Introduction

• Our knowledge of things or ordinary objects is generally expressed as judgements or propositions.

• Truth and error are characteristics of judgements or propositions, which are verbal expressions of judgements.

• If any knowledge cannot be expressed as a judgement, it cannot have the character of truth or falsity.

• The problem of truth and error concerns empirical facts expressed as judgements or propositions.

• A judgement is an assertion about something that claims to be true but may be false.

• Judgements may be affirmative or negative, affirming or denying that a thing is a certain way, but always claim to be true.

• Judgements proceed on the understanding that what is affirmed or denied is true or a real fact.

• When knowledge contains no claim to truth, there is no occasion for truth or error.

• Doubt as a mental state is neither true nor false, because doubting does not claim to hold the truth but is uncertain about it.

• A judgement is a definite assertion claiming something is or is not such-and-such and may be true or false.

• The main questions are:

  • What makes one judgement true and another false?

  • What do we mean by the truth and falsehood of judgements?

  • How do we know or test that a judgement is true or false?

• Two main aspects of truth and error:

  • How truth and error are constituted (nature of truth and error).

  • How truth and error are known or tested (criteria or tests of truth and error).

Indian Theories of Truth and Error

• In Indian philosophy, the problem of knowledge is studied under Pramanas, which are means or instruments of knowledge.

• Different schools accept varying numbers of Pramanas: one, two, three, four, or six.

• The six commonly accepted Pramanas are: pratyaksha (perception), anumana (inference), upamana (comparison), sabda (verbal testimony), arthapatti (postulation), and anupalabdhi (non-apprehension).

• Prama is right knowledge, and that which produces right knowledge is called Pramana.

• Prama is knowledge of an object as it is (yathavasthita) and conducive to life (vyavahara-anuguna) or in accordance with experience.

• Knowledge must be purposeful, contributing to material, moral, or spiritual ends to be considered valid.

• Right knowledge must be free from faults such as doubt (samsaya) and error (viparyaya).

• Doubt (samsaya) arises when an object appears to possess contradictory qualities making it difficult to decide what it truly is, leading to indecision.

• Error (viparyaya) is an impediment to right knowledge and has two types:

  • Wrong apprehension (anyathajnana): The object is cognized but some of its qualities are either omitted or wrongly attributed.

  • Misconception (viparatajnana): The object itself is mistaken for another (e.g., mistaking a shell for silver).

• In wrong apprehension, the essential nature (svarupa-nirupakadharma) of the object is correctly known, but error occurs regarding its attributes (nirupita-svarupa-visesana); this is called dharmaviparyasa (error about qualities).

• In misconception, the essential nature fails to be recognized, and the object is mistaken for another, an error of the substratum (dharmiviparyasa).

• Example of misconception: Seeing a shell but cognizing it as shining silver.

• Therefore, Prama is knowledge that is free from these faults, and Pramana is the instrument or means by which such knowledge is produced.

Perception: Nirvikalpaka Savikalpaka

• In perception, there is sense-object contact where an object is cognized with its form (rupa) and qualities (guna).

• Nirvikalpaka pratyaksha (indeterminate perception) occurs when we perceive an object for the first time, cognizing only that object and its qualities without any conceptual thought of similar objects or species.

• This first cognition is experienced as ‘this is thus’ (idam ittham), where ‘this’ refers to the object and ‘thus’ to its inseparable qualities and form.

• Savikalpaka pratyaksha (determinate perception) occurs when the object is recognized along with the thought that it belongs to a known class or species, connecting it to previously perceived similar objects.

• The key difference: nirvikalpaka perceives only the object itself, while savikalpaka includes recognition of the object’s membership in a class or species.

• Both types of perception involve cognition of an object qualified by inseparable attributes; an object is never perceived as a mere form- or quality-less entity.

• The Nyaya school classifies perception into two types:

  • Laukika (ordinary) perception: direct sense contact with objects present to the senses.

  • Alaukika (extraordinary) perception: perception of objects not ordinarily present to the senses but conveyed through unusual mediums.

• Perception is also divided into:

  • External (bahya) perception: through the external senses—sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell.

  • Internal (manasa) perception: brought about by the mind’s contact with psychical states and processes.