Transition from Common Rational Moral Cognition to Philosophical Moral Cognition
First Section

- Good will is the only thing considered good without limitation.
- Other qualities like understanding, wit, courage, resoluteness, and temperament can be good but can also become evil if the will behind them is not good.
- Gifts of fortune (like power, wealth, honor, health, happiness) can lead to arrogance if not guided by a good will.
- A rational spectator would not take satisfaction in the welfare of someone if it lacks a pure good will.
- Even moderation, self-control, and sober reflection have value, but they need a good will to be truly good.
- The good will is good not because of what it accomplishes, but for the act of willing itself.
- A good will shines even if it fails to achieve its aims, and it holds value regardless of the outcome.
- Utility or success does not affect the value of the good will.
- The concept of absolute worth of the good will may seem strange, yet it resonates with common reason.
- If happiness were the only goal, reason would be unnecessary, as instinct would be more effective.
- Reason is not meant to guide us towards happiness, but to guide our will to be good in itself.
- Reason should not simply serve to satisfy inclinations but to make the will morally good.
- Reason has a higher vocation than happiness; it is meant to guide towards a good will.
- Reason’s true purpose is to ensure a good will, even if it doesn’t guarantee happiness.
- A good will is necessary for the pursuit of happiness, but it might limit it in this life.
- Reason should cultivate a good will, as this is its highest practical vocation.
- Duty and good will are interlinked; the concept of duty reveals the good will even through limitations.
- Actions contrary to duty can never be considered actions done from a good will.
- Actions in conformity with duty can be done for other reasons (e.g., inclination or self-interest).
- An action in conformity with duty must be performed from duty and not self-interest.
- Example: A merchant who does not overcharge is following duty, but may do so out of self-interest, not love for customers.
- Preserving life is a duty, but it lacks moral worth if done out of inclination or fear; it gains moral value when one does it out of duty despite having no desire to live.
- Beneficence can be a duty, but if done from sympathy or a natural inclination, it lacks true moral worth. True moral worth emerges when one acts from duty despite having no inclination or when inclined to act otherwise.
- Happiness is a duty (indirectly), but pursuing it based on mere inclination (e.g., health vs. immediate pleasures) does not make it morally valuable. True happiness comes when pursued not from inclination but from duty.
- Love of neighbor and even enemies cannot be based on inclination, as that would be pathological love. Instead, it must be based on beneficence from duty—acting for others’ good regardless of personal feelings.
- Moral worth lies not in the effect or goal of an action but in the maxim (principle) behind it, based solely on duty without regard for personal outcomes.
- Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law (the principle of universal legislation). Actions are morally good not based on consequences but because they follow a universal, impartial law.
- An action is morally good when the maxim of the action can be willed to become a universal law, without any self-interest or inclination influencing the will.
- Moral actions cannot be determined by expected effects, but by the will that follows a universal law.
- The principle of duty calls for acting out of respect for the moral law, not for personal gain or inclination. The action is morally valuable if it could be willed as a universal law.
- False promises (e.g., to get out of trouble) cannot be universalized because such a maxim would destroy the concept of promise and thus lack moral value.
- Common human reason inherently understands moral principles and applies them without needing philosophical training. It can distinguish right from wrong based on universal principles.
- Practical reason does not rely on empirical experiences but on moral laws, which are universal and abstract, to guide actions.
- Common sense can navigate moral decisions better than philosophical reasoning, as the latter can be muddled by unnecessary complications.
- Wisdom needs science to preserve moral precepts, while reason struggles against inclinations and desires that seek to corrupt moral duties.
- A dialectic emerges between the strictness of moral law and human inclinations, prompting practical reason to seek philosophical guidance to maintain ethical integrity and avoid self-deception.