics matters, especially ecological ethics, and its public profile needs to be raised.
Ethics cannot be as precise or mechanical as mathematics or the exact sciences. It does not provide a set of rules that can be applied without thoughtful consideration of specific, unique situations.
Life is complex and messy, and ethical values can conflict. Ethics involves an ongoing interaction between one’s ideas, values, and the world, requiring personal engagement.
This perspective reflects a debate within ethics between those who view ethics as applying rationally-grounded principles or rules and those who see ethics as emerging from lived experience and being answerable to it.
The latter approach, where ethics is seen as closer to wisdom and understanding what is good rather than applying theoretical rules, is considered more ecological and hopeful for developing ecological ethics.
What’s New?
A specifically ecological ethic values both human and non-human nature, recognizing that humanity is only one part of the broader life on Earth and that we depend on the rest of nature far more than it depends on us.
This ethic is ecocentric, emphasizing the protection and flourishing of all aspects of nature, rather than being anthropocentric, which restricts value to humanity alone.
The idea of an ecological ethic was first proposed by Richard Routley (later known as Richard Sylvan) in 1973, suggesting the need for a ‘new, an environmental, ethic.’
Philosophers like John Passmore initially opposed this idea, arguing that a more general adherence to existing ethics, which prioritize human responsibilities alone, was sufficient. Passmore believed that a new ethic would emerge from existing attitudes or not at all.
Despite Passmore’s view, the concept of a new ecological ethic is seen as a reawakening of something ancient, rather than something entirely new. Indigenous cultures often still embody an awareness of the interconnectedness and co-dependency of humans with the natural world.
The need for such an ecological ethic is pressing, as the current ethical frameworks have proven inadequate in addressing the worsening environmental crisis. The familiar ethics fail to account for the significant impact of human activities on nature.
Institutionalized ideas and values underpinning the current human impact on nature often disregard the ethical significance of these impacts. Thus, a new ecological ethic, rooted in ancient understandings but adapted to contemporary needs, is urgently required.
As Sylvan and Bennett argue, what may currently seem extreme or unthinkable in terms of environmental respect and ethics might soon become necessary and widely accepted.
Transparency and Responsibility
The author acknowledges that every book reflects certain underlying positions and values, which are often covert but nevertheless influence the content and perspective.
The traditional distinction between description (what ‘is’) and prescription (what should be done) is more of an intellectual habit than a strict separation. A description inherently involves a particular perspective and prescription includes a description of the world.
Complete neutrality or detachment in description is impossible. Efforts at fairness and comprehensiveness are ideal goals but should not be mistaken for absolute neutrality.
The author openly shares their own assumptions, values, and priorities, committing to a global ecological ethic and emphasizing the ecocentric dimension, often overlooked in mainstream and environmental discourse.
This book aims to provide a thorough treatment of ecological ethics, focusing on ecocentrism, and is intended to be of use and inspiration to both academics and activists.
The primary focus of the book is on anthropogenic ecocrisis and its possible resolution or mitigation, rather than academic debates. Scholarly contributions are relevant only insofar as they enhance understanding and practice of ecocentrism.
The author seeks to balance analytical depth with practical critical awareness, avoiding both excessive analysis and lack of critical engagement.
Ecocentric ethics is not presented as the sole solution but is deemed essential for any meaningful progress. The author argues that anthropocentric ethics alone is inadequate and that addressing human needs without considering broader ecological concerns will fail both humanity and the rest of life.
The approach is pragmatic, recognizing that while ecocentric ethics is crucial, it must be integrated with other necessary changes to be effective.