What is Luck Egalitarianism?

• Luck egalitarianism defines justice in terms of inequalities caused by bad luck: it is unjust if some people are worse off due to factors beyond their control, such as genetic disabilities or systemic inequalities (e.g., apartheid).
• The core luck egalitarian claim is: It is unjust if some people are worse off than others through their bad luck. This positions luck egalitarianism as both egalitarian and luck-based, meaning it objects to inequalities caused by bad luck but not those resulting from personal choices or actions.
• Examples illustrating this claim include the racial inequalities under apartheid (where being born black was a consequence of bad luck) and the disadvantages faced by those born with disabilities due to genetic causes.
• The view focuses on justice, not overall moral goodness or permissibility. While justice is important, other factors (like welfare or deontological principles such as the prohibition against killing) also play a role in determining what is morally permissible.
• Luck egalitarianism does not claim to be a complete theory of morality, but specifically addresses inequalities caused by bad luck, without necessarily incorporating broader moral values.
• Luck egalitarianism defines justice in terms of bad luck but does not claim to be a complete theory of justice. It merely provides a sufficient condition for a distribution to be unjust, specifically when some are worse off due to bad luck.
• Incompleteness: Luck egalitarianism does not account for all forms of injustice. For example, it does not claim that exploitation is unjust solely because it involves bad luck. It is possible to view exploitation as unjust independently of bad luck (e.g., even when the exploited person freely chooses to enter into an exploitative situation).
• The view is also silent on when it is just for people to be equally well off. In the example of Anna and Bruce, one might argue that good luck (such as Bruce receiving a tuna) could also be unjust, but the core luck egalitarian claim does not address this issue.
• Good luck is not inherently unjust according to luck egalitarianism. For example, in a gamble where one person ends up better off through good luck, this does not automatically entail that the other person is worse off due to bad luck. Bad luck is not the cause of their worse situation in every case.
• Comparative nature: Luck egalitarianism focuses on relative positions between people rather than their absolute circumstances. Unlike a non-comparative view of justice (where each person gets their due based on deservingness), luck egalitarianism views justice as inherently about inequality between people, especially when it results from bad luck.
• Luck egalitarianism leaves open the precise definition of being “worse off through bad luck.” Two possible conceptions of luck are distinguished:
  • Choice-based: Something is luck if it is not a result of the agent’s choices.
  • Control-based: Something is luck if the agent has no control over it.
• The choice and control conceptions may overlap but are analytically distinct. For example, indecisiveness may be seen as bad luck in the choice-based conception but not in the control-based conception, if the agent could have controlled their decision-making.
• What makes inequality unjust is a separate issue from when inequality is unjust. One could think inequality due to bad luck is unjust because the better-off cannot justify their superior position to the worse-off. The unjust nature lies in the inability to justify the inequality, rather than the fact that the inequality stems from bad luck.
• Scope of luck egalitarianism: If luck egalitarianism is defined by what makes inequality unjust, it may support a broader scope, like cosmopolitan luck egalitarianism, which could apply globally.
• Summary: Luck egalitarianism is an incomplete theory of justice, stating that it is unjust for some to be worse off due to bad luck. It does not address all issues, such as the justice of being equally well off through luck or better off through good luck. Additionally, luck egalitarianism can be combined with different theories of what constitutes luck.

What is attractive about luck egalitarianism?

• Supporting luck egalitarianism: There are two ways to support luck egalitarianism:
  • Justification from other views: Luck egalitarianism can be supported if it follows from or justifies other attractive views that one holds.
  • Plausibility on its own: It can be supported by showing that situations of bad luck resulting in people being worse off seem unjust once alternative explanations are ruled out.
• Rawls’ intuitive argument for the difference principle:
  • Rawls’ difference principle states that it is unjust if the basic structure of society is such that the worst-off could have been better off.
  • The argument begins with equality of opportunity as understood by laissez-faire libertarians, which allows for people to pursue any job if they are able and willing. However, Rawls argues that this view is flawed because it allows distributive outcomes to be influenced by natural and social contingencies (e.g., genes, upbringing).
  • These contingencies are morally arbitrary, meaning that one’s superior social position due to them is unjust. For example, outcomes of the social and natural lotteries (e.g., whether one is born with advantageous genes or a supportive family) are luck-based.
  • Rawls rejects the laissez-faire conception of equality and argues for a liberal egalitarian view, which seeks to eliminate such social contingencies. He contends that equal prospects should be available to all individuals with similar talents and efforts, regardless of their starting point in society. However, even the willingness to make an effort depends on factors like family and social circumstances, making it also contingent on luck.

• Rawls argues that the natural distribution of abilities is as morally arbitrary as being born into a stimulating or non-stimulating social environment, meaning that inequalities resulting from natural abilities should be considered unjust, just like those stemming from social circumstances. Thus, even the liberal conception of equality of opportunity is morally deficient.

• Rawls combines the principle of fair equality of opportunity with the difference principle to form his concept of democratic equality. The just society is the one that improves the prospects of the least advantaged members, while addressing both social and natural luck. This mitigates inequalities stemming from both genetic and social factors.

• Rawls’ argument suggests that condemning inequalities due to natural or social contingencies can align with luck egalitarianism. By rejecting laissez-faire equality of opportunity, Rawls seems to commit to the idea that inequalities arising from bad luck should be condemned.

• Michael Otsuka highlights that people who are worse off due to luck often feel that life is unjust, asking, “Why me?” For example, people in Southern Sudan may feel that it is unjust that their prospects are worse simply because of their birthplace. The sense of unfairness persists even when basic needs are met, as in the case of Greeks comparing their situation to Germans, where comparative disadvantage due to bad luck is seen as unjust. This common sense of unfairness often reflects a commitment to luck egalitarianism, reinforcing that inequalities due to bad luck are morally problematic.

• Some may argue that the two considerations above do not constitute an argument for luck egalitarianism, at least not in the sense of deriving it from more basic principles of justice. However, it is unclear whether all principles of justice need to be deduced from more fundamental ones.

• Luck egalitarians are not alone in thinking that there are non-derived principles of justice. For example, Nozickean libertarians argue that self-ownership is a basic, non-derived principle. This shows that there can be disagreement over the specific principles of justice, but both sides can agree that some principles are not deducible from others.

• While disagreement between principles of justice exists, it can be settled by comparing how well each principle accounts for moral judgments. A principle that better explains or aligns with considered moral judgments may be justified over others.

• For example, Nozickean libertarians object that luck egalitarianism could justify absurd outcomes, like seizing one eye from everyone born with two eyes to give one to each person born without any. Similarly, luck egalitarians criticize Nozickean libertarianism for suggesting that it is not unjust for someone to refuse to donate blood to save lives, even if doing so could benefit society.

• This discussion shows that while luck egalitarianism has not been derived from more basic principles of justice, its justification (or rejection) may still be supported by appealing to various moral intuitions in favor of or against it.

Three Important Luck Egalitarians: Dworkin

• Luck egalitarianism has been defined and supported with two key considerations.
• Dramatis personae include three main thinkers in luck egalitarianism, though one rejects the label (Dworkin 2003) and another has retracted (Arneson 2000a).
• Ronald Dworkin’s work in Philosophy and Public Affairs (1981) and later in Sovereign Virtue (2000) popularized luck egalitarian themes.
• Dworkin argues a state’s legitimacy depends on treating citizens with equal concern (Dworkin 2000: 1) or equal concern and respect in earlier writings.
• He emphasizes a distribution sensitive to ambition but insensitive to endowment (Dworkin 2000: 89), aligning with luck egalitarian principles.
• Ambitions are seen as choice-based, while endowments are luck-based, though Dworkin’s distinctions do not perfectly align with core luck egalitarian views.
• Ambition sensitivity leads Dworkin to critique equality of welfare ideals.
• Using examples like tastes for luxury or skills (e.g., plovers’ eggs, skiing, or opera), Dworkin argues that justice doesn’t require compensating individuals (e.g., Louis) for choices that increase their welfare costs.
• Many agree with Dworkin that resources shouldn’t be redistributed to accommodate such costly ambitions.
• Dworkin argues it would be unjust to transfer resources to Louis because doing so would unfairly burden others, forcing them to subsidize a life Louis considers more successful due to his expensive tastes (Dworkin 2000: 56).
• Compensating Louis would trespass on the fair shares of others, violating principles of justice.
• Dworkin highlights a discrepancy in Louis’ case. While Louis deliberately cultivates expensive tastes, this deliberation plays no role in Dworkin’s argument against compensating him.
• Dworkin suggests the distinction between deliberately cultivated tastes and native or socially imposed desires might not matter, as both stem from beliefs about a successful life, which are not themselves chosen (Dworkin 2000: 52).
• Dworkin’s reasoning assumes expensive tastes reflect individual success judgments, but he does not address cases where such tastes arise from broader, altruistic goals (e.g., enhancing collective welfare).
• For instance, if Louis develops expensive preferences believing it will raise overall hedonistic welfare, except for his own, it is unclear why justice would deny him compensation.
• Dworkin transitions to his competing ideal of equality of resources, using the envy test to determine when resources are equally distributed.
• In the envy test, a distribution is equal if no individual prefers someone else’s resource bundle over their own (Dworkin 2000: 66–67).
• The test is illustrated with a hypothetical involving shipwreck survivors dividing resources on a desert island, emphasizing equal entitlement and satisfaction with one’s allocation.
• Dworkin views satisfaction of the envy test as necessary but insufficient for ensuring equal treatment.
• Identical resource bundles might not account for varying preferences, disadvantaging those who value certain resources more.
• Dworkin refines the envy test with a resource auction, where survivors bid using equal quantities of clamshells.
• The auction mechanism allows individuals to acquire bundles matching their preferences, ensuring fair distribution of external resources like land and water.
• Endowment insensitivity is achieved for external resources but does not naturally apply to internal resources like body parts or labor power.
• For example:
  • A blind individual might envy someone with eyes, suggesting redistribution, but Dworkin rejects this.
  • Similarly, redistribution of labor power to address talent disparities risks creating a “slavery of the talented”, which Dworkin opposes.
• To address inequalities in internal resources, Dworkin proposes a hypothetical insurance scheme:
  • It assumes everyone faces equal risks of future physical or mental handicaps.
  • People would hypothetically purchase insurance based on these risks, with compensation reflecting what an average person would insure.
  • Compensation is funded by taxation or similar mechanisms, simulating premiums from the hypothetical market.
• Those with handicaps receive additional resources, determined by the market-based average insurance level in this hypothetical scenario.
• While the scheme involves a fictitious assumption about insurance behavior, Dworkin sees it as a reasonable starting point for ensuring endowment insensitivity.
• Dworkin acknowledges that his insurance scheme and similar mechanisms reduce but do not eliminate inequalities due to internal endowment differences.
• Some handicaps or disparities in talent may be so significant that insuring against them is either prohibitively expensive or provides insufficient coverage.
• As a result:
  • People with non-compensable handicaps may remain worse off.
  • Those with immense talents could still be disproportionately better off.
• This appears to conflict with the endowment insensitivity ideal, which seeks to mitigate inequalities due to unchosen endowments.
• Dworkin concedes this issue but defends his approach, arguing that:
  • His framework best balances the requirements of endowment insensitivity and ambition sensitivity.
  • Addressing this problem more fully would necessitate drastic changes that undermine ambition sensitivity.
• Critics question whether Dworkin’s response sufficiently addresses the challenge:
  • He admits that some inequalities persist, aligning less with luck egalitarianism‘s canonical goals.
  • Critics argue that welfare egalitarians could similarly defend their view by restating their arguments, weakening Dworkin’s critique of welfare egalitarianism.
• Dworkin’s distinction between option luck and brute luck further nuances his approach:
  • Option luck involves outcomes from deliberate gambles (e.g., buying a stock).
  • Brute luck arises from uncontrollable events (e.g., being struck by a meteorite).
  • His framework emphasizes compensating for brute luck while holding individuals accountable for option luck.
• Dworkin considers inequalities resulting from differential brute luck unjust and supports compensation for such inequalities.
• He argues that inequalities reflecting differential option luck are just, as they result from deliberate, voluntary risk-taking.
• Redistributing from winners to losers of gambles would, in his view, unjustly remove the possibility of taking risks.
• This stance aligns with luck egalitarianism regarding brute luck but diverges concerning option luck.
• The inequality resulting from option luck still hinges on chance, as losers do not choose to lose or to be worse off than winners.
• Some luck egalitarians argue that injustices arise from avoidable bad luck, but this does not account for cases where declining a gamble leaves someone worse off than a winner.
• Dworkin’s ideal of equality of resources balances ambition sensitivity and endowment insensitivity, making his view partially aligned with luck egalitarian principles.
• His rejection of compensation for expensive preferences, severe handicaps, and lack of talent raises questions about the consistency of his framework with luck egalitarianism.
• Differential outcomes in his auction model highlight luck’s role in:
  • The set of external resources available, potentially disadvantaging those who dislike all available resources.
  • Distribution of preferences, where some benefit from economies of scale while others do not.
• Despite these tensions, Dworkin’s work significantly shaped the development of the luck egalitarian literature.

Three Important Luck Egalitarians: Arneson

• Arneson critiques Dworkin’s rejection of welfarist egalitarianism, arguing that Dworkin conflates distinctions between welfare and resources and between outcomes and opportunities.
• He agrees with Dworkin that individuals cultivating expensive tastes should not receive compensation but attributes this to the principle of equality of opportunity for welfare.
• Arneson suggests that someone like Louis, who deliberately cultivates expensive tastes, had the opportunity not to do so, ensuring his opportunities for welfare were initially equal to others.
• Arneson defines equality of opportunity for welfare as occurring when individuals face effectively equivalent decision trees.
• A decision tree maps all potential life choices available to a person, starting from when they become morally responsible, detailing all possible future sequences of actions.
• Two decision trees are equivalent if the expected value of each person’s best, second-best, etc., choices is the same.
• Decision trees are effectively equivalent if differences in awareness, decision-making ability, or persistence are counterbalanced by inequivalence in options.
• Arneson’s preference-based account of welfare defines it as preference satisfaction, weighted by the importance of preferences to the individual.
• He emphasizes hypothetical preferences, which reflect what individuals would desire if better informed, over actual preferences.
• Arneson uses examples, such as mistakenly desiring to drink petroleum believing it to be mango juice, to demonstrate how informed preferences better determine welfare.
• Arneson bases welfare on second-best rational preferences, not on first-best preferences formed under ideal deliberation with full information and rationality.
• Second-best preferences incorporate an individual’s actual resistance to rational advice, the cost of overcoming such resistance, and the likelihood of effective educational interventions.
• For example, if someone’s first-best preference values intellectual experiences, but they are firmly attached to low-life preferences, their second-best preferences would prioritize the latter due to the improbability of change.
• Arneson uses the example of a gift, suggesting that catering to second-best preferences (e.g., giving jug wine instead of poetry) better enhances welfare.
• Arneson’s focus on self-regarding second-best preferences avoids two criticisms of welfarist accounts:
  • It excludes external preferences, such as those concerning others’ welfare, which Dworkin deems irrelevant to justice.
  • It dismisses the need to account for offensive preferences, like racist or sexist ones, since these rarely align with second-best preferences due to their reliance on misinformation.
• Arneson’s approach represents a welfarist luck egalitarianism that avoids many of Dworkin’s objections while maintaining a focus on justice through individual welfare.

Three important Luck Egalitarians: Cohen

• G. A. Cohen critiques Dworkin’s distinction between endowments (material and physical capacities) and ambitions (tastes and preferences), arguing it fails to fully align with egalitarian justice’s underlying motivation.
• Cohen asserts that egalitarianism aims to eliminate involuntary disadvantage, meaning disadvantage arising from brute luck rather than genuine choice.
• Cohen emphasizes the distinction between luck and genuine choice, which does not align neatly with Dworkin’s endowment-ambition dichotomy.
  • Endowments (e.g., physical capacities) can result from genuine choice, such as donating a kidney.
  • Ambitions (e.g., expensive tastes) can result from brute luck, like involuntary preferences for costly goods.
• Cohen critiques Dworkin through an immanent critique, arguing that Dworkin’s core arguments align more with Cohen’s luck-choice distinction than with the endowment-ambition divide.
• Cohen notes the hypothetical insurance device in Dworkin’s framework derives its appeal from addressing brute luck rather than the endowment-ambition distinction.
• Cohen highlights a tension in Dworkin’s writings:
  • In “Why Liberals Should Care About Equality,” Dworkin emphasizes the impact of choices versus non-choice advantages/disadvantages, aligning with Cohen’s framework.
  • Dworkin’s defense of denying compensation for expensive tastes (e.g., Louis’s case) reflects a different framework emphasizing ambitions over endowments.
• Cohen concludes that Dworkin’s declared position is inconsistent with its own foundational impulse, which better supports Cohen’s luck egalitarianism.
• Cohen, like Arneson, agrees that Dworkin’s example of Louis with expensive tastes undermines equality of welfare but not equality of opportunity for welfare.
• Cohen critiques the metrics used by egalitarians, arguing that what matters fundamentally is not always the proxy measures (e.g., income inequality) but the underlying factors (e.g., how well people’s lives go).
• Cohen rejects Dworkin’s and Arneson’s positions on egalitarian justice’s currency:
  • Dworkin: Cohen believes welfare matters fundamentally, contrary to Dworkin’s focus on resources.
  • Arneson: Cohen argues welfare is insufficient, as egalitarian justice also addresses resource deficiencies.
• Cohen illustrates his views with two examples:
  • Tiny Tim: Tim is happy and has ample opportunity for happiness, yet egalitarians would still compensate him for his disability, showing resource concerns remain relevant.
  • Painful Movement: A person who suffers extreme pain while moving their arms but is resource-adequate still warrants compensation, demonstrating the irreducible welfare aspect in egalitarian justice.
• Cohen highlights variations among luck egalitarian views:
  • Not all luck egalitarians adopt the vocabulary of luck.
  • Core disagreements exist between resourcist and welfarist approaches.
• Unlike Dworkin, both Cohen and Arneson view equality as independent of state legitimacy, focusing instead on justice in distributions.

Other distributive views

• Luck egalitarianism vs. utilitarianism: Utilitarianism holds that an act is morally permissible if it maximizes overall well-being. Different conceptions of well-being exist, including pleasant mental states or preference satisfaction. Utilitarianism may favor equality due to diminishing marginal utility of resources but only instrumentally, as a means to maximize welfare. For example, grumpy individuals who derive less welfare from resources might justifiably receive fewer resources under utilitarianism. Luck egalitarianism, on the other hand, values equality not just instrumentally but also intrinsically, irrespective of welfare maximization.

• Distinct focuses: Utilitarianism is about moral permissibility, while luck egalitarianism concerns justice. The two are not necessarily competing, as rejecting utilitarianism does not directly entail adopting luck egalitarianism.

• Incompatibility in some cases: Luck egalitarians prioritize justice, even when it conflicts with welfare maximization. They may favor distributions that do not maximize total welfare if they align better with principles of distributive justice.

• Broader concerns: Utilitarianism focuses solely on welfare.

• Utilitarianism lacks a luckist element, meaning it does not assign fundamental significance to whether someone’s level of welfare is due to luck or non-luck. In principle, a luckist version of utilitarianism could be constructed by incorporating a desert-based conception of luck, where one has good luck if one has more than one deserves, and bad luck if one has less. Fred Feldman, for example, defends a version of consequentialism that adjusts utility for desert, arguing that pleasure is more valuable if deserved and less valuable (or even disvaluable) if undeserved. This version could be called luck-utilitarianism or luck-consequentialism, where the moral value of an outcome increases with welfare for individuals, but the moral value of an extra unit of welfare is greater the more deserved it is.

• Utilitarianism is indifferent between gains in well-being for non-human animals or human beings. In contrast, luck egalitarianism focuses on inequalities between human beings, not between non-human animals or between humans and animals.

• Moving on to sufficientarianism, it holds that it is unjust if some people do not have enough. This view is closer to luck egalitarianism than utilitarianism, leaving open what the relevant currency of justice is. However, sufficientarianism can be revised to include a luckist element, where it is unjust if people do not have enough due to their bad luck. On this version, it is not unjust if people have less than enough due to imprudence.

• The concept of having enough can be understood in two ways. One approach compares individuals’ resources with others’ resources, such as saying someone has less than enough if they have less than 50% of the resources others have on average. An extreme form of comparative sufficientarianism may resemble egalitarianism, where one has less than enough if one is worse off than others. The second approach defines enough independently of comparison, focusing on basic capabilities like health and attachments. Those lacking these capabilities are considered not to have enough, regardless of others’ conditions. Determining where the threshold of sufficiency lies remains controversial.

• Sufficientarianism is typically endorsed in a non-luckist form, where the view on sufficiency is non-comparative. Unlike luck egalitarianism, which is comparative across individuals, sufficientarianism only concerns whether people have enough without comparing their distributive positions to others. In a scenario where everyone enjoys a blissful life above the level of sufficiency but some are slightly worse off due to bad luck, sufficientarians see no injustice, while luck egalitarians do.

• Some are drawn to sufficientarianism because they believe morality is more concerned with the worse-off than the better-off, but they feel uneasy about its disregard for inequalities above sufficiency. These individuals may find prioritarianism attractive, which holds that moral goodness is determined by the sum of individual well-being, weighted by how well-off the relevant individuals are. Prioritarianism has two core ideas: (i) any benefit to an individual improves the outcome, and (ii) a unit of well-being has greater moral value when it accrues to someone at a lower level of well-being.

• Prioritarianism values additional welfare even for those already better off, but more so when it benefits those worse off. It tends to favor equality due to the greater moral value of benefits at lower levels of well-being. This makes prioritarianism more egalitarian than utilitarianism, as it has a stronger tendency to favor equality.

• Weighted beneficence, combining prioritarianism with the view that an act is morally permissible if it maximizes the sum of moral value (measured in prioritarian terms), contrasts with luck egalitarianism. It can favor more unequal distributions if they maximize the sum of moral value, even if some are made worse off through no fault of their own.

• Arneson proposes a luckist version of prioritarianism that aligns with the egalitarian intuition that fortunate individuals should help those with worse initial conditions due to bad luck. In this version, the moral value of a gain (or avoidance of loss) is greater the lower the person’s expected well-being and the more deserved the gain is.

• Rawls’ difference principle holds that a society is just only if the worst-off group, in terms of primary goods, is as well off as possible. This gives absolute weight to the position of the worse-off, which can seem problematic. If modifying the basic structure of society benefits everyone else greatly but slightly worsens the worst-off, the difference principle would consider this unjust, while prioritarians would find this implausible.

• The difference principle differs from luck egalitarianism in several ways. First, the site of justice is the basic structure of society rather than distributions. Second, it lacks a luckist element. Third, it can justify an unequal distribution if it improves the well-being of the worst-off compared to an equal distribution, even in the absence of responsibility for the inequality. Fourth, it focuses on groups rather than individuals, whereas luck egalitarianism typically concerns inequalities between individuals.

• Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity states that it is unjust if individuals with the same native talent and ambition do not have equal prospects of success in competitive positions that offer superior benefits. Unlike luck egalitarianism, this principle is more restricted, primarily focusing on benefits tied to positions such as jobs and income, and not on other aspects of life, like temperament or appearance.

• Luck egalitarianism may not be satisfied even if Rawls’ fair equality of opportunity is, if people suffer from differential bad brute luck in areas not covered by Rawls’ principle. Conversely, a distribution may meet luck egalitarian principles even if Rawlsian equality of opportunity is not met, if unfair inequalities of opportunity are offset by luck benefiting those with worse opportunities.

• Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity does not imply that no one is worse off than others through bad luck for at least two reasons.

• First, differences in natural talents are a form of brute luck, yet Rawls’ principles allow for unequal prospects of success between two equally ambitious individuals if one has more natural talent than the other. Luck egalitarianism would reject this, as it sees such differences as unjust.

• Second, bad luck in ambition could occur, as illustrated by Richard Arneson’s example. In a society where socialization instills ambition in boys but suppresses it in girls, girls would suffer from bad ambition luck due to circumstances beyond their control. This would be seen as unjust by luck egalitarians, who argue that differences in ambition and effort might result from luck and therefore should not justify inequality.

• If Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity is satisfied but luck egalitarianism is not, a situation could arise where luck egalitarianism calls for equalization between two individuals, one whose ambitions are due to good luck and one whose ambitions are not. This would result in a situation where luck egalitarianism is met, but Rawlsian equality of opportunity is not, demonstrating that the two principles are distinct.

• It is possible to explore versions of equality of opportunity that align with luck egalitarianism, as some luck egalitarians have done.

Summary

• The chapter introduced a core luck egalitarian claim: it is unjust if some people are worse off than others through bad luck.

• The attraction of this claim was explained, with a rejection of the view that it needs to be derived from a more basic moral principle.

• Three influential luck egalitarians—Dworkin, Arneson, and Cohen—were introduced, highlighting differences such as whether equality is a moral requirement or whether equality concerns resources or welfare.

• Luck egalitarianism was contrasted with competing views that favor more egalitarian distributions, noting its similarities and differences with Nozick’s right-libertarianism, which has no such tendency.

• Lessons include:

  • Standard luck egalitarianism concerns distributions across individuals.
  • It leaves open what the relevant currency of justice is.
  • It is essentially comparative across individuals.
  • It is a justice view, not a moral permissibility view.
  • Its equality element can be detached from its luckist element.

• In the next chapter, the justification for the equality element will be explored, while Chapter 3 will focus on the luckist element.