Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION
- In Hobbesian state of nature, violence ruled; however, European Great Powers have always existed in a similar state.
- European civilization, since the 15th century, has been defined by sovereign states acknowledging no superior authority.
- Despite the potential for perpetual war, Europe has experienced periods of peace due to the Balance of Power.
- No single state has been strong enough to dominate all others, preserving the sovereignty of smaller states.
- The relations among Great Powers have shaped European history, especially in the last age discussed in the book.
- Attempts to supersede sovereign states include seeking universal moral law or overwhelming armed force.
- Challenges to the Balance of Power include attempts at hegemony by Philip II, Louis XIV, and Napoleon.
- The Balance of Power survived challenges, such as Napoleon’s bid for mastery and Germany’s rise.
- The First World War was a struggle to preserve or restore the Balance of Power, but its outcome did not fully restore the balance.
- International history saw challenges from ideologies like Roman Catholicism and the French Revolution’s ideas of the Rights of Man.
- The Balance of Power worked alongside challenges from ideologies, maintaining stability in Europe.
- The First World War discredited self-operating laws of economics and politics, leading to new moralities and challenges to sovereignty.
- Lenin and Wilson symbolized new outlooks, advocating for international cooperation and the end of sovereign states.
- Despite changes in population, economic resources, and political structures, the Great Powers remained organizations for war.
- Military strength became the test of a Great Power, with the Prussian system of universal military service revolutionizing military thought.
- Changes in military capabilities affected the standing of Great Britain in Europe, leading to shifts in the Balance of Power.
- Population changes also influenced the Balance of Power during this period.
- France experienced a dramatic decline in population relative to other Great Powers from 1850 to 1910.
- France’s dwindling manpower contributed to a loss of confidence, despite her ability to field comparable military forces during WWI.
- Germany’s rapid population growth and military buildup shifted perceptions of power dynamics.
- Military authorities before WWI focused on the number of men under arms, exaggerating the power of Russia and underestimating Great Britain.
- The proportion of men serving in armed forces remained relatively stable for most Great Powers between 1850 and 1914.
- France’s attempt to compete with Germany and Britain simultaneously strained its resources.
- By 1914, Russia, Great Britain, and Germany emerged as dominant Great Powers.
- Rising armament expenditures per head and as a proportion of national income reflected Europe’s escalating militarization.
- Economic resources, particularly industrial capacity based on coal and steel production, reshaped power dynamics.
- Germany’s industrial growth surpassed France’s, and eventually, even rivaled Great Britain’s.
- The United States emerged as a significant economic rival to Europe by 1914, with unparalleled industrial capacity.
- Russia and the United States demonstrated rapid economic development, challenging Europe’s economic hegemony.
- Between 1885 and 1913, British industrial production increased at an annual rate of 2.11%, while Germany’s grew at 4.5%, the US at 5.2%, and Russia at 5.72%.
- Despite Britain’s decline in world industrial production share from 25% in 1860 to less than 10% in 1913, the US’s share rose significantly, surpassing 35% by 1913.
- Economic shifts influenced political dynamics in Europe, challenging established power balances.
- Prussia and Austria’s fears of French domination waned by 1870, replaced by concerns about Germany’s ascendance.
- The United States and Russia emerged as significant factors in European power calculations.
- European statesmen often focused on political appearances over economic realities, leading to miscalculations regarding the US’s potential influence.
- The decline of revolutionary fervor in Europe, especially after 1848, reduced the fear of internal upheaval driving foreign policy decisions.
- Bismarck’s political acumen in mastering the German revolution was crucial in reshaping the European power dynamics.
- The onset of World War I was driven by a convergence of beliefs among Austrian and German rulers, underestimating the risk of revolution.
- The war revealed the unity and resilience of democratic nations like France and Great Britain, disproving German expectations of internal discord.
- The period between 1848 and 1918 marked the last age of the European Balance of Power, but it was challenged and ultimately transformed by economic and political shifts.
- The First World War did not result in traditional outcomes, leading to a reevaluation of European power dynamics and the diminishing centrality of European affairs.
CHAPTER I. THE DIPLOMACY OF REVOLUTION, 1848
- The stability challenged in 1848 was based on principles and design rather than treaties.
- By the end of the 19th century, most Great Powers were involved in informal alliances, which became more complex in the 20th century.
- Metternich’s system, though stable and rigid, lacked general alliances and relied on few particular treaties.
- The Quadruple Alliance provided limited guarantees, and treaties like the Treaty of London of 1839 guaranteed Belgian neutrality.
- The Holy Alliance, comprising Russia, Prussia, and Austria, opposed changes in frontiers and constitutional concessions within states.
- The agreements of Miinchengratz in 1833 outlined the Holy Alliance’s terms, focusing on maintaining the status quo in Turkey and Poland.
- The Holy Alliance aimed to prevent liberal and revolutionary movements, particularly in Poland, Italy, and the Near East.
- Conflict was avoided among the conservative powers by monarchical solidarity and mutual threats against liberalism.
- The revolutions of 1848 were not unexpected and signaled a challenge to the Vienna settlement and international stability.
- Lamartine’s Manifesto to Europe in 1848 repudiated the treaties of 1815 and declared France’s intention to recognize territorial provisions while threatening war in case of interference with Switzerland or independent Italy.
- Lamartine’s circular marked the first official announcement by a Great Power that the Vienna settlement lacked moral validity, shifting international relations to a de facto basis.
- Metternich viewed the revolution as external and compared the situation to that of 1792, aiming to demand France’s respect for existing treaties.
- Frederick William IV and Tsar Nicholas talked about resisting revolution but avoided committing to any plan of action.
- British policy diverged from the rigidity of the Holy Alliance, with leaders like Palmerston seeking to appease French sentiment and preserve peace.
- Lamartine’s Manifesto to Europe repudiated the treaties of 1815 but aimed for peaceful relations, proposing guarantees to France instead of demanding them from France.
- The revolution spread from France to central Europe in March 1848, leading to Metternich’s fall from power in Vienna and the end of the system of 1815.
- Frederick William IV initially made liberal concessions in response to rioters in Berlin but later proclaimed Prussia’s merger into Germany and promised protection against perceived dangers.
- The focus of radical sentiment was on Poland and Italy, with Italy achieving liberation through internal action while Poland faced repression from Russia.
- Charles Albert of Sardinia declared war on Austria for the sake of Lombardy and Venetia, while Prussia did little for the Polish cause despite liberal government gestures.
- German liberals believed that unity could only be achieved through a foreign war, leading to a desire to liberate Poland from Russian rule.
- Russia feared Polish independence, viewing it as a threat to its existence as a Great Power, and avoided provocation while France refused to provoke Russia.
- French support for Poland waned as the revolution progressed, and Polish hopes collapsed after a radical revolt in Paris in May 1848.
- Lamartine’s foreign policy in the Assembly favored fraternity with Germany, the reconstruction of a free Poland, and the liberation of Italy but did not prescribe specific actions.
- Prussian policy under Frederick William IV shifted against liberal sentiment and aligned more with conservative principles.
- Russia proposed dividing Sleswick along national lines, but conflicting claims between Germany and Denmark prevented a quick resolution.
- Palmerston mediated between Denmark and the Germans but was unable to compel Denmark to accept a division at the national line.
- British policy focused on maintaining peace and armistice negotiations but did not significantly contribute to the resolution of the Sleswick question.
- Frederick William IV’s abhorrence of association with liberal causes led to negotiations to postpone the duchies’ question to a less revolutionary future.
- The armistice of Malmo in August 1848 disregarded German national aspirations and provoked a crisis in the German national assembly at Frankfurt.
- Frederick William IV’s shame at Tsar Nicholas’s moral disapproval shaped Prussia’s policy regarding Sleswick and German unification.
- French foreign policy shifted under Bastide, who prioritized stability over revolutionary ideals and saw German unity as potentially threatening.
- Bastide instructed French representatives to avoid inciting nationalism and backed Prussia as a means to prevent German unity, despite theoretical disapproval.
- Palmerston justified the armistice of Malmo with the prospect of a European war, but this threat was exaggerated.
- The armistice caused a breach between Frederick William and German liberals, hindering German unification under a liberal Prussia.
- British policy aimed to prevent German unification under a liberal Prussia to maintain the balance of power in Europe.
- Italian unification took a backseat in European diplomacy, with Italy seen as less significant than France or Russia.
- France’s reluctance to intervene in Italy stemmed from various factors, including a fear of creating powerful neighbors and reluctance to support a monarchy like Savoy.
- French and British mediation efforts in Italy aimed to prevent Austrian domination but were hindered by conflicting interests and actions of the Italian states.
- The Austro-Sardinian war prompted British and French mediation efforts to prevent Austrian dominance in Italy.
- French and British cooperation aimed to prevent a united Italy that might challenge the European balance of power.
- French politicians, wary of public opinion and distrustful of British motives, hesitated to commit fully to Italian intervention.
- Austrian acceptance of Anglo-French mediation, though not based on the Hummelauer plan, suited French interests by preventing the union of Lombardy and Sardinia.
- The rise of realist statesmen like Schwarzenberg in Austria and Louis Napoleon in France shifted diplomatic priorities towards maintaining peace and stability.
CHAPTER II. THE DIPLOMACY OF REACTION, 1849-50
- By the end of 1848, order had been restored in major European capitals, with Vienna subdued and Berlin’s liberals capitulating.
- Louis Napoleon’s election in France signaled a shift towards order and conservatism, completing the suppression of the June days’ revolution.
- Remnants of the revolution persisted in Rome, Sardinia, Hungary, and the German National Assembly in Frankfurt, but lacked material force.
- The new rulers of Europe were despotic and focused on maintaining power through military force.
- Louis Napoleon, despite his conservative support base, harbored resentment against Austria and sought to redraw Europe’s map.
- Louis Napoleon’s dream of a general Congress to settle disputes reflected his mix of idealism and conspiracy, driven by a desire for expansion.
- Despite opposite origins, both Louis Napoleon and the legitimate monarchies pursued similar aims and methods, aiming for stability through revolutionary means.
- Plans by Schwarzenberg and Frederick William IV aimed at reshaping Germany’s balance of power and extending influence beyond its borders.
- German unity plans were anti-Russian and aimed at dominating the Danube valley and the Balkans, with a focus on countering liberal movements.
- The struggle in Germany between Radowitz and the Junkers mirrored a conflict over the direction of Prussian policy.
- The events of 1849 paved the way for the German question to take center stage once Poland, Italy, and the Near East were no longer pressing issues.
- Italian affairs served as an epilogue, with Charles Albert’s defeat at Novara in 1849 leading to renewed Italian appeals to Paris and rumors of French intervention.
- Revolutionary policy had ended, and Bonapartist policy had not yet begun in 1849.
- Palmerston, restrained by the cabinet, refused to support French action, and the French showed no enthusiasm for intervention.
- Peace negotiations between Austria and Sardinia focused on the size of the indemnity, resulting in peace based on the status quo.
- Victor Emanuel, despite authoritarian tendencies, maintained the Constitution and favored Sardinian liberals, intending to renew the war against Austria.
- Rome became a republic in 1849, facing expected intervention from Austria, Naples, or Spain.
- French intervention aimed to challenge Austrian dominance in Italy, resulting in the fall of the Roman republic despite initial negotiations.
- Louis Napoleon’s actions in Rome faced criticism domestically, particularly as they contradicted republican principles.
- Hungarian independence was declared in April 1849, with Kossuth as governor, despite earlier attempts to garner support from liberal Europe.
- Prussia offered help against the Hungarian revolution but demanded Austrian recognition of Prussian supremacy in Germany, which Schwarzenberg rejected.
- Russia intervened in Hungary to protect Austrian interests and maintain the balance of power in Germany, with a focus on suppressing revolutionary movements.
- Russian action aimed to preserve Austria as a Great Power, restore the German balance, and protect Russian interests in Poland and the Near East.
- Palmerston welcomed Russia’s action, seeing it as restoring Austria as a Great Power and maintaining stability in the Near East.
- Both Russian and British motivations were driven by immediate concerns rather than long-term strategic visions.
- Russian intervention in Hungary, successful by mid-August 1849, aimed to restore the Holy Alliance system without provoking liberal alliances.
- A Russian blunder, triggered by demands for extradition of Polish and Hungarian refugees, led to a crisis with Austria and Turkey.
- Turkish adroitness in managing the crisis involved seeking support from both British and French ambassadors while secretly appealing to the tsar.
- Nicholas I, initially advocating clemency for defeated Hungarians, later reacted angrily to Austrian repression and withdrew demands on Turkey.
- British and French fleets were mobilized in response to the crisis, with Palmerston’s determination overriding cabinet pacifism.
- Louis Napoleon’s government in France initially hesitated but eventually joined British action in the Near East, temporarily disrupting the growing Anglo-French alliance.
- Prussian policy under Frederick William IV oscillated between desires for a united Germany under Austrian agreement and attempts to maintain Prussian dominance.
- Prussian involvement in the Elbe duchies conflict strained relations with Russia and Great Britain, leading to further discredit and estrangement.
- Schwarzenberg’s compromise proposal for joint administration of the German Confederation was tentatively accepted by Prussia, delaying confrontation.
- Russian intervention in German affairs continued, with Nicholas urging Prussia and Austria to repudiate their constitutions and unite against revolution while emphasizing adherence to treaties.
- Schwarzenberg aimed to repudiate the Austrian constitution of March 1849 and sought compromise with Prussia to divide Germany.
- Despite offering a compromise, Schwarzenberg also pursued territorial ambitions, requesting permission to annex the county of Glatz from Prussia, which was refused.
- The underlying issue between Austria and Prussia was dominance over Germany, with conflicts arising over Holstein and Hesse.
- Holstein and Hesse disputes intensified, leading to military gestures and alliances between Austria, Bavaria, and Württemberg.
- Prussia’s equivocal policy alienated France, Great Britain, and Russia, with Louis Napoleon attempting to sway Prussia against Austria.
- French overtures to Prussia, including offers of territory on the Rhine in exchange for support, were rejected by Frederick William IV.
- Prussia remained isolated due to lack of conviction in its policy, despite military superiority and enthusiasm for war among its populace.
- Diplomatic maneuvers intensified, with Schwarzenberg securing Russian support against Prussian resistance in Holstein and Hesse.
- Prussian policy shifted towards surrender, culminating in negotiations and the Agreement of Olomouc in November 1850.
- The Agreement of Olomouc marked a return to the old order, with Prussia accepting conditions without war but without enthusiasm, leading Frederick William IV to repent his decisions.
- Prussia and Austria failed to reach agreement on the incorporation of all Austrian territory into the German Confederation at the Dresden conference, with smaller states supporting Prussia’s stance.
- France and Great Britain protested against modifying the settlement of 1815, with Louis Napoleon seeking Russian support against Anglo-French cooperation provoked by Austrian policy.
- In March 1851, Manteuffel proposed a compromise, suggesting a secret alliance between Prussia and Austria to guarantee Austrian territory without including the Austrian empire in Germany.
- The Austro-Prussian alliance, signed on 16 May 1851, aimed to counter ‘the revolution’ and secure Austrian territory in Italy, with Prussia providing the guarantee.
- Nicholas declined to join the alliance to avoid provoking a western alliance in return, learning from the mistake of the Quadruple Alliance of 1834.
- The defeat of the Polish movement and the stabilization of Russia’s position led Nicholas to believe he had a free hand in the Near East, with no need for a revived Holy Alliance.
- Nicholas assumed he could negotiate with France or Great Britain from a position of strength, confident in Russian power after the revolutions of 1848.
- However, it was unforeseen that Russia would eventually need protection before the Austro-Prussian alliance expired, leaving Nicholas regretting the lost opportunity for a united Northern Courts alliance.