“Two Concepts of Liberty” in Context

“Two Concepts of Liberty” in Context

Chapter – 1

Harshit Sharma

Alumnus (BHU)

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Isaiah Berlin delivered his 1958 inaugural lecture as Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory at Oxford University on 31 October 1958.
The lecture, titled “Two Concepts of Liberty,” was contextualized by Berlin himself, addressing major political problems and rival interpretations of these problems.
Berlin’s lecture was published shortly after its delivery and revised over the following eleven years in response to critiques, including H. L. A. Hart and Stuart Hampshire in 1967.
In 1969, the lecture was published in a revised form along with three other essays, including an Introduction where Berlin responded to critiques and slightly modified his views, although expecting continued opposition.
Berlin anticipated that his doctrines would face fierce criticism, especially from students in the B.Phil. examination in Politics.
In 2002, Henry Hardy edited and corrected the 1969 version of the lecture, incorporating additional writings and a guide to Berlin’s critics.
The primary contextualization goal is to interpret Berlin’s lecture within the political debates of his time, focusing on how Berlin responded to the challenges posed by communism, socialism, nationalism, and struggles for self-determination in the decolonizing world.
Berlin’s lecture contributed to the rise of negative liberty liberalism, influencing the Cold War ideological landscape in Europe and North America.
One central question Berlin addresses is the concern of Western liberals about the relationship between individual liberty and the exploitation or neglect of the majority.
The issue at hand is the belief that individual liberty as an ultimate goal might be attained at the expense of others, leading to concerns about social justice and equality.
Berlin’s argument seeks to dispel this concern by redefining liberty in a way that separates it from the broader meanings that create such issues.
The lecture contributes to decolonization and Cold War debates by narrowing the understanding of liberty, distancing it from concerns about exploitation and inequality.
The last sections of the lecture address liberal critics who were dissatisfied with Berlin’s arguments, continuing to raise the issue of liberty’s relationship with exploitation.
Berlin’s interpretation of liberty helped to marginalize progressive, pluralistic liberalism and shifted the focus toward a more exclusive form of negative liberty.
Negative liberty, as promoted by Berlin, became the dominant liberal ideology, particularly during the Cold War, and sidelined other forms of liberal thought.

THE COLD WAR: THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY

Berlin contextualizes his two concepts of liberty within the Cold War conflict, which he views as a three-sided struggle: between the capitalist West, the Communist countries, and the decolonizing Third World countries.
The Cold War, according to Berlin, involves competing answers to the central political question of obedience and coercion.
The two dominant concepts of liberty that emerge from this context are negative liberty and positive liberty, with a third concept emerging from the Third World struggles for self-determination.
The key to understanding the Cold War and the liberty debate is to recognize these two rival concepts that animate the capitalist and communist ideologies.
Negative liberty answers the question, “What is the area within which the subject is or should be left to do or be what they are able to do or be, without interference by others?” It represents the liberty of non-interference or a sphere of non-interference.
Positive liberty answers the question, “What, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?” It is about self-mastery, self-realization, and self-government.
Berlin’s conceptualization of the Cold War as a battle between negative liberty and positive liberty is a central and original feature of his lecture.
The dual idea of liberty—negative and positive—has been part of European liberalism for some time, but Berlin’s innovation is to define liberalism solely in terms of negative liberty, claiming this is the focus of the capitalist West.
Berlin claims that the capitalist West fights for negative liberty, while Communist countries fight for positive liberty, positioning these concepts as mutually exclusive and opposed.
This redefinition of liberalism as negative liberty challenges traditional views that see both negative and positive liberty as integral to liberal thought.

PROGRESSIVE EUROPEAN LIBERALISM AND LIBERTY AT THE MID CENTURY

The mainstream of European liberalism at the time of Berlin’s lecture was based on four interrelated senses of liberty.
The first two senses are part of Benjamin Constant’s dual framework (1819):
- Negative liberty: the “liberty of the moderns” or private autonomy.
- Positive liberty: the “liberty of the ancients” or public autonomy, focusing on the right to participate in representative institutions and the public sphere.
Negative liberty includes the liberty of:
- Person, speech, thought, faith.
- Equality before the law.
- Private property and the ability to enter into contracts.
- Free trade or market liberty: non-interference by political power in economic transactions.
In the interwar years, progressive liberals introduced a third type of liberty: social and economic liberty, which is more recent and subordinate to negative and positive liberty.
Berlin notes that liberals disagreed over the boundaries of negative liberty and the degree of positive liberty(participation in self-government).
Disagreements also existed on the type of social and economic liberty required to exercise negative and positive liberty.
John Stuart Mill introduced the idea of “social power” distinct from political power, which liberals sought to address in their understanding of liberty.
These three senses of liberty—negative, positive, and social and economic liberty—were not separate but interrelated and mutually supportive.
Mill’s work in On Liberty emphasizes a package of liberties, including negative liberties, self-government, public participation, cooperative forms, and social capacities for liberty.
Benjamin Constant supported participatory and social liberty to diffuse class war.
Postwar progressive liberals introduced a fourth strand: international liberty, which rejects the assumption that one individual or state can be free while others are unfree or exploited.
The idea of free trade used to justify exploitation was challenged in favor of a new form of association where freedommeans the mutual recognition and respect of all agents as free.
Social-democratic liberals of the decolonisation period stressed the need for liberty for all peoples, asserting the right of self-determination.
The four interrelated types of liberty became foundational in international human rights, culminating in:
- The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),
- Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960),
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966),
- International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966).
These four types of liberty were expected to form the basis of a new international order under the Bretton Woods System, the United Nations, international human rights, and potentially world federalism.
Berlin’s lecture reflected the tension between existing and emerging understandings of liberty.
By the mid-1950s, the liberal imagination was increasingly influenced by the neoliberal monistic vision of liberty, particularly negative liberty promoted by figures like Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek, and Milton Friedman.
However, progressive liberals such as Aldous Huxley, John Maynard Keynes, Harold Laski, and others continued to champion the four interrelated types of liberty.
The shift towards a more right-wing liberalism during the Cold War era, as represented by Berlin, contrasted with the views of his more progressive liberal contemporaries.
Despite this shift, Berlin’s lecture was not hegemonic, as his audience and critics presented devastating criticisms of his position.

BERLIN’S ATTACK ON PROGRESSIVE LIBERALISM, DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL DEMOCRACY, AND PLURALISM

Berlin defines liberalism and the Cold War struggle in terms of negative liberty, claiming that positive liberty is historically linked to socialism and communism.
He challenges the view of progressive liberals, social democrats, and pluralists who understood liberty as a mix of negative and positive liberty, and saw them as connected to democracy and social democracy.
Berlin rejects the assumption that the liberal tradition overlaps with the democratic tradition. Liberals traditionally prioritize negative liberty and the constitutional rule of law over democracy.
Berlin argues that there is no necessary connection between individual liberty and democratic rule. Positive liberty, associated with the question of who rules, is conceptually related to democracy, whereas negative liberty is independent of this issue.
Including positive liberty (participation and self-government) threatens negative liberty. Berlin claims that the only acceptable interest in positive liberty for liberals is to protect their negative liberty, which should be safeguarded by constitutional guarantees.
Berlin also seeks to separate liberalism from social democracy, arguing that social and economic liberty (e.g., New Deal, postwar European welfare state) is not a valid form of liberty.
He criticizes the “confusion of values” that equates liberty with equality, fairness, justice, or social and economic freedom, arguing these are independent values.
Social and economic conditions might be preconditions for liberty, but they involve interference in the sphere of negative liberty, leading to a reduction of liberty, thus threatening it.
Berlin asserts that liberty is distinct from values like equality and justice, and that curtailing liberty to reduce inequality results in absolute loss of liberty.
Berlin views discussions of social and economic liberty as leading down the path to positive liberty, socialism, and communism.
He argues that negative liberty and social/economic liberty cannot coexist without a zero-sum dynamic where increasing one reduces the other, despite the social democratic view that both are interrelated.
Negative liberty presupposes the enabling capacities necessary to exercise freedoms (e.g., education, health, mobility, workplace rights, recognition).
Social democratic liberals argue that the lack of enabling capacities (e.g., poor access to food or education) is equivalent to interference in negative liberty, and thus a violation of freedom.
Berlin disagrees, claiming that poverty and lack of social/economic ability are not political freedom violationsunless caused by human agents, but this overlooks how such conditions affect freedom.
For Keynesian social democratic liberals, interference in the private sphere to foster basic social and economic abilities enhances negative liberty for all, countering Berlin’s claim that such policies reduce liberty.
Social and economic liberty, in combination with positive liberty (democratic participation), can create a third waythat prevents the working class from turning to socialism or communism.
Berlin undermines this progressive liberty by detaching negative liberty from its connections to democratic and social/economic liberties, viewing these as claptrap, confusions, and a Trojan horse that leads to communism.
His next goal is to define negative liberty independently of its historical and semantic connections to these other forms of liberty.

BERLIN’S NARROW DEFINITION OF NEGATIVE LIBERTY AND ITS FAILURE

Berlin defines negative liberty in the narrowest terms possible, focusing on its analytic distinction from positive liberty, claiming the two are mutually exclusive and historically opposed.
He defines negative liberty as the absence of interference, meaning freedom from external obstacles, and argues that the wider the area of noninterference, the wider one’s freedom.
This definition does not reference desires, choices, or activities of the subject, distinguishing it from positive liberty, which focuses on these aspects.
However, the limitation of this definition is that it cannot determine what constitutes interference without reference to the agency of those being interfered with.
Richard Wollheim critiques Berlin’s definition, arguing that if freedom is merely the absence of obstacles to desires, one could be free by extinguishing desires, an idea Berlin initially acknowledges as a mistake in his first lecture.
Berlin clarifies that freedom involves the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities, not merely the absence of frustration, emphasizing that freedom is about how many doors are open for a person to choose from.
This definition links negative liberty to the market liberalism view, where freedom is framed as the ability to choosefrom a variety of options without interference from government.
However, if negative liberty is framed as the availability of choices, it shares criteria with positive liberty, which involves making choices, engaging in activities, and evaluating them according to one’s way of life.
The political issue of who decides what counts as an obstacle to freedom leads to the question of democratic participation, thus connecting negative liberty with the positive liberty of democratic self-governance.
Berlin admits that his original distinction between negative and positive liberty is flawed, as the two concepts are not entirely distinct. He acknowledges that these liberties are often conceptually and historically interrelated.
In response to critics, Berlin defends his historical argument that positive liberty, if taken too far, can lead to the extinction of the area of negative liberty, a view also held by figures like T.H. Green, Hegel, and Marx.
Progressive liberals accept both negative and positive liberty to a degree, without adopting extreme forms of socialismor communism, because the two are inextricably linked and cannot be fully separated.
Berlin’s critics argue that his strict division between the two forms of liberty is misleading, as positive liberty is not inherently destructive of negative liberty, and both can be accepted without undermining freedom.
Berlin’s confusion lies in drawing a distinction in kind where none exists, failing to recognize the overlapping features of negative and positive liberty and the historical contexts in which they intersect.
His critics contend that the real disagreement is over the nature of positive liberty and its features, rather than a fundamental separation between the two concepts of liberty.

THE BROADNESS OF POSITIVE LIBERTY AND THE SLIPPERY SLOPE TO COMMUNISM AND TOTALITARIANISM

Berlin defines positive liberty in the broadest terms, focusing on self-mastery and collective self-government. One is free if they govern themselves and participate in the governance of society.
This two-part definition of positive liberty is shared by liberals, democrats, social democrats, and socialists.
Berlin argues that while this definition seems harmless analytically, it leads to dictatorship and communism in practice through a slippery slope (steps 1–5).
Step 1: The self in collective self-government is divided into the lower, empirical self and the higher, transcendental self.
Step 2: An elite emerges, justifying their authority using theories of civilization, development, and evolution that claim a process of moving from a lower to a higher self.
Step 3: The elite justifies coercion to move individuals from their lower self to the higher, enlightened self, even when people resist.
Step 4: Positive liberty and coercion are combined; people are forced to become free or self-realised by progressing through developmental stages against their will.
Step 5: Berlin’s central thesis is that these theories lead to authoritarian governments that overturn negative libertyin the name of positive liberty.
Berlin’s audience was familiar with these theories, used to justify state-building in Europe and imperial expansionoutside Europe, as well as forced economic development in the Soviet Union.
These theories persisted post-decolonisation, with elites in the Third World using them to justify rapid development.
The democratic counterargument suggests that step 3 is a contradiction, as it violates the principle of self-government; it’s not to abandon positive liberty but to combine it with limitations on governmental power.
Berlin disagrees, claiming that in practice, democratic self-rule cannot coexist with respect for negative liberty, and positive liberty leads inevitably to the abuse of power.
Berlin insists that historically, the defense of individual rights and civil liberties has come from the tradition of negative liberty, not from any democratic or popular sovereignty tradition.
He presents no evidence for the claim that the Cold War presented only a choice between negative liberty and the slide into communism.
Critics argue that resistance to tyranny has historically come from popular sovereignty, where people exercise their right to self-governance and overthrow unjust rulers.
Berlin dismisses this response, concluding that self-government always leads to its opposite in practice and that positive liberty ultimately means centralized power in the hands of elites.

PAGAN SELF-ASSERTION: UNMASKING THE FREEDOM OF SELF-DETERMINATION

The freedom of all requires recognition and respect for the self-determination of peoples in the former colonies and a reconstruction of the international order.
This recognition addresses the demand for self-determination expressed by peoples of the Third World in resistance to colonialism, neocolonialism, and dependency during the Cold War.
The demand for self-determination was forcefully presented at the Bandung Conference (1955), recognized by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 1514 (1960), and endorsed by figures like Kwame Nkrumah in Neo-Colonialism(1965).
Self-determination means the freedom to govern, develop economies independently, and engage in international relations as equals, not subordinates of the West or Soviet Union.
Western liberals are troubled by the violation of this freedom, which calls for recognition and international reconstruction.
Berlin rejects the view that Third-World struggles are for either negative or positive liberty, claiming instead that they are struggles for recognition.
He argues that what oppressed peoples demand is recognition as an independent entity with a will of its own, not simply liberty or equality.
Oppressed groups may prefer to be ruled by their own kind, even if it means being misgoverned, rather than being governed by a higher, foreign power that does not recognize them as equals.
Berlin claims that authoritarian democracies or despots may be preferred over enlightened governments due to this desire for group recognition.
He does not provide empirical evidence for his interpretation of decolonization movements or his portrayal of gentle, well-meaning colonisers.
Berlin dismisses the notion that these movements involve the surrender of liberty for security, describing it as a misunderstanding of the motivations behind nationalism and Marxism in the Third World.
Berlin argues that these peoples do not live in the modern world where individual liberty emerged, but in an earlier time akin to feudal or pagan societies.
The correct motivation behind these movements is “pagan self-assertion”, where groups seek to assert their identityand exercise unchecked powers of self-government.
Pagan self-assertion in a socialized form is seen as an ideal for asserting the personality of one’s group, which Berlin describes as a hybrid form of freedom.
Although not strictly negative or positive liberty, this form of freedom is closer to positive liberty and leads to the same destruction of negative liberty in practice.
Those advocating for pagan self-assertion claim to be pursuing “true liberty” but their ideal has little in common with Mill’s notion of liberty.
Berlin concludes that the division of the Cold War is between the negative liberty ideal of the civilized minority in the West and the mindless self-assertion of the majority in the Third World.
He argues that liberals are blinded to this reality and fail to recognize that the world is divided between self-consciousdefenders of negative liberty and those driven by pagan self-assertion.

LIBERTY, DISCIPLINE, AND DESPOTISM

Berlin argues that the Third-World independence movements are motivated by pagan self-assertion, which he believes is the key to understanding these struggles.
According to Berlin, the West must bring the gift of liberty to the Third World, but this is difficult since many Third-World peoples resist, support their own leaders, and embrace nationalism and Marxism in the belief that it leads to liberation.
Berlin describes the condition of people in the Third World as “half-naked, illiterate, underfed, and diseased” and claims they are not yet ready for negative liberty or positive freedom like the civilized minority in the West.
He argues that preconditions of liberty such as clothes, medicine, and education are necessary before freedom can be offered.
In the future, Berlin believes the peasants will need the same kind of liberty that the West already enjoys: the freedom of professors, artists, and millionaires.
Berlin’s solution for the Third World is to discipline the unconstrained self-assertion into the individual libertyalready achieved in Europe, similar to the approach of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.
Berlin compares this process to the historical domestication of pagan self-assertion in Europe, achieved through severe discipline, military discipline, and the rule of liberal-minded despots.
He believes that through authoritarian means, such as the application of discipline and despotism, self-assertiveness can be channeled into the modern liberty celebrated by figures like Mill.
Berlin’s argument is similar to John Stuart Mill’s in the 19th century, where non-European societies are deemed not civilized enough for modern liberty and need to be ruled despotically as a step towards eventual self-government.
Berlin claims that the Third World needs to undergo a process of civilization by applying discipline and despotism from the West, as it is the more advanced civilization that already achieved the necessary stages of liberty.
The coercion and despotism of the Third World are necessary for them to reach the civilized liberty the West enjoys, as the Third World is not yet ready to govern itself.
Berlin argues that this process must be done in the name of negative liberty, unlike the theories he criticizes, which are based on positive liberty.
However, Berlin fails to acknowledge the self-understanding of Third-World leaders like Gandhi, Fanon, and Cabral, who viewed their struggles for self-determination as a rational means to gain control over resources and economic development.
The multinational corporations that exploited Third-World resources also justified their actions in terms of negative liberty, opening doors to free trade and foreign investment, while being protected from interference.
When new Third-World governments passed laws to regulate or expropriate foreign corporations for the public good, their actions were often overridden by transnational trade law, military intervention, and the installation of dependent elites to protect foreign investment.
Third-World theorists knew they needed to develop popular democratic traditions to resist the risk of postcolonial elites controlled by foreign powers, as seen in the Tricontinental meeting of the Non-aligned Movement (1966).
Berlin is silent on the explanation of the Cold War from the Third World perspective, where authoritarian rule was imposed by the West’s enforcement of negative liberty for foreign corporations.

THE TROUBLE-FREE NEOLIBERAL CONSCIENCE

The initial question Berlin addresses reflects two major concerns of Western liberals: the suppression of liberty in colonized peoples and the exploitation that supports the West’s development, including the institutions of modern liberty.
Berlin responds to the first concern by trying to reduce liberty to negative liberty, disconnecting it from democraticand social/economic liberties.
He warns liberals that recognizing the four-fold liberty of the Third World would reduce their own liberty.
He argues that the decolonized peoples do not possess the freedom of self-determination or other modern concepts of liberty, as they are too underdeveloped to understand them.
According to Berlin, the colonized people are seeking group recognition and the ideal of pagan self-assertiondisguised as Western freedom, which leads to nationalism and Marxism.
Berlin believes that the Third World does not have liberty to be deprived of, thus maintaining the West’s liberty intact despite the exploitation of the colonies.
He argues that there is no need for a new international economic order based on reciprocal liberty, as the concern troubling liberals dissolves once they clear their misunderstandings.
Berlin contends that liberty should not be extended to the Third World yet, as they do not know how to use it, and recognizing them as self-determining will lead to the spread of nationalism and Marxism, undermining negative liberty.
He advocates for the application of aid, discipline, and enlightened despotic rule to guide the Third World up the stages of development to eventually reach negative liberty.
Berlin asserts that once the Third World reaches this “ultimate” end, they will not want to express their self-determination in diverse ways, but will need the universal liberal civilization that the West has.
He criticizes liberals for projecting their modern ideas of liberty onto the postcolonial world, which, in his view, is in a premodern state and exists under relations of enlightened dependent development with the West.
Once liberals shed their illusions, they can continue treating the former colonies in the same manner as the colonial period, guided by the mission of civilization, with a clear conscience.
Progressive liberals could see Berlin’s view as a misunderstanding and an affront to those who fought for decolonization.
Berlin’s reactionary theory was criticized during worldwide protests, particularly against the Vietnam War, as progressive liberals hoped their understanding of liberty would eventually triumph.
In response to colonialism, the UN removed the language of civilization and the ranking of peoples, which had justified Western imperialism.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) proclaimed that all humans are born free and equal, with rights to all freedoms outlined in the Declaration.
On December 14, 1960, UN Resolution 1514 recognized the freedom of self-determination for all peoples and condemned colonialism as suppression of freedom and social, economic, cultural development.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966) confirmed the universality of civil, democratic, and social liberties.
These international agreements repudiated the key theses of Berlin’s argument, affirming the rights of postcolonial states to self-determination and economic independence.
By the time Berlin revised his lecture and introduction, the international community had enshrined in international laweverything he rejected.

NEGATIVE LIBERTY AND THE VIOLENCE AND EXPLOITATION OF CAPITALISM

Berlin frequently mentions the oppression caused by socialism, nationalism, and communism under positive libertybut never addresses the violence and exploitation of capitalism spread under the guise of market freedom and negative liberty.
He only responds to this concern in the 1969 Introduction after critics challenge his silence, suggesting his lecture legitimates the violence of unrestricted capitalism while discrediting democratic opposition.
Berlin acknowledges that negative liberty is compatible with and has contributed to great social evils, including the support of destructive policies like Social Darwinism, which armed the strong against the weak.
He admits that the legal liberties of negative liberty are compatible with exploitation, brutality, and injustice, referencing the blood-stained story of economic individualism and unrestrained capitalist competition.
Berlin justifies not addressing this issue in the lecture, claiming it was too obvious to need mentioning.
He concedes that the social evils of laissez-faire capitalism stem from a perversion of negative liberty, not from it directly, stating that unrestrained capitalism led to violations of negative liberty or failures to provide its preconditions.
Berlin compares this perversion of negative liberty to the perversion of positive liberty, which also turned into authority and oppression.
However, if both concepts are manipulable, negative liberty is equally subject to the slippery slope Berlin applies to positive liberty, leading to authoritarianism and exploitation under the guise of market freedom.
Berlin abandons the historical thesis that only positive liberty is subject to perversion, asserting that negative liberty’s perversion is less bad, less common, and more transparent than positive liberty’s perversion.
He offers no evidence for this claim and fails to address the foundational premises of coercive market imposition and the civilising mission which underpin both negative and positive liberty theories, including his own.
The decolonisation generation of progressive liberals rejected these premises, recognizing that the freedom of the Other must be acknowledged in a fuller, fourfold sense, not just through Western-imposed market conditions or discipline.
Berlin’s final defense of negative liberty is that its abuses, though significant, are less severe and less systematic than those of positive liberty, but this does not address the deeper issues of coercive Western domination.
His policy recommendations to counter these abuses remain unchanged, focusing on promoting negative liberty, even if it leads to low-intensity democracy aligned with neoliberal agendas, like free trade and market liberty.
Berlin’s view of democracy as separate from freedom contrasts with progressive liberals, who see democratic participation and self-determination as essential to resistance against oppression.
Progressive liberals argue that true freedom comes from self-government and self-determination, which is crucial for overcoming oppressive governments.
Berlin’s revision eliminates the possibility of expressing a progressive view of political freedom, which emphasizes the right to self-determination as a check against abuse of power.
This shift aligns Berlin with Cold War neoliberal policies, which support a minimal set of political liberties but do not embrace the broader social and economic freedoms required to resist oppression effectively.
Berlin’s revised position on liberty and democracy is far removed from the decolonization generation’s understanding of freedom, which emphasized full self-determination as a means to combat oppression.