Book No. –  19 (Philosophy)

Book Name The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy – A.C. Ewing

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1. INTERACTION OF BODY AND MIND

2. ARE BODY AND MIND THE SAME SUBSTANCE?

3. SURVIVAL

4. THE MIND CONCEIVED AS THE ‘FORM’ OF THE BODY

5. THE RELATION OF MATTER AND MIND IN THE UNIVERSE AS A WHOLE

6. MEANINGS OF MATERIALISM

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The Relation of Matter and Mind

Chapter – 6

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Harshit Sharma

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Table of Contents
  • Despite the concept of mind and matter, many problems remain about their relations, whether concerning the human body and mind or matter and mind in general.

  • Two main controversial issues arise regarding the human body and mind:

    1. Do a man’s body and mind interact?

    2. Are a man’s body and mind the same substance or different substances?

INTERACTION OF BODY AND MIND

  • The affirmative answer to whether body and mind interact may seem obvious but has been questioned by philosophers.

  • Rejecting interaction requires an alternative explanation for the frequent correlation between bodily and mental events.

  • The popular modern approach: bodily and mental events correspond because they are different attributes of the same substance.

  • Two main theory classes:

    1. Interaction theories: assert causal interaction and that body and mind are different substances.

    2. Parallelist theories: deny interaction and say bodily and mental events correspond because they are different sides of the same thing running in parallel.

  • Possible to assert both that body and mind are the same substance and that there is causal interaction between their states.

  • Possible to assert body and mind are different substances that do not interact, but this leads to difficulty explaining apparent interaction unless God’s intervention is invoked.

  • Established points:

    1. Bodily and mental processes are qualitatively different, even if aspects of the same substance (e.g., pain vs nervous impulses).

    2. There is a regular correlation between bodily and mental events, known at a common-sense level and partially supported by physiology.

    3. The idea of a complete correlation where every mental event corresponds to a brain change is beyond current scientific proof and should not ground positive theories.

    4. The correlation could be explained by interaction of two substances, qualities of one substance, parallel aspects, or divine action.

  • We know much more about psychological antecedents of mental events than physiological ones and predict future mental events better from past mental states than brain states.

  • The interaction doctrine is challenged mainly because the causal connection between mind and body seems inconceivable due to their difference.

  • This objection is weakened by recognizing that even interaction between two physical things is not fully understood; some say it is a brute fact, others that we lack sufficient knowledge.

  • Our inability to understand causal connection does not uniquely argue against mind-body interaction.

  • If we cannot know the internal nature of matter, it is hard to claim what it can or cannot cause.

  • It is also unclear if cause and effect must be similar, so dissimilarity does not rule out interaction.

  • The argument against mind-body causation sometimes claims that causation requires the two terms to be part of a common system, which body and mind allegedly lack.

  • Reply:

    • We do not know a priori that belonging to the same system is necessary for causation.

    • Both bodily and mental events are at least in time, and mental events may be spatially localized.

    • It can be argued we are directly aware of body and mind as a unique whole, not separate entities.

    • The distinction between body and mind is a learned abstraction, though their qualities are radically different by inspection.

  • Another main motive for denying interaction is the desire to preserve a complete mechanical system based on Newtonian physics, which excludes non-physical causation.

  • This objection is less plausible now as physics itself has encountered limits to strict mechanical causation, though many biologists still assume it applies fully.

  • The objection is often based on the principle of conservation of energy: energy cannot be created or destroyed, only transferred.

  • Thus, mind cannot add or remove energy from the physical body without violating this principle.

  • However, this only disproves interaction if we assume all causation requires energy transfer, which is unproven.

  • Even in the physical world, causation can alter direction or velocity without changing total energy (e.g., a pendulum’s string).

  • Mental and bodily characteristics differ greatly, so their mode of causation may also differ.

  • No conclusive arguments exist against interaction, but the onus probandi lies with opponents of interaction.

  • By ordinary empirical criteria, bodily and mental processes are causally related, so this evidence should be accepted unless strong counterarguments arise.

  • Parallelist theories explain the mind-body correlation only by invoking metaphysical hypotheses that are far-reaching and less plausible.

  • Epiphenomenalism: bodily events cause mental events, but mental events cause no bodily or other mental events.

  • Objections to epiphenomenalism:
    (a) If true, the belief in epiphenomenalism arises only from physiological brain changes, not mental awareness of arguments, since awareness is mental.
    (b) If mental events do not affect physical actions, it is incredible how a person could produce complex works like Hamlet or Kant’s Critique, since these works reflect deliberate intentions.

    • Epiphenomenalists admit mental processes accompany physical ones but deny that mental processes cause physical actions.

    • This leads to an inexplicable coincidence: complex works produced without purposeful mental causation.
      (c) Everyday life assumes our will and motives affect physical actions, making epiphenomenalism practically absurd.
      (d) Since mental processes accompany physiological events, it is arbitrary to say only the physiological cause subsequent mental events, excluding mental processes.

  • Objections (a), (b), and (d) apply to some but not all forms of parallelism.

  • Some equate causation with regular sequence (concomitance); if true, interaction must be accepted as fact due to regular sequences like burning causing pain or willing causing movement.

  • However, the author does not accept that causation reduces to mere regular sequence.

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