• Unlike South Asian neighbours, political institutions in India have developed organic roots.

• There has been a deterioration of Parliament due to the decline of moral credibility of elected representatives.

• Quality of debate on policy issues has declined, and dignity of parliamentarians is often lost during confrontations.

• Parliamentary decline is matched by the ascendancy of other institutions like the President, Supreme Court, and Election Commission, which uphold liberal democratic values.

• The judicial system of independent India is a compromise between parliamentary and federal models.

• India, not being a unitary polity, inherited a federal structure under colonial rule, including a federal court.

• Adoption of the British parliamentary system limited the strength and autonomy of federal institutions.

• Under the American federal model, the Supreme Court holds supremacy as the protector of the Constitution and people’s rights.

• Under the British parliamentary model, the highest court is subservient to Parliament, which is sovereign.

• The Indian system is a halfway mark between federal and parliamentary systems, making the judiciary an amalgam of both.

• Key question for the Constituent Assembly: how far should the judiciary imbibe features of both systems to suit Indian polity.

• The judiciary increasingly acts as a cleaning house for political and administrative failures.

• Independent commissions serve as operational support systems for governance, complementing the judiciary’s role.

PERSPECTIVES OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

• Members of the Constituent Assembly idealized the courts for enforcing fundamental rights and acting as guardians of the Constitution.

• Independent judiciary was designed with focus on Supreme Court powers and judicial review.

• Supreme Court tasked with maintaining federal sanctity and protecting fundamental rights as core of democratic life.

• Judicial review was restricted in cases of property rights and personal liberty to align with parliamentary democracy.

• Framers wanted to prevent judicial supremacy in absence of checks and balances of the presidential system.

• Judicial independence was paramount; detailed focus given to tenure, salaries, allowances, retirement age, and appointment mechanisms.

• Objective: insulate courts from coercion by internal or external forces.

• Sapru Committee and ad hoc committee recommendations guided provisions.

• British method of appointment (lord chancellor) rejected as unsupervised; American method (Senate confirmation) rejected as too political.

• Judges appointed by President after consultation with judicial officers.

• Tenure, salaries, and future employability secured to strengthen judicial autonomy.

• Safeguards for judicial independence made part of rigid constitutional provisions requiring two-thirds majority in Parliament and ratification by half the states for amendment.

• Later, judicial independence declared part of the basic structure doctrine, making it unalterable.

• Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar cautioned against making independence of judiciary a dogma that turns it into a super-legislature or super-executive.

• Powers of Supreme Court circumscribed in property rights and personal liberty cases, especially during Emergency.

• During Emergency, Court’s power to issue writs curtailed, and executive powers expanded, enabling suspension of fundamental rights.