1. The problems of ethics: an example

• Ethics, like other branches of philosophy, springs from seemingly simple questions.
• These questions include: What makes honest actions right and dishonest ones wrong? Why is death a bad thing for the person who dies? Is there anything more to happiness than pleasure and freedom from pain?
• Such questions naturally occur in our lives and in the lives of people from different cultures and times.
• These questions seem simple but are ultimately perplexing.
• Every sensible answer one tries proves unsatisfactory upon reflection.
• This reflection marks the beginning of philosophy, turning seemingly simple questions into philosophical problems.
• Further reflection helps us plumb the depths of these problems.
• Not every hard-to-answer question is a source of philosophical perplexity.
• Some questions, like whether there is life on Mars, are hard to answer due to difficulties in getting all the facts.
• Such questions are for the natural sciences, which gather facts and solve problems arising from finding or knowing which facts to look for.
• Ethical questions resist easy answers due to difficulties in making sense of facts and how they bear on these questions.
• Reflecting on these matters reveals that our ordinary ideas contain confusions, obscurities, and surprising implications.
• Our ordinary beliefs about these matters are shaky and have complicating consequences we did not realize and are reluctant to endorse.
• Philosophical study begins with seemingly simple questions and uncovers difficulties.
• Through close, critical examination of our ideas and beliefs, philosophy seeks to overcome these difficulties.
• An example: You find a woman’s purse in a park, containing a driver’s license and a huge wad of cash.
• You consider the options: returning the purse or taking the cash.
• An honest person looks for a way to return the purse with its contents intact.
• A dishonest person would take the cash and discard the purse, thinking “Finders keepers, losers weepers.”
• Even an honest person might think about taking the cash, especially if struggling financially.
• This person might wonder why they should be honest when dishonesty seems more profitable.
• The honest person suppresses these thoughts and looks for a way to return the purse.
• These troubling thoughts raise the question: Is there nothing to be said for doing the honest thing?
• Is there nothing that shows honesty, in these circumstances, to be the better course of action?
• In asking whether to return the cash or keep it, we are essentially asking if you have a stronger reason to return the cash than to keep it.
• A huge wad of cash, such as four thousand dollars, is more than just pocket money. It can buy many useful and valuable things or help pay off debt.
• Clearly, there is a strong reason to keep the money.
• At the same time, keeping the money is dishonest, which may provide a strong and overriding reason to return it.
• However, we cannot simply assume that honesty is the better course of action in these circumstances.
• Asking if honesty is the better course of action entails questioning whether an action’s honesty provides a strong or any good reason to do it.
• Assuming honesty is better without argument is to beg the question, taking as given something that needs proof.
• Thus, our question is about what you have good reason to do when dishonest action is safe from detection and appears more profitable than honest action.
• Could it be that doing the honest thing in such circumstances is to act without good reason?
• Could it be that only ignorant and weak-minded people act honestly in such situations?
• This suggestion may seem strange, but without showing good reason to be honest even when dishonesty is undetectable and profitable, this conclusion is unavoidable.
• The question about what to do leads us to wonder whether you have stronger reason to be honest or dishonest and then whether you have any good reason to be honest.
• Both questions are troubling, but the second is especially so.
• We commonly think that having an excellent character is worth preserving even at significant costs, with honesty as one of its essentials.
• The first question might lead us to reconsider the value we place on an excellent character, while the second questions whether honesty is essential to it.
• Thinking one could have an excellent character without honesty is unsettling.
• It threatens the confidence in the moral rule that calls for honesty even when dishonesty is undetectable.
• It also puts into doubt basic feelings and attitudes toward others and ourselves, affecting our relationships with friends, neighbors, colleagues, and society.
• It undermines the admiration and esteem we feel for those of unquestionable honesty and the pride we take in our own honesty and trustworthiness.
• When people are honest in their dealings with us, we praise and think well of them for not taking advantage.
• Similarly, when our own honesty is tested and we meet the test, we feel proud for not yielding to temptations.
• We see honesty as an admirable trait in others and a source of pride in ourselves.
• The trouble with our question becomes evident: how could doing something without good reason be a sign of an admirable trait or justifiably pride-inducing?
• Such action would seem to indicate ignorance or a weak mind, with nothing admirable about ignorance or slavish conformity to others’ opinions.
• Thus, the feelings and attitudes honesty inspires must be misguided if honesty is only valued where dishonesty is punishable.
• It would be odd if our high regard for honest friends and colleagues and our self-regard were unwarranted, based on the mistaken belief that honesty is essential to excellent character.
• Could it be that those who warrant our admiration are not those of impeccable honesty but those who are honest only when it is advantageous or necessary to avoid unpleasant consequences of being caught acting dishonestly?

Socrates and Thrasymachus

• Reflecting on a common test of a person’s honesty leads us to a seminal problem in moral philosophy, central to Plato’s Republic.
• Plato (427–347 BC) introduces this problem through an exchange between Socrates (469–399 BC) and the sophist Thrasymachus.
• The initial exchange concerns the nature of justice, focusing on Thrasymachus’ thesis that justice is what the powerful require others to do for their benefit.
• Under Socrates’ cross-examination, Thrasymachus contradicts himself and shifts the conversation to whether the best life is one of justice and honesty or the opposite.
• Thrasymachus argues that those who act with complete injustice and avoid punishment live better lives than those who are just and honest.
• He claims that just and honest people always come out worse in their interactions with unjust people.
• Just people take only their fair share, while unjust people take as much as they can get away with.
• Just people fulfill their responsibilities even when it costs them, whereas unjust people evade their responsibilities when it benefits them.
• Thrasymachus maintains that acting justly is for another’s good, while the unjust person acts for their own benefit.
• Unjust people gain riches and seize opportunities that just people forgo, leading to a better life.
• Thrasymachus idealizes the tyrant, who uses supreme power to become prosperous at others’ expense.
• Historical examples include kings and emperors who set themselves up as deities and exploit their subjects.
• A modern example is the military dictator who rules by terror and fraud, loots wealth, and lives opulently while stashing spoils in offshore accounts.
• Thrasymachus sees the successful tyrant as the happiest of men, unlike small-time criminals who are scorned.
• The tyrant is hailed as masterful and lordly, receiving much deference and respect, which Thrasymachus sees as proof of great happiness.
• He concludes that the completely unjust man who dominates and deceives others is admirably strong, wise, and free.
• In contrast, the completely just individual is seen as a good-hearted simpleton.
• Thrasymachus fails to defend his views on the advantages of living an unjust life, much like his initial thesis about the nature of justice.
• Plato depicts Thrasymachus as arrogant and belligerent, possibly to ensure he is not mistaken for a skillful thinker, a role reserved for Socrates.
• Socrates renews his cross-examination, and Thrasymachus crumbles and withdraws.
• Thrasymachus’ defeat leads to a restatement of his claims by more amiable participants: Glaucon and Adeimantus.
• Glaucon and Adeimantus subtly change the focus, emphasizing the seeming absence of benefits intrinsic to practicing justice.
• They argue that whatever good one can gain from living a just life can also be gained by fooling people into believing one is just.
• Glaucon introduces the idea of a magical ring that gives the wearer the power to become invisible at will.
• A person with such a ring could enrich himself by theft and advance ambitions by murder while remaining above suspicion.
• This person could enjoy both the advantages of being esteemed as just and the fruits of real crime.
• This sneak, like Thrasymachus’ tyrant, can practice injustice with impunity and seems to live a better life than the truly just individual.
• Additionally, by appearing just, he reaps the benefits of being so, putting the value of justice into doubt.
• If one can gain all the benefits of justice by appearing to be just without actually being just, it shows that justice has no intrinsic merit.
• Plato uses the fable of Gyges’ ring to turn Thrasymachus’ challenge into a central problem of ethics.
• The main problem becomes understanding justice as admirable in itself, as something worth practicing even when one could profit from injustice without fear of being found out.

The subject of ethics

• The main problems of ethics arise from reflecting on situations in life that involve matters of morality.
• Ethics is the philosophical study of morality, focusing on what are good and bad ends to pursue in life and what it is right and wrong to do in the conduct of life.
• Ethics is a practical discipline, aiming to determine how one ought to live and what actions one ought to do.
• It differs from studies in anthropology, sociology, and empirical psychology, which are positive sciences focused on describing, analyzing, and explaining human pursuits and social norms.
• These positive sciences do not seek to establish conclusions about what a person ought to do but rather establish what people do and the common causes and conditions of their actions.
• The difference between ethics and social sciences is similar to the difference between medicine and physiology, or agriculture and botany.
• Medicine and agriculture are practical disciplines focused on achieving or producing certain goods (health and crops), yielding prescriptions of what one ought to do.
• Physiology and botany are positive sciences that describe and explain processes of animal and plant life but do not yield prescriptions for improving those processes.
• Ethics is defined as the philosophical study of morality, the chief meaning of the word.
• In general conversation, “ethics” is often used as a synonym for morality or to refer to the moral code or system of a particular tradition, group, or individual (e.g., Christian ethics, professional ethics).
• In philosophy, “ethics” can also refer to a particular system or theory that is the product of philosophical study (e.g., Hume’s ethics, Kant’s ethics, utilitarian ethics).
• In this context, “ethics” will be used solely with its chief meaning: the philosophical study of morality.
• To understand this meaning, it is important to define what is meant by “morality.”
• Morality can mean different things; to avoid confusion, it is necessary to pin down its meaning when defining ethics as the philosophical study of morality.
• Fixing the meaning of morality by defining it as the subject of ethics would be circular and unhelpful.
• Instead, the contrast between ethics and studies in anthropology and sociology highlights two distinct notions of morality.
• One notion is morality as an existing institution of a particular society, commonly called the society’s conventional morality.
• The other notion is morality as a universal ideal grounded in reason, which defines the subject of ethics.
• There are two notions of morality: conventional morality and morality as a universal ideal grounded in reason.
• A conventional morality consists of the norms of a particular society that are generally accepted and followed by its members.
• These norms reflect the shared beliefs about right and wrong, good and evil, and define the corresponding customs and practices prevailing in the society.
• Sometimes, these beliefs rest on superstitions and prejudices, and the customs and practices they define may promote cruelty and inflict indignity.
• A person may come to recognize these facts about some norms of their society’s conventional morality and conclude that they ought to reject them.
• Implicit in this conclusion is the realization that one has to look beyond the conventional morality of one’s society to determine what ends to pursue in life and what is right to do in the conduct of life.
• Therefore, a conventional morality cannot be the subject of ethics.
• An example: in the past, the conventional morality in many parts of the United States condemned interracial romance and marriage. In some small pockets, norms forbidding such relationships are still accepted and enforced.
• Someone raised in a community with such norms might question their authority upon realizing they are based on ignorance and prejudice and involve gratuitous injuries.
• This newfound clarity might result from forming a friendship with someone of another race, much like Huckleberry Finn’s epiphany about the untrustworthiness of his conscience resulted from his friendship with the runaway slave Jim.
• Huck suffered a bad conscience about helping Jim escape but then ignored it upon discovering he couldn’t turn Jim in and would feel equally low if he did.
• Our approval of Huck’s decision to disregard the reproaches of his conscience, and a similar decision to go against norms prohibiting interracial romance and marriage, shows we recognize the difference between what a society generally sanctions as right and wrong and what one ought to do and ought not to do.
• Ethics, concerned with what one ought to do, does not take conventional morality as its subject.
• The possibility of a sound decision to go against the norms of a society’s conventional morality implies standards of right or wise action distinct from those norms.
• A sound decision requires a basis, and this basis cannot consist of norms whose authority comes from being generally accepted and enforced in one’s society.
• A decision like Huck Finn’s represents a conclusion that general acceptance and enforcement are not sufficient reasons to follow a norm.
• The basis for a sound decision must consist of standards whose authority is independent of custom.
• These standards may coincide with the norms of a conventional morality but derive their authority from a different source, making them distinct moral standards.
• The source of these standards must be rational and reflective thinking about one’s circumstances, implying that their authority comes from reason.
• This second notion of morality comprises standards of right and wise conduct whose authority in practical thought is determined by reason, representing a universal ideal.
• Unlike conventional morality, which is an existing institution of a particular society, this ideal is found through reasoning and argument from elementary facts about human existence.
• Morality, in this ideal sense, is the subject of ethics, which involves finding these standards, expounding them systematically, and establishing their rational grounds.
• Subsequent references to morality should be taken as references to this set of standards, not to some conventional morality.
• Understanding ethics in this way highlights why the problem at the heart of Plato’s Republic is central to the study.
• It would be disconcerting if the authority of basic standards of justice and honesty in our practical thinking derived only from custom and was not backed by reason.
• This possibility is implied by reflections on finding a lost purse with cash and by Glaucon’s restatement of Thrasymachus’s position.
• Both represent arguments that basic standards of justice and honesty are only standards of conventional morality.
• The challenge for ethical theory is to find rational grounds for the authority of basic standards of justice and honesty in practical thought.
• Justifying these standards on rational grounds would show that one has good reason to do the honest thing for its own sake.
• This justification would address doubts raised by scenarios where one could profit from dishonesty without fear of being found out, affirming the reasonableness of doing the honest thing.

An alternative conception of morality

• Nothing is ever quite this pat in philosophy.
• Many people think of morality as a list of universal “Do’s” and “Don’ts” corresponding to universal truths about what is right and wrong.
• The basic standards of justice and honesty appear on this list in the form of injunctions like “Tell the truth!”, “Keep your promises!”, “Don’t cheat!”, and “Don’t steal!”.
• Those who think of morality in this way see corresponding truths as propositions in which truth-telling and promise-keeping are right actions, and cheating and stealing are wrong actions.
• On this conception of morality, the connection between ideas of right and wrong and matters of justice and honesty guarantees the truth of these propositions.
• Justice and honesty involve what we owe others and what we are obligated to do for them, eliminating any question about whether it is right to do what justice and honesty require.
• If you borrow a thousand dollars, you owe a thousand dollars and are obligated to repay the loan. Reneging would be dishonest and a violation of the duty assumed by accepting the loan.
• Violating a duty is wrong unless necessary to avoid violating a more important or stringent duty.
• Because reneging would be a violation of the duty assumed by accepting the loan, you ought not to renege, unless necessary to avoid violating a more important or stringent duty.
• If this conception of morality defined the subject of ethics, the problem at the heart of Plato’s Republic would need re-evaluation.
• This call for re-evaluation is important among philosophers for whom this conception defines ethics.
• They maintain that the problem is based on a mistake: confusing whether basic standards of justice and honesty are authoritative with whether they are ultimate guides to achieving one’s ends or satisfying one’s interests.
• A standard of conduct can have authority in practical thinking even if it doesn’t guide one toward achieving ends or satisfying interests.
• It is enough that the standard defines a duty. Recognizing a duty, such as repaying a loan, means understanding that you are obligated to repay, regardless of personal desires or benefits.
• Understanding that the duty binds you is recognizing the authority of the standard defining it.
• Confusion arises when considering circumstances where one might be tempted to renege and asking, “Should I repay this loan?”
• This question can be misconstrued as challenging the authority of the standard requiring repayment.
• The question can only challenge the authority if it expresses uncertainty about whether one has a duty to repay the loan, but one cannot be uncertain about this duty.
• It cannot represent such a challenge if it is merely a question about personal benefit from defaulting.
• Even if defaulting is more in one’s interest, the duty to repay remains, and the standard remains an authoritative rule for measuring rightness and wrongness of conduct.
• Philosophers who criticize the Republic’s core problem view morality as a system of standards whose authority in practical thought is independent of the desires and interests of those it regulates.
• The key element in this conception of morality is that the standards define duties.
• To have a duty to do something means being bound to do it regardless of one’s attitudes or the effect on one’s interests.
• A familiar example is the duty to keep a promise to visit a cantankerous relative, even when it is both unpleasant and disadvantageous.
• Recognizing this duty, one thinks it wrong to cancel the visit and believes they ought to keep the promise despite lacking desire and knowing it would be a nuisance and a loss of valuable time.
• The thought that one ought to keep the promise expresses the sense of being bound by it.
• That satisfying one’s desires and serving one’s interests would be better by canceling the visit gives no reason to abandon this thought.
• If one still wonders whether to keep the promise, they must have a different sense of “ought” in mind.
• Philosophers who favor this conception of morality distinguish between two uses of “ought”: one captures the sense of being duty-bound, and the other captures the sense of being well-advised in view of what best serves one’s ends and interests.
• This distinction reflects and reinforces the theme that morality’s authority is not answerable to the desires and interests of those it regulates.
• The distinction solidifies the criticism of the Republic’s core problem, which rests on a mistake about the import of asking whether one ought to be just or do the honest thing.
• Such questions can be construed as challenging the authority of basic standards of justice and honesty, but only because of confusion over the sense in which “ought” is used.
• For these questions to challenge that authority, “ought” must be used in the sense of being duty-bound.
• This is not the sense in which Glaucon or anyone else would use “ought” to ask such questions.
• The sense in which “ought” is used in these questions is the sense of being well-advised in view of one’s ends and interests.
• This sense arises from reflection on the advantages of acting unjustly or dishonestly.
• When “ought” is used in this sense, these questions do not challenge the authority of basic standards of justice and honesty.
• Regardless of how advantageous acting unjustly or dishonestly might be, one may still be duty-bound to act justly and honestly.
• The criticism charges misdirection, arguing that Plato put ethics on the wrong track by seeking to justify the authority of basic standards of justice and honesty based on what best serves one’s ends and interests.

Two types of ethical theory

• The opposition between Plato and the philosophers who criticize him, referred to as Plato’s critics, reflects a major division among ethical theories.
• This division, like the opposition between Plato and his critics, reflects a disagreement over the proper conception of morality.
• Theories siding with Plato support the conception that his critics regard as the source of his error.
• On this conception, morality comprises standards of right and wrong conduct that have authority in practical thought due to the ends or interests served by the conduct these standards guide.
• These theories are teleological.
• Opposing theories support the conception on which Plato’s critics base their criticism.
• On this conception, morality comprises standards of right and wrong that have authority in practical thought independently of the ends or interests of those whose conduct they guide.
• These theories are deontological.
• Teleology and deontology are technical terms in ethics, with their etymology explaining their meaning.
• “Telos” is Greek for end or purpose, while “deon” is Greek for duty.
• On a teleological conception of ethics, the study of what is right and wrong follows and depends on the study of what are good and bad ends to pursue or what one’s real interests are.
• In contrast, on a deontological conception, the study of right and wrong is partly, if not wholly, independent of the study of good and bad ends or real interests.
• Determining what is right and wrong does not always require knowing what are good and bad ends to pursue or what one’s real interests are.
• To understand this difference more clearly, consider how each conceives of ethics as a practical discipline.
• A practical discipline aims to prescribe actions relevant to its area of study, with chief conclusions being prescriptions of what one ought to do in various circumstances within that area.
• In some practical disciplines, “ought” has the second of the two senses distinguished earlier, meaning one would be well-advised to do something in view of certain ends or interests.
• These disciplines are teleological, with medicine being a prime example.
• Medicine’s chief conclusions are prescriptions about actions one ought to take to prevent illness and improve health, specifying actions well-advised to protect and promote health.
• Health is the ultimate end within medicine, making its study about right and wrong ways to pursue this end.
• Health can be characterized as a good, with medicine being the study of how to achieve this good.
• By analogy, on a teleological conception of ethics, a certain end is taken to be ultimate, such as pleasure, happiness, or the welfare of humankind.
• This ultimate end is the highest good for human beings, known as the summum bonum.
• The object of ethical study is to determine how to achieve this highest good.
  • The study of what is right and wrong in the conduct of life follows and depends on the study of what this good consists of, or what are good and bad ends to pursue in life.
• On a deontological conception of ethics, its chief conclusions involve prescriptions where “ought” is used in the sense of duty-bound rather than well-advised in view of certain ends or interests.
• This significantly alters how ethics is understood as a practical discipline, diverging from fields like medicine, historically seen as teleological, towards disciplines like jurisprudence.
• In Christian ethics tradition, jurisprudence serves as an analogy where moral standards are akin to community laws regulating conduct.
• Just as jurisprudence determines legal obligations without solely considering public or private goods, deontological ethics determines moral obligations independently of the goods realized by their observance.
• Moral standards derive authority from their source, similar to how community laws derive authority from legislators or legislative bodies, independently of the ends and interests of those they regulate.
• Plato’s critics argue that the core problem in the Republic stems from its teleological conception of ethics, which they believe a deontological conception avoids.
• According to them, if ethics prescribes actions as duty-bound rather than as advantageous in view of certain ends and interests, the truth of these prescriptions remains unchallenged by considerations of benefits gained from violating duties of justice or honesty.
• Plato’s critics view the Republic’s core problem as based on a mistaken teleological conception of ethics.
• However, they may not fully recognize that a deontological conception does not entirely avoid this problem.

The problem of deontology

• Plato’s critics argue that the problem of whether to take the cash from the lost purse hinges on understanding whether the question pertains to what duty requires or what would be advantageous in view of personal ends and interests.
• They assert that ethics concerns what duty requires, not what would be well-advised based on personal interests, suggesting that confusion over this distinction underlies the problem.
• According to Plato’s critics, if a deontological conception of ethics is correct, then having a duty not to take what doesn’t belong to you should inherently provide a good reason to refrain from taking it.
• However, this assertion faces challenges. It assumes that having a duty itself constitutes a sufficient reason to act, which is not universally accepted without further justification.
• Plato’s critics might argue that if one has a duty to perform an action, then one ought to perform it, and to say one ought to do something implies having a good reason to do it.
• This argument, however, begs the question by assuming the validity of the thesis that to say one ought to do something implies having a good reason, without proving that this holds true specifically in cases where duty-bound actions are concerned.
• Therefore, before using this thesis to defend their view, Plato’s critics must demonstrate that it applies specifically to actions where one is duty-bound, which necessitates separate consideration and justification.
• Plato’s critics respond by distinguishing between moral reasons and personal reasons, arguing that a deontological ethics provides moral reasons to act based on duty, not personal interests.
• They assert that having a duty to do something inherently provides a moral reason to do it, avoiding the charge of begging the question about whether duty itself constitutes a sufficient reason.
• This perspective shifts the focus away from seeking personal reasons to do the right thing and emphasizes recognizing moral reasons derived from the authority of moral standards.
• They liken moral standards to legal laws in a community, suggesting that just as legal laws provide legal reasons to comply, moral standards provide moral reasons to act as they dictate.
• However, this analogy raises questions about the nature of the community to which these moral standards apply and how membership in such a community is determined.
• Critics would need to clarify which community’s moral standards hold authority and how individuals become members subject to these standards.
• This approach aligns ethics with jurisprudence, where compliance with legal laws is obligatory due to their authority over community members.
• Yet, the critics’ view faces challenges in defining the community governed by these moral standards and establishing why individuals are morally obligated to comply with them.

The idea of a moral community

• Plato’s critics suggest that the appeal of deontological ethics stems from the belief in a global moral community where all human beings share common moral standards.
• This belief posits that morality’s authority applies universally, independent of personal reasons or interests.
• Critics argue for a universal morality grounded in the idea that all human beings belong to a global community by virtue of being human.
• They assert that this global community adheres to universal moral truths about right and wrong, which are intrinsic to human practices such as lending, promising, and forming relationships.
• Despite lacking empirical evidence of a tangible global moral community, critics justify their stance by appealing to these universal truths that underpin moral duties across societies.
• According to this view, the authority of moral standards precedes and validates moral reasons, suggesting a framework applicable to all human social interactions.
• Critics argue that these universal truths about morality, which align with basic standards of ethics, form the foundation for a cohesive moral framework across diverse human societies.
• Plato’s critics argue that the universal truths about right and wrong they affirm may not necessarily correspond to moral standards that constitute a framework for a global moral community.
• These universal truths are grounded in human practices that create duties across societies, but they may merely reflect social norms of conventional morality rather than overarching moral standards.
• For example, fidelity in marriage is universally valued, but its interpretation varies widely based on cultural norms such as monogamy or polygamy, patriarchal or egalitarian relations, and attitudes towards remarriage.
• Critics contend that what they perceive as moral standards might simply generalize these diverse norms, lacking authority beyond customary practices.
• The core problem in Plato’s Republic revolves around understanding the authority of basic standards of justice within morality.
• Critics argue that any valid conception of morality must firmly include these standards without ambiguity.
• Deontologists uphold the view that basic standards of justice are paradigmatic moral standards, central to their ethical framework.
• However, their attempts to insulate morality from questions about its rational foundation — through distinctions between types of “ought,” moral versus personal reasons, appeals to a global moral community, and universal truths — only delay addressing these fundamental issues.
• Ultimately, deontologists must demonstrate how the authority of moral standards is grounded in reason rather than mere custom to truly address the core problem of justifying moral authority.
• Failure to provide such justification risks reducing their ethical framework to abstract anthropology rather than a robust moral theory.

Ethical theories and moral ideals

• Ethical theories aim to explain how justice and honesty constitute excellences of character, which involves demonstrating why acts of justice and honesty are reasonable in themselves.
• Teleological theories connect acting justly with achieving a summum bonum, the ultimate end of right and wise action, which varies between different teleological theories.
• Deontological theories, on the other hand, explain the rightness of acting justly and honestly based on their conformity to standards that have authority in practical thought independent of personal ends.
• Deontological explanations must enlarge our understanding of these standards and their significance in human life to show the point of conforming to them.
• If a deontological theory fails to provide such an explanation, it risks leaving the justification of moral authority based on blind faith rather than reasoned backing, falling short of ethical theory’s central aim.
• Every ethical theory implicitly includes an ideal of human life, necessary for justifying moral standards by explaining their rational grounds in practical thought.
• A complete ethical theory not only formulates moral standards but also justifies them by explaining how conformity to these standards is meaningful conduct.
• This justification requires showing how such conduct contributes to realizing an ideal of human life, making actions aligned with moral standards meaningful.
• Ideals such as athletic prowess, artistic creativity, and commercial prosperity give meaning to various activities of life by providing models of success.
• Conformity to moral standards, termed as moral ideals, is distinct because it does not define success in activities but rather frames meaningful conduct.
• Ethical theories imply moral ideals in their answers to the Republic’s core problem, aiming to integrate these ideals to justify moral standards and explain their significance in human conduct.
• Many people in daily life rarely question the meaningfulness of conforming to moral standards, often seeing them as necessary for social harmony and personal benefits like a good reputation and goodwill.
• However, situations arise where acts of dishonesty or injustice would not disrupt social life or harm personal reputation, such as the example of finding a lost purse with cash.
• In such reflective moments, individuals realize that the justification for conforming to moral standards cannot solely rely on social harmony or personal advantage.
• Finding meaning in conforming to moral standards in these situations requires a deeper understanding of their role in one’s life, often leading to the affirmation of a moral ideal.
• An ethical theory that successfully justifies moral standards must affirm a moral ideal by laying out rational grounds for their authority in practical thought.
• This justification entails explaining why one should follow moral standards even when social peace or personal advantage is not at stake.
• Ethical theories articulate the thinking of reflective individuals facing such circumstances, each theory corresponding to different moral ideals guiding ethical thought.
• The upcoming chapters will explore various ethical theories, beginning with teleological theories, followed by deontological ones.
• Subsequently, attention will turn to a skeptical critique from the twentieth century and the alternative ethics it proposes.
• This exploration will lead to broader questions about practical reason and ethical knowledge, addressing their feasibility and understanding.
• The final chapter will delve into these issues in depth, concluding the examination of ethical theories and their implications.