TOPIC INFOCUET PG (Philosophy)

SUB-TOPIC INFO  Philosophy (Section I: Metaphysics)

CONTENT TYPE Short Notes

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1. Historical Origins

2. Basic Forms of the Mind-Body Problem

3. Major Philosophical Positions

3.1. Substance Dualism

3.2. Property Dualism

3.3. Monism

3.4. Behaviorism

3.5. Identity Theory

3.6. Functionalism

3.7. Eliminative Materialism

4. The Problem of Consciousness and Qualia

5. Contemporary Scientific Perspectives

6. Conclusion

Note: The First Topic of Unit 1 is Free.

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Mind and Body Problem

(Metaphysics)

CUET PG – Philosophy (Notes)

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Harshit Sharma

Alumnus (BHU)

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Table of Contents

The mind-body problem is one of the oldest and most persistent issues in philosophy, concerning the relationship between mental phenomena—such as beliefs, desires, sensations, and consciousness—and the physical body, especially the brain. The problem is essentially about explaining how immaterial mental states can arise from, relate to, or influence material physical states. It asks whether mind and body are fundamentally distinct substances, properties, or processes, and how they interact if they are indeed separate.

Historical Origins

The origins of the mind-body problem can be traced back to Ancient Greek philosophy. Thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle laid foundational ideas about the distinction between soul and bodyPlato, particularly in dialogues like the Phaedo, argued for dualism, proposing that the soul is immortal and separable from the body. Aristotle, by contrast, developed a theory of hylomorphism, claiming that the soul is the form of the body and not a separate substance.

However, it was René Descartes in the 17th century who most sharply formulated the mind-body problem as it is understood today. Descartes proposed substance dualism, which holds that mind and body are distinct substances:

  • The mind is a res cogitans (thinking thing), characterized by thought and lacking spatial extension.

  • The body is a res extensa (extended thing), characterized by extension in space and subject to mechanical laws.

This dualism led directly to the problem of interactionism: If mind and body are radically different substances, how can they causally interact? Descartes suggested that the pineal gland might be the locus of this interaction, but this hypothesis was soon rejected as inadequate.

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